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FOREWORD 
The structure of public finance in the Arab countries has 
certain peculiar characteristics that deeply affect the conduct 
of economic policy and prospects for developnent. 
Oil revenue is by far the most important source of 
government finance in many countries. Non-oil producing 
countries al so benefit from it in various forms: direct 
subsidies, transit tolls for passage through the Suez Canal or 
pipeline transportation, migrants' remittances. The latter do 
not accrue directly to the state treasury, but are indirectly 
taxed mainly through customs duties, as they cause an increase 
in the demand for imports. 
There is little doubt that the complex mechanism of oil rent 
circulation in the region has increased the financial means 
available to practically all Arab states, the only exceptions 
possibly being Morocco, Mauritania, Scmalia and Djibuti. At the 
same time, it has discouraged the developnent of a modern 
taxation system again with the possible exception of Morocco. 
As Oualalou and Jaidi clearly show in their chapter, ·the 
taxation systems have only marginally been modified since 
independence, and different systems found in each Arab country 
still mostly reflect different colonial experiences. Certain 
countries inherited an income taxation system pre-dating the oil 
era, in others there is no direct income tax worth speaking of, 
al though, as Gharaibeh points out for Jordan, attempts are being 
made to reducing dependence on subsidies, custom revenue and 
indirect taxes. 
The lack of'. a well developed income tax has momentous 
consequences for the conduct of economic policy. Inccme taxation 
is a fundamental tool to control liquidity and contrast 
inflation; it is also an effective and visible redistributive 
tool. When goverrments are deprived of this tool, income 
redistribution can be pursued only through the expenditure side, 
leading to uncontrollable deficit spending, of which the 
consumption subsidies that are common to all Arab countries are 
the clearest example. Thus calls for greater financial orthodoxy 
necessarily come to mean that real inccme distribution should be 
allowed to worsen. 
Luciani - ForEWord 
Under the present structure of state revenue, economic 
growth often leads to a worsening of the state deficit, as 
expenditure tends to increase more rapidly than revenue. GrCMth 
is also almost inevitably acccmpanied by incane palarisa tion, 
leading to social and political protest. The evolution in the 
pattern of state expenditure is discussed in the chapters by 
Mona E1 Baradei and Khaled E1 Manoubi, pointing to strong 
similar! ties and common dilenmas that Arab states face. 
Fiscal constraints are the immediate and prosaic cause of 
many an idealogical turnaround, as 'socialist' production units 
commonly fail to generate a surplus and become constant drains 
for public resources. This point is well documented in the 
chapter by Oualalou and Jaidi, and is further discussed in the 
case of agriculture in the chapter by Hamid Ait Amara. Faced 
with a grCMing deficit in their agricultural balance, Arab 
goverrments have ceased to viEW agriculture as a sector that 
should be squeezed to sustain the industrialisation effort. 
'Ihe limited yield of Arab taxation systems, coupled.with the 
decline in oil prices that has been evident for much of the 
1980s, and has nOii becane a full-scale rout, is one of the 
causes of increasing indebtedness of the Arab countries. Azzam 
Mahjoub clearly documents a negative trend, which could lead 
some Arab countries to face problems of a magnitude comparable 
to that of the Latin American debtors. 
In viEW of the importance of migrants• remittances, a 
chapter (written by Ibrahim Saadeddin Abdallah) was specifically 
devoted to their influence on economic policies of the countries 
of origin and on the possibility of taxing this important source 
of income. 
Finally, two chapters by Hazem E1 Beblawi and Mahmoud Abdel 
Fadil are devoted to an analysis of rentier economies at the 
micro and macro level respectively. The dominant role played by 
the oil rent has in fact multiple consequences alongside the 
underdeveloJJllent of taxation systems, that affect the very 
possibility of redressing the situation, and reducing the 
reliance of the state on sources of revenue fran outside the 
national economy. 
It is hoped that this collection of essays will serve the 
purpose of underlying the importance of developing modern 
taxation systems, and in particular direct income taxation, and 
reduce dependence on an unstable oil rent. 
Research for the papers in this collection was made possible 
by a generous IDRC grant to the Istituto Affari Internazionali 
of Rome, which came to complement an existing interdisciplinary 
research program on the foundations and nature of Arab states. 
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Luciani - Foreword 
Al though the latter dealt with ideological, historical, social 
and political considerations as well, it was clear fr an the 
beginning that economic variables, and in particular public 
finance structures, are of paramount importance to an overall 
understanding of Arab states. The broader research program will 
lead to the publication of four collective volumes (The Arab 
State: 1. Foundations, edited by a.Salam~; 2. The Rentier State 
edited by H.Beblawi and a.Luciani; 3. Beyond Coercion, edited by 
A.Dawisha and I.W.Zartman; 4. Integration and Arab Politics, 
edited by R.Aliboni and A.Cudsi; Croan & Helm, 1987, London) in 
which some of the IDRC supported papers will also appear. 
Readers who have an interest in such interdisciplinary approach 
are referred to those. 
In order to allow for mutual criticism and discussion, the 
authors of these papers were invited to participate in three 
international gatherings, which took place respectively in Corfu 
in September 1984, Alexandria in April 1985, and again in Corfu 
in September 1985. '!be meetings in Corfu were organised in 
cooperation with the Panties School of Political Science. 
Andrew Watson encouraged this project and provided precious 
criticism and suggestions. I am grateful to him for all of them, 
but I am even more grateful to him for his friendship. The 
latter was very appreciated in countering the frustrations of 
organising collective research under sometimes difficult 
conditions. 
The shortcomings of this work are my responsibility. I only 
wish that, in accordance with IDRC' s main purpose, parti.cipa ti on 
into this et"fort will have been instrumental. in improving the 
understanding on the part of m:1 Arab friends of the problems of 
their beautiful countries. 
aiacano Luciani 




FISCAL RFSOURCES AND BUDGET FINANCING IN THE COUNTRIES OF THE 
MAGHREB (ALGERIA, MOROCCO, 'IUNISIA, LIBYA AND MAURITANIA) 
Fathallah Oualalou and Larbi Jaidi 
This chapter describes the evolution and current status of 
tax revenue in the context of budget financing in the five 
countries of the Ma.ghreb: Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Libya and 
Mauritania. In all five countries the fiscal organisation 
inherited from the colonial past is still visible. The 
complexity of fiscal systems in the Ma.ghreb is a function of 
diversification of the economy, which was in turn provoked by 
colonial penetration. Today, the structure of tax revenue, which 
is derived mostly from indirect taxes, is a reflection of the 
lack of domestic integration and of the extroverted orientation 
of Maghrebi economies. Since independence, no important 
transformation has occurred. Quite to the contrary, the advent 
of a rentier econorey based on oil exports, in particular in 
Libya and Algeria, has contributed to the reduction of the role 
of tax revenue in the financing of the budget. 
The failure of policies aimed at mobilising the economic 
surplus is shown by the quantitative and qualitative limits of 
domestic tax revenue, and obliges all Maghrebi countries, with 
the exception of Libya, to look for international ere di t. Debt 
accumulated by Morocco, Ma.uri tania, and to a lesser extent 
Tunisia, provoked a gradual worsening of international and 
domestic financial equilibria, and led the states to follow 
restrictive policies on consumption and public investment, 
following the classical recipe of the IMF. In Algeria as well as 
in Libya, oil revenue still allows a situation of relative 
financial ease, al though it has fallen very considerably since 
1982. 
Notwithstanding attempts at fiscal reform presently underway 
in Morocco, it is correct to conclude that in all five countries 
it is the oil rent and/or foreign credits that determine the way 
in which the budget is financed, and the state has no incentive 
to reform and reinforce its fiscal instruments. 
It is impossible to study fiscal resources in the Ma.ghreb 
countries without considering other financial sources of 
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support, mostly from abroad. In this context, we shall analyse 
the role of fiscal resources in the financing of the budget in 
Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Libya and Mauritania; a general 
comparative synthesis will be offered at the end of the chapter. 
ALGERIA 
Algeria derives important financial resources from. the sale of 
hydrocarbons to foreign countries and the Algerian state plays a 
central role in the economy. State intervention in the 
organisation of economic life necessitates an intensive 
mobilisation of financial resources. Hydrocarbons production is 
the main source of revenue, but differently from other Arab oil 
countries, Algeria has a complete and diversified fiscal system. 
'lhe latter generates a considerable share of the ordinary 
revenue of the state. Furthermore, its role in the regulation of 
economic activity and its social impact are far from negligible. 
In a dynamic perspective, the ratio of oil revenue relative 
to other sources fluctuated as a function of the level of 
economic activity and of adjustments that were made in the 
fiscal system. On the other hand, economic policy, while it is 
still centered around the role of the state, was modified 
because of changes in economic orientation as well as in the 
political superstructure. Th.e fiscal instrument was affected by 
these changes but not profoundly. 
First Period: from Reappropriation of Resources to the Build-up 
of the State, 1962-70 
From independence to the beginning of the seventies, economic 
life in Algeria was characterised by the effort to reappropriate 
national resources and to establish a state apparatus. Th.e 
fiscal system inherited from the colonial period was not 
modified with respect to its composition or contribution to 
budget revenue. 
This phase was however not uniform. Two sub-periods may be 
distinguished, one characterised by uncertainty and a deficit in 
public finance, the other by the elimination of the 
disequilibrium and a clear orientation towards the economic 
policies that were to characterise the develoIJUent strategy of 
Algeria in the seventies. 
a) Sub-period 1962-65. Immediately after independence, 
Algeria had a predominantly agricultural economy, with a 
fragmented and extroverted industrial sector. Incane generation 
was concentrated in the large land holdings devoted to export 
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agriculture. Colonial capital paid little a tte n ti on to 
industry, but oil concessions that had been granted in the early 
50s represented a gr<:Ming share of danestic production. 
The restructuring of the Algerian economy in order to break 
dependence on France was based on nationalisation of former 
colonial capi taJ., an attempt at financial sovereignty and the 
search for an autonanous develoJ;JDent strategy ( Jacquemot 1977: 
65-70). 
The goals of reconstruction and develoJ;JDent postulated the 
mobilisation and centralisation of financial resources. However, 
on one side, the 'surplus' that the agricultural sector 
generated was too small and fragile to satisfy the financial 
needs of the economy; on the other hand, the mismanagement of 
recently nationalised public enterprises ruled out a transfer of 
resources to benefit the state budget. Finally, the revenue 
yielded by the fiscal system was limited because of the poor 
economic environment and in particular the economic and social 
displacement caused by the departure of the French. The fiscal 
system was not adapted to develoJ;JDent conditions and its 
effectiveness was limited by the collapse of the tax· base. It 
was foreign public aid which permitted to pay for investment 
and part of current expenditure. 
The fiscal legislation was only marginally modified (Kandi! 
1970: 120-35). Because direct taxes could not be levied on a 
sufficiently wide base, indirect taxes remained more important 
(table 1). 
Table 1: Structure of the fiscal system (percentages) 1961-66 
Year 61 
Direct taxes 29 




















Source: Minist~re des finances, quoted by Kandi!, 1970, p. 120 
The fiscal system was at work in the midst of 
disorganisation and economic depression. Revenue considerably 
decreased after independence and did not begin recovering until 
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1966. Because revenue was derived mostly from activities with an 
important foreign participation, it was severely curtailed by 
the liquidation and departure of the French. 'lhe revenue 
decrease was amortised through a reinforcement of fiscal 
pressure. The self-managed and the public sectors were mostly in 
the red and many enterprises did not contribute to the state 
budget. 
State budgets for 1963-65 were characterised by the weakness 
of budget revenue when compared to its l eve! before 
independence; by the increasing weight of current expenditure 
over the total, due to the growth in the administrative 
apparatus; by the limited size of investment expenditure 
compared to the total. Foreign public aid played a key role in 
the financing of the .deficit, covering all investment and part 
of current expenditure. 
b) The 1966-70 sub-period. In the years 1966-73 the Algerian 
economy changed course. The phase of experimentation and 
learning by doing was abandoned and a new political context 
precipitated crucial decisions for the Algerian productive 
system. The state apparatus was reinforced and the national 
economy restructured. 
The new orientation was manifested by the creation of a 
system of planning and the implementation of structural reforms. 
With respect to public finance, the reorganisation effort 
allowed to gradually reequilibrate the state budget. '!he budget 
laws in the latter years of this period introduced few changes, 
but the yield of existing taxes increased. Revenue passed from 4 
to 6 .4 billion Algerian dinars. Half of this increase was due to 
taxes on incane and expenditure. Oil revenue increased in 
connection with increased production and came to be almost one 
quarter of the total. The contribution of the socialist sector 
had a tenfold increase following the introduction of compulsory 
contribuions to the Treasury on the part of State enterpris~s. 
Foreign aid played a more limited role. 
'lhe budget closed with a surplus at the end of the period. 
This was made possible by an increase in revenue and strict 
control over current expenditure, thus allowing to increase 
investment and pub! ic saving. 
Second Phase: Oil Revenue and the Algerian Develoanent Strategy 
During this period (1971-77) an industrialisation strategy was 
implemented aiming at breaking away fran dependence bonds. The 
essential canponents of the strategy were the enlargement of the 
state sector, industrialisation, agrarian reform and 
reinforcement of the planning system. State intervention in the 
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economy was largely financed by oil revenue. The latter grew 
very fast because of increases in both price and goverrment 
take; it came to play a dominant role over the total revenue of 
the state passing from 23. 0 per cent in 1 971 to 37 .2 per cent in 
1974. At the same time, the heavy commitments of the state, and 
in particular the Treasury loans and anticipations to finance 
public investment, also greatly increased. Foreign credit was 
tapped to meet part of these needs, but Algerian debt service 
remained modest. 
Industrialisation was expected to integrate the economy and 
reduce dependence from abroad. Capita! intensive industries were 
preferred, because of their ability to transform the economy. 
The allocation of investment funds to individual industrial 
sectors confirmed the bias in favour of the investment goods 
producing sector, and of the oil and gas sector. The strategy 
was based on the intensification of the valorisa ti on of 
hydrocarbons; iron and steel and mechanical engineering were to 
be the key sectors of the industrial isa ti on effort. This 
strategy had a veI"f high cost for the state. 
The industrial isa ti on effort could not be pursued in the 
long run if the agricultural sector was not reformed as well. 
Algerian agricultural policy after independence was 
characterised by 'weakness and inefficiency of structures' 
(Destanne de Bernis 1971: 30). Production and exports were 
declining, and agriculture did not generate the surplus needed 
to finance its own investments and modernisation. Agrarian 
reform was expected to solve this problem as well as to 
redistribute land. Its implementation led to modest production 
increases and did not all ow for a transfer of financial 
resources to the rest of the economy. 
Direct public control over production activity and the 
inflow of oil revenue allowed the funding of the projects 
included in the two four-year plans in this period ( 1970-73 and 
1974-77). The first plan had put the t;otal of public investment 
at 27.7 billion Algerian dinars, as against 9.4 billion in the 
67-69 plan. The second plan envisaged total public investment of 
110 billion Algerian dinars, more than three times the figure in 
the previous plan. The increase in the total level of investment 
is attributable to the increase in oil revenue following the oil 
price increase of 1973. The largest share of investment under 
the two plans went to industI"f and energy (54 per cent in 70-73, 
and 43 .6 per cent in 74-77). 
The rapid growth of pub! ic 
through an increase in the 
registered yearly growth rates 
investment was financed primarily 
State investment budget, that 
of 14.9 per cent in 1971 and 32.4 
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per cent in 1973. Out of a total of approximately 41.2 billion 
Algerian dinars of public investment spent during the 71-7 4 
period, almost a third (12.9 billion) was accounted for by State 
capital expenditure (IMF 1977: 13). The rest was financed by 
public enterprises, mostly in the industrial sector. The primary 
source of funds for public investment was oil revenue. 
Mobilisation of financial resouces fran danestic sources 
remained minimal, and the largest part came fran abroad. 
Danestic savings contributed only 25 per cent of funds utilised 
under the 70-73 plan, while oil revenue accounted for 31 per 
cent, revenue of migrants for 16 per cent and foreign aid for 28 
per cent (Jacquemot 1977: 155). Thus the State involvement in 
the economy is closely linked to oil revenue, as table 2 shows. 
A radical change in the structure of revenue took place in 
197 4175. Taxes on the oil sector became the most important item 
( 59 .1%), because of the increase in posted oil prices and in the 
incane tax rates applied to oil companies. This structural 
change was maintained in the period 75-77, as the data in table 
3 show. Total revenue in 1 975-77 greN by nearly a third and the 
two main components, oil revenue and ordinary tax revenue, grew 
at the same pace (36 and 34 per cent respectively). 
Table 2: Summary of the Ordinary Revenue of the State 1971-7 4 
1971 % 1972 1973 1974 % 
TAX RE.VENUE 4,264 61'1 5,050 5 ,701 z,916 1i!.l 
Taxes on incane and 
profits 1 '1 98 (28.1) 1 ,400 1 ,653 2' 117 (26.5) 
Taxes on· international 
trade 565 (13.3) 641 759 1 ,286 (16.2) 
Taxes on production 2 ,5 01 (58.6) 3 ,009 3,289 4 '573 ( 57. 3) 
OIL TAX RE.VENUE 1 ,648 23.6 3' 188 4' 116 13402 57.2 
NON-TAX RE.VENUE 1 ,071 15 .3 967 1,495 3 ,039 _§_J_ 
Contribution of state 
enterprises 683 609 742 1 ,524 
Of which: SONATRACH (300) ( 1 ,000) 
Other non-tax revenue 388 358 453 515 
TOT.AL RE.VENUE 6 ,983 100 10,205 11 ,312 24,417 100 
Source: Data submitted fran the Algerian goverment, IMF, 1977, p. 71 
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Table 3: Algeria, Surve'j of Ordinary State Revenue Forecasts 
1975-77 (millions of AD) 
1975 1976 1977 
ORDINARY TAX REVENUE 7,265 --11 8,280 10,260 ~6,7 
Direct taxes 1 , Boo 2'150 ( 21) 
Customs duties 1'020 1 ,800 ( 17.5) 
Indirect taxes 5 ,300 6,150 (61 .5) 
Registration and stamp 160 160 
OJI.. TAX REVENUE 13 ,ooo 59 .1 15 ,ooo 16,500 59 .1 
NON TAX REVENUE 1 ,730 7.9 910 1 '1 50 4.2 
TOTAL REVENUE 21 ,995 100 24' 1 90 27,910 100 
Source: Data derived from various reports on the Algerian 
economy. Discrepancies with respect to Table 2 should be 
attributed to the classification standards adopted by the IMF, 
which differ fran those currently used at the national level. 
Leaving aside the increase in oil revenue, the ordinary 
fiscal system evolved only very slowly. The relative share of 
the main category of taxes was but marginally changed, with 
indirect taxes gaining importance. The financial ease brought by 
the increase in oil revenue allowed the state to put aside the 
need to undertake a radical reform of the fiscal system, and 
make it more adapted to the reality of the economy. Sane 
modifications were nevertheless introduced, in view of improving 
social justice and redefining relations between enterprises and 
the state. The first goal was pursued mainly through a tax 
exemption for in cane below 500 Algerian dinars and abolition of 
custom duties on certain essential imports, while at the same 
time rates were increased on the revenue of corporations and on 
capita! gains connected to the sale of real estate, as well as 
indirect taxes on non-essential products. The second goal was 
manifested by reductions in fiscal pressure on private 
enterprises and the self-managed sector. But the most important 
changes affected relations between the state and public 
enterprises, in view of stimulating better management. 
A reform was introduced that embodied a new fiscal 
philosophy with respect to the role of public enterprises in the 
national economy, based on four main principles (Boussoumah 
1982: 645): a) the socialist enterprises that manage the danain 
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of the state are not ordinary taxpayers; b) the state, being the 
sole owner, has the right and obligation to define the tasks 
that public enterprises must fulfill in the develoi:ment process; 
c) a unified contribution is introduced as the form of taxation 
on socialist enterprises; d) this contribution is divided 
between the state and the local community. Thus the state became 
more demanding both in terms of economic efficiency and in terms 
of fiscal revenue. 
Table 4: Algeria, General Budget of the State (millions of AD) 
REVENUE AND EXPEND. 71 72 73 74 75 76 
Total revenue 6.982.6 9.205.2 11.011.7 23 ,400 .4 25.053 25,660 
Of Which: 
Oil revenue 1 ,648 3, 188 4, 11 5 13,462 14,237 18.019 
Ordinary expenditure -4541 .5 -4920.7 -6, 193 .6 -8,336.3 -13 ,659 -14,410 
Balance on ordinary 
budget 2.441.1 4,284.5 4.818.1 1 5, 06 4. 1 11 ,3 94 11 .250 
Investment expend. -2254.2 -2808. 7 -3.719.3 -4, 158 .5 -5 ,480 -7, 870 
Balance on total 







Source: for 71-74: IMF, 1977, for 75-77, Annuaire de l'Afrigue du Nord, various issues 
'Ihe situation of the Algerian budget considerably improved 
over this period (table 4), as the surplus went frcm 187 billion 
Algerian dinars in 1971 to 8,007 billion in 1977. This 
improvement was mostly due to the increase in oil revenue, while 
current expenditure increased but slowly until 1973, but at a 
very accelerated rate in the following years. The growing 
surplus in the budget is however not indicative of the situation 
of the Treasury, as a large part of it was absorbed by loans and 
advances extended by the Treasury itself. In principle, loans 
from the Treasury should be used to finance industrial 
investment or redress the financial situation of public 
enterprises. Overall, however, the increase in Treasury credit 
led to a decrease of outstanding debt to the banking sector, a 
decrease in financement frcm the domestic non-banking financial 
sector, and limited amortisation of foreign indebtedness. 
On the latter aspect, the number and total value of loans 
arranged on the international financial market rapidly increased 
after the beginning of the first four-year plan, and even more 
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so during the years 1976 and 77. Since independence, Algeria has 
always had an important foreign debt both when her trade balance 
was in deficit and when it was in surplus. Foreign dredi t was 
extended in the years 1 962-66 mostly under form of bilateral 
loans granted fran France, and then also by other countries 
(USA, URSS, Arab countries). Sellers credit had become the 
preferred form of aid at the end of the 60s. But since the 
inception of the strategy based on large industrial projects, 
funds were increasingly provided by loans underwritten by 
international banking consortia and by the Euranarkets. Total 
outstanding debt became quite important in 1 977 ( 14. 9 billion US 
dollars) but debt service remained moderate during this period 
(absorbing 15.3 per cent of exports in 1977). 
Third period: change in develognent policy and continuity in 
fiscal pol icy 
During the period (1978-84) the development policy was 
redefined: the industrialisation effort was slowed down, the 
public sector was restructured, the role of private initiative 
was redefined, and planning showed a greater degree of 
pragmatism. While these changes were introduced, the revenue of 
the state continued to be generated mostly by the oil sector, 
following the second wave of oil price increases. The turnaround 
in the oil market in the 1980s had a considerable impact on the 
ability of the state to meet its financial needs. 
In the industrial sector, a critical assessment underlined 
the excessive develoµnent of the hydrocarbons sector and 
numerous structural deficiencies. On a total public invest.ment 
of almost 400 billion Algerian dinars that was expected to be 
realised between 1980 and 1984, almost half was allocated to the 
completion of projects undertaken under previous plans. The oil 
sector maintained a dominant position in the allocation of funds 
under the plan for 80-84 (40.8 per cent) but a considerable 
share was also allocated to intermediate goods (28.1 per cent). 
The reorganisation of the public sector became a 
precondition to improve economic efficiency. Having soon grown 
to huge dimensions, a majority of the public enterprises were 
faced with difficult financial and management problems, and 
became a drain on the financial resources of the state ( fran 
which they received subventions or loans) rather than a net 
contributor to them. The large pubiic enterprises were thus 
subdivided into smaller specialised units, with decentralised 
management, following the rule of profit. 
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At the same time, the rehabilitation of private enterprise 
was the most evident sign of the change in the conduct of 
economic policy. 'lhe state tried to define the role of the 
private sector both more precisely and more broadly. 
The change in economic orientation took place at a time when 
the oil market was characterised by slackness of demand, and at 
the end of 1981 the price of Algerian oil was 1 cwered 2 dollars 
per barrel. Oil revenue was correspondingly reduced, even more 
so as Algerian production is constantly decreasing (52 million 
tons in 79, 47 in 80, 44 in 81). At the same time the strategy 
of valorisation of natural gas resources, that were expected to 
produce a considerable revenue, suffered because of the 
difficulties that were encountered in the renegotiation of 
prices with European and American customers. 
'lhe negative evolution in the international envirorment had 
an impact on the revenue of the state. Oil revenue further 
increased to reach 68 per cent of total revenue in 1981, but 
subsequently declined to 57.7 per cent in 1984. Oil revenue 
increased 3.1 times between 1978 and 84 (table 5). 'lhe tax rate 
was increased to 85 per cent (fran 70 per cent) and uniformly 
applied to all hydrocarbon-related activities (production, 
transport, commercial isa ti on). 
Ordinary fiscal revenue grew fran a minimum of 32.1 per cent 
of the total in 1981 to 46. 3 per cent in 1984. While in absolute 
numbers the various components of ordinary taxation grew 
unevenly depending on the year and the tax, the overall rate of 
increase was high. The budget laws introduced n\Jllerous changes 
that had social, economic and technical objectives: taxation on 
consumption goods was reduced to preserve the real value of 
wages; modifications were introduced in the fiscal treatment of 
enterprises in the social sector, of handicraft enterprises as 
well as of agricultural and hydraulic activities; technical 
measures were adopted which aimed at simplifying fiscal 
procedures. None of these measures had a structural character: 
aside fran the 1977 reform of taxation on pub! ic enterprises, 
the Algerian taxation system suffered no major changes in the 
period. 
Direct taxation in the Algerian Fiscal System 
'lhe primary distinction is between the contribution of the oil 
sector and other ordinary fiscal revenue. 
Taxation on the oil sector is the most important source of 
budget revenue. Corporations operating in the sector pay a 
royalty which is a fixed percentage of the posted price, and an 
income tax at an established rate, imposed on the estimate of 
net incane based on posted prices after deduction of the royalty 
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Table 5: Algeria, Ordinary budget revenue forecasts and 
allocations 1978-84 in millions of Algerian dinars 
Year 
Ordinary taxation 
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36.9 50.8 68.4 73.1 98.6 105.7 
20.6 27.8 36.2 42.2 50.4 59.7 
16.3 23.0 32.2 30.9 48.2 46.0 
16.2 23.1 31.6 42.6 48.2 46.0 
0 . 1 -0 . 1 -0 • 6 -11 . 7 
Sources: Maghreb developpement, various issues. 
• Contributions: excises, profits of fiscal monopoly, taxes on 
specific services, taxes to use goods, etc.) 
and of estimated production costs (IMF 1977: 60) . Both the 
royalty and the incane tax rate have been repeatedly increased 
since 1973. In 1980 the income tax rate reached 85 per cent, 
while it was but 55 per cent in 1974. This rate, which initially 
applied to oil activities only, was later extended to pipe! ine 
transportation and to all liquid hydrocarbons (70 per cent 
previously). 
Income taxation in Algeria is still based on a schedular tax 
(specific incane tax vs. general) applying different rates to 
different sources of income. 
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Dire ct taxation is canpo sed of: 
a) a tax on industrial and commercial income: this is paid by 
both individuals and entities (including cooperatives and state 
enterprises} as a function of profits derived fran commercial, 
industrial, craft or banking activity. It is characterised by a 
multiplicity of regimes: thus private corporations pay a higher 
rate than public enterprises; self-managed enterprises benefit 
fran a reduced rate; new enterprises benefit f ran a temporary 
exemption. 
b) taxation on non-commercial income: this tax applies to income 
earned by individuals or entities in the exercise of a liberal 
profession. The State tried to improve evaluation of 
professional incane while at the same time offering special 
reductions and deductions. 
c) taxation on salaries and fixed earnings: it imposes a monthly 
withal.ding on salaries, fixed earnings, pensions and other 
emoluments, based on net revenue after deductions, and witheld 
at the source. 
d) a tax on higher salaries: this is a complementary yearly tax 
on the higher salaries. It is al so deducted at the source and 
benefits the central administration. 
e) a tax on financial assets: it affects the gross revenue of 
individuals and entities coming fran financial assets and 
deposits. The tax is geared to discourage the distribution of 
benefits and favours long-term savings. It has more of an 
economic than a financial purpose, as its revenue is negligible. 
Interest on Treasury bonds and other paper is al so taxed. 
f) a tax on property revenue: it is canposed of a tax on 
inheritance and a tax on donations. The former is calculated on 
the net inherited assets, the rates being a function of the 
total value of transferred assets and the degree of parentage; 
the latter is calculated on the net value of the dona ti on. 
g) a complementary tax on total revenue: it is added to the 
individual taxes, with the exception of the tax on salaries, and 
is progressive; it has but limited yield. 
h) registration rights: they apply to many legal acts as well as 
to certain contracts; the rates are fixed or progressive 
depending on the nature of the act. 
Indirect taxation, is al so characterised by the simultaneous 
presence of numerous taxes: 
a) taxes on goods and services: including a unified global tax 
on production, a unified global tax on seMi ces and duties on 
certain products. The unified global tax on production is levied 
once only on merchandise sold in the country or imported. It is 
not applied to agricultural products and to certain goods that 
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pay consumption taxes. Rates are diversified (reduced, normal 
and increased). This is the tax that has the highest yield among 
indirect taxes. The tax on services is also not applied to the 
agricultural sector. Its rates are considerably higher, and the 
revenue goes to local communities. 
b) excises: imposed on certain basic consumption goods (sugar, 
gasoline, wine, tobacco ••• ) are ccmposed of a specific duty 
which can be frequently changed and of a tax ad valorem. The 
most productive products are gasoline and tobacco, followed by 
sugar, coffee and tea. 
c) custom duties: these were initially low and were revised only 
in 1968, a fact that explains their limited contribution to the 
total yield of indirect taxes. A new tariff was introduced in 
1 'J73. A regular tariff is applied to merchandise coming frcm 
countries that grant to Algeria the MFN treatment. A special 
tariff may be applied if the merchandise is included in specific 
commercial agreements. Rates are differentiated between primary 
need products, secondary need products and luxury products. 
Investment goods and raw materials are exempted frcm duties. 
d) other taxes, such as the one on road transpor ta ti on and stamp 
rights on certain legal acts, make a very minor contribution to 
the total revenue derived from indirect taxation. 
TUNISIA 
The Evolution of Tunisian Fiscal Pol icy in the First and Second 
DeveloIJ11ent Decades 1960-70 
Following independence and until the end of the decade of the 
60s two subperiods may be distinguished in the evolution of 
Tunisian fiscal policy. A first transitional period was 
dominated by the problems of decolonisation and witnessed no 
change in the structure and conception of the fiscal system as 
an instrument of economic pal.icy. Financial aid fr cm France 
continued to dominate irwestment expenditure. In a second phase, 
going from 1962 to 69, Tunisia chose planned develoi;::ment, 
structural reforms and industrial isa ti on led by the state. This 
phase witnessed certain adjustments in the fiscal instrument, 
but no effective integration of taxation into the broader 
framework of develoi;::ment policy. The failure of the dirigiste 
experience signals the end of this decade, and opens the door to 
a more liberal orientation. 
During the early years of independence, the most urgent 
problem was to maintain financial equilibrium and establish a 
budget structure that would permit the transition of power to 
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take place. 'lhe massive exodus of foreigners and the with draw al 
of capital invested by financial intermediaries considerably 
weakened the financial possibilities of Tunisia. 
The fiscal system inherited fran the protectorate was 
maintained, no new taxes were created and rates were not 
significantly increased. The fiscal system included taxes that 
can be grouped under two main headings: taxes on revenue and 
taxes on expenditure. A tax on capital, with a low yield, 
canpleted the structure. Taxes on the incane of individuals and 
entities were and still are schedular (specific vs. general}. 
'!hey include: a) a patent tax which applies to industrial and 
commercial activities; b) a tax on non-commercial professions 
including liberal professions; c} a tax on fixed earnings and 
salaries (ITS); d} taxes on real estate; e} taxes on financial 
assets; f) the so-called personal contribution to the State 
(CPE}. Taxes on expenditure include a tax on turnover, composed 
of three elements, a tax on production, a tax on consumption, a 
tax on services and specific taxes on certain individual 
products. The fiscal system was unbalanced and its yield was 
low: the largest share of the revenue came fran indirect taxes 
(in excess of 80 per cent) ( Ayadi 1980) while within direct 
taxes 90 per cent of the revenue was derived fran the patent 
tax, the ITS and the CPE. Fis cal pressure was well within 
tolerable 1 imi ts ( 17% in 1956} • 
The increase in public expenditure following the new, 
expensive tasks undertaken by the state made it necessary to 
drain a maximum of financial resources fran the economy. The 
state proceeded to increase rates without touching the structure 
of the system. 
Notwithstanding increased taxa. ti on, increased indebtedness 
and an obligation imposed on banks to participate in investments 
guaranteed by the state, the financial needs of the Treasury 
could not be met. To obtain the needed financial means the new 
state was obliged to seek foreign aid (Poucet 1971; 92). 
Starting in 1962 a policy of reforms and more active 
encouragement to developnent was initiated. The emphasis on 
structural reform implied a new orientation in economic policy. 
A fiscal reform approved in 1961 was expected to mobilise 
revenue to meet the rapid increase in public expenditure. 
The fiscal reform was inspired by the following objectives: 
maximise mobilisation of potential domestic resources, 
contribute to social justice, fashion an instrument to pursue 
economic equilibrium and provide an orientation to developnent. 
The reform modified the characteristics of certain taxes and 
improved the collection techniques for direct taxes. Almost all 
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taxes saw their field of application redefined, so as to reduce 
the importance of defiscalised sections of the economy (Ayadi 
1980). Agricultural taxes were ccmpletely changed, to increase 
the contribution of agriculture to the revenue-raising effort. 
The reform had positive effects on revenue, but indirect 
taxes continued to prevail as a source of revenue, accounting 
for 75 .4 per cent of total revenue on average. The main 
components of indirect taxation were the turnover tax (45 per 
cent), fiscal monopolies (17 per cent), customs duties (16 per 
cent) and consumption duties ( 11 per cent). Direct taxes did not 
account for more than 21 .9 per cent of total revenue and 
stagnated after 1965. Revenue frcm a feN oil fields generated a 
marginal contribution to the total (4.7 per cent of revenue). 
Fiscal revenue was 15.6 per cent of GDP on average. Because of. 
the dominant role of indirect taxation, one ma¥ conclude that 
the reform failed to mobilise in full potentially available 
fiscal resources. 
Considerable financial tensions and difficulties were the 
result. Increasing reliance was made on external financing, and 
onerous loans were gradually substituted for grants· in aid. 
Already in 1964 the service of the Tunisian foreign debt came to 
7.6 million dinars, as against 1.1 million in 1962 (Poucet 1971: 
97). 
The Financing of the BudQ:et in the Second Develocment Decade 
The difficulties experienced during the cooperative experiment 
prcmpted the Tunisian goverr111ent to steer a different course and 
undertake rehabilitation of the financial situation. In the 
second developnent decade, Tunisian developnent was based on a 
different set of principles: increased participation of the 
private sector in the developnent effort, increased opening to 
the rest of the world and pr emotion of exporting industries, 
intensification of efforts to mobilise domestic and 
international financial resources to sustain state intervention 
in the economy. 
The second developnent decade had two constrasting phases. 
In a first phase ( 1970-76), fiscal pal.icy introduced further 
technical changes in the determination of certain taxes 
( creation of a proportional advance and of a forfeit system in 
the determination of the patent tax as a function of the nature 
of the activity and of turnover; modification of turnover taxes 
to improve the system of deductions). Thus, fiscal measures 
included in the various budget laws were mostly aimed at 
improving the methodology of determination and collection of 
direct taxes. The base of the tax on individual revenue was 
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enlarged to take into account various el anent s of the standard 
of living (ownership of land, real estate, automobiles, etc.). 
Special measures were adopted to ensure a more EG ui table 
distribution of the fiscal load among salaried personnel. 
Legislation called for the determination of salaries to include 
the totality of revenue for the year (bonuses, fringe benefits, 
etc.). 
Other fiscal measures were introduced with the aim of 
implanenting the new develanent strategy. Firstly, a system of 
exemptions (law of 27 April 1972) was created in favour of 
exporting enterprises. Secondly a system of incentives was put 
in place to encourage the creation of small and medium 
enterprises and industrial decentralisation (1 aws of 31 Dec. 
1973 and 3 Aug. 1974). Finally, a new custan tariff was adopted 
in 1973 which differentiated imports in various categories, 
increasing effective protection for the import-substituting 
industries. 
These changes in economic strategy and in fiscal policy 
brought about a considerable increase in the ordinary revenue of 
the state (table 6). It should also be said that during this 
period economic activity expanded rapidly in the wake of a 
favourable international situation. The increase in total budget 
revenue reflects primarily the ranarkable increase in tax 
revenue, which increased 15.7 per cent between 1972 and 73, 
further accelerated to 27 .4 per cent in 74 and 30 per cent in 
7 5, then s1 owed down to 10 per cent in 1978. However, the 
relative share of tax over total revenue has not changed during 
this period (passing fran 84 per cent in 1970 to 84 .2 per cent 
in 1976). 'lhe burden of taxation over GDP increased slightly 
(passing fran 22.8 per cent in 1972 to 27.2 per cent in 1976). 
'lhe overall increase in tax revenue was accompanied by a 
1 imi ted modification in its structure. The relative importance 
of indirect taxes was reduced from 77 .8 per cent in 1970 to 75 
per cent in 1976. Among indirect taxes, taxes on international 
trade played a growing role. Another important factor is the 
increase in non-tax revenue from the oil sector, which 
contributed 56 .6 per cent of total non-tax revenue in 1976, up 
fran 45 per cent in 1970. Public sector enterprises did not at 
all contribute to the budget, as the rest of ownership revenue 
came fran financial assets in the hands of the Treasury. 
Notwithstanding the positive evolution of tax revenue, 
public finance suffered a negative turn after 1970. Table 6 
shows that current expenditure of the consolidated central 
administration gra1 at an accelerating pace after 1972. Its 
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annual rate of increase, which had been 14.7 per cent in 
1972/73, shot to 27 per cent in 1974/75 before slowing down to 
9.7 per cent. '!he ratio between current expenditure and nominal 
GDP reached 21 per cent in 1976, while it was 18.3 per cent in 
1972. '!he increase in current expenditure was primarily due to 
increased subventions and transfers to the Caisse ~n~rale de 
compensation and to public enterprises. The total amount of 
these outlays passed fran 54.3 million dinars in 1972 to 144.1 
million dinars in 1976. Personnel expenditure also increased 
fran 98 to 172 million dinars), essentially because of increases 
in the pay of civil servants. Interest on foreign public debt 
(17.7 million dinars in 1976) was only 4.6 per cent current 
expenditure. 
Following a decrease in 1971 and 1972, investment 
expenditure increased more than fourfold and reached 4 .8 million 
in 1976. Net state loans also considerably increased in this 
period. As a consequence of these movEl!lents, the balance 
onoperations of the central public administration, following an 
improvE111ent in 1972, worsened again because of the acceleration 
in capital expenditure, and reached a deficit of 4· million 
dinars in 1976, equal to 10.3 per cent of total expenditure 
(including net loans to the econoy). 
'!he financial needs of the central administration continued 
to be met predominantly by domestic sources (state drawings fran 
deposit banks, drawings from the public sector, public sector 
deposits with the Treasury, net Treasury drawings fran the 
central bank). '!he net utilisation of foreign resources financed 
more than a third of the deficit, but total outstanding foreign 
debt increased considerably. 
In a second phase, going fran 1977 to 1980, the relatively 
high rate of growth resulting from a favourable international 
eINironment decreased dramatically. Tensions on prices of 
imported goods and in danestic financial resources began to have 
negative effects on domestic as well as external equilibria. 
'!he state aimed at supporting economic activity and limiting 
bankruptcies in the private sector. Public investment, including 
both investment of the state and of public enterprises, 
accounted for two-thirds of total investment during the period. 
Economic stagnation limited the possibility to finance 
investment with domestic savings and reliance on foreign loans 
increased. On top of official loans and other forms of aid fran 
abroad, the state tapped the international capital market for 
the first time in 1977. This tendency was maintained until 1980. 
20 
Oualalou and Jaidi - Fiscal Resources in the Ma.ghreb 
Table 6: Tunisia, structure of revenue and summary of accounts 
of the consolidated central administration 1970-76 (millions of 
TD) 
Fiscal revenue 
Taxes on incane and 
net profits 
Taxes on pro per ty 
Taxes on goods and 
services 





Other tax revenue 
Non-tax revenue 
Revenue on property 
of which : oil revenue 
Other non-tax r~enue 
Total ordinarv receipts 
Grants 
Other revenue 
TOTAL RE.VENUE AND GRANTS 




Net loans to the economy 
CURRENT FUBLIC SAVINGS 
CN ER ALL DEFICIT 





GDP (current prices) 
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Reliance on foreign credit is partly explained by the fact 
that the fiscal system was not able to mobilise sufficient 
danestic resources. As was said, the fiscal system was but 
marginally changed in the first develolJllent decade, and changes 
introduced in the second decade, al though more important, did 
not amount to an organic reform. New measures introduced between 
1 'J77 and 1980 aimed essentially at reinforcing mechanisms of 
control, comba tting fraud, rationalising fiscal incentives. The 
only important innovations were the introduction of a tax on 
real estate appreciation and an extra tax on certain luxury 
products to finance expenditure on the part of the Caisse de 
compensation. Lastly, certain rates were increased to foster 
revenue (the maximum rate of the CPE went from 45 to 55 per 
cent, and customs duties were raised). 
'Ihese measures allowed a certain improvement in fiscal 
revenue (see table 7), which increased by a factor of 1 .6 
between 1<J77 and 1980, but the rate of increase decelerated at 
the end of period (going fran 23 .4 per cent between 77 and 78 to 
14.4 per cent in 78/79 and 15.1 per cent in 79-80). 'Ihe slowdown 
is even more marked if social security contributions are 
included. Consequently the share of total expenditure covered by 
fiscal revenue practically did not change (69.7 per cent in 1980 
as against 67 .6 per cent in 1977), notwithstanding the reduction 
in capital expenditure. 'Ihe· structure of fiscal revenue was 
improved and the role of direct taxa. ti on increased (passing fran 
22 per cent in 1 977 to 26 .2 per cent in 1980) but indirect taxes 
continued to play a dominant role. 
Another characterising feature in the evolution of current 
revenue was the increase in revenue fran property, and in 
particular the part of it which comes fran the oil sector. This 
increase largely explains the surplus in the current account, 
notwithstanding the rapid increase in current expenditure in the 
years 1978 and 1979. 
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Table 7: Tunisia, Summary of Accounts of the Consalida ted 
Central Administration (millions of TD) 
1 977 1978 1 979 1980 
Current revenues 616.2 779 .o 93 9 .1 1.108.5 
Fiscal revenues 522.3 644.6 735.0 846 .1 
Direct taxes 102.6 132.3 149 .6 194.4 
Taxes on goods and services 176.3 203 .8 243 .o 264.5 
Taxes on foreign trade and 
international transactions 158 .5 193. 7 234.1 273 .3 
Other indirect fiscal 
revenues 28 .8 32.0 10.2 11.0 
Social security contri-
butions 56 .1 82.8 98 .1 102.9 
Non-fiscal revenues 94. 9 134.4 1 96 • 1 243 .4 
Revenue on property 78.5 111 .2 175.4 214.4 
- of which oil revenue ( 53 • 7) ( 69.0) (129.8) (173.3) 
Other non-fiscal revenues 16.4 23.2 20.7 29.0 
Other administra-
tion revenues 22.6 8.5 12. 9 22.7 
Capital revenues 9.2 0.8 2 .1 0.7 
Of which 13 .4 7.7 10.8 22.0 
Current exoendi tures 463.4 559.9 728.2 7 84 .1 
Expendi t·ures on goods 
& services 269 .9 308.3 389 .3 471.3 
Interest on public debt 21 .4 29.9 48 .1 50.4 
Subsidies and other 
transfers 17 2. 1 221. 7 300.2 267.4 
rJ Sur2lus or Deficit on 
C:!.!!::rent Account 152 .8 219 .1 210.9 324.4 
v. Ca Qi tal exoendi ture 266.4 285·.6 265.4 333.3 
VI. N.et Loans 42.2 43.2 38 .o 112. 7 
VII financial Deficit -132.2 101 .2 -139.6 98.9 
VIII Sources of Funds 132.2 101 .2 139 .6 98.9 
Foreign 95. 8 75.5 136 .8 80 .4 
Domestic 36.4 25.7 2.8 18.5 
Non banking 46 .o 14.9 18.6 26 .8 
Comm er ci al ba nlcs 2.7 17. 1 -21 .5 26.2 
Monetary authority -12.3 -6 .3 5.7 -34.5 
Source: Goverment Finance Sta tis tics Yearbook IMF, 1983: p. 
754-57. 
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In fact, current expenditure increased rapidly in those two 
years (20 .8 per cent and 30 per cent respectively) because of 
increases in the pay of civil servants and in subventions and 
transfers to the Gaisse de compensation. In this phase Tunisia 
followed an active policy of subsidisation, and the outlays of 
the Gaisse for the contairment of prices of basic necessities 
went from 50 .4 million dinars in 1 975 to 157 million in 1981. 
Progressive price readjustments met with considerable social 
resistance. 
The increase in current expenditure obliged Tunisia to 
contain the growth of ca pi ta! expenditure in order to keep 
within limits the deficit to be financed, and all the more so as 
foreign sources became the primary source of financing. In any 
case, the load and the structure of Tunisian foreign debt 
remained kept tolerable with respect to that of other countries 
in the Third World. 
The Structure of Tunisian Fiscal Revenue 
According to IMF data Tunisian tax revenue in 1981 was canposed 
of 352.2 million dinars fran direct taxes (includi.ng 116.8 
million of social security contributions), 310 .6 million from 
taxes on goods and services, 338.2 million fran taxes on trade 
and international transactions and 16 .4 million fran other taxes 
(including stamp rights for 4.2 million). The total came to 
1 ,017 .4 million dinars, equal to 76. 3 per cent of the total 
revenue plus gifts received by the central administration. 
Direct taxes generate 34. 6 per cent of total revenue, but their 
contribution is reduced to 26 per cent if social security 
contributions are not included. 
1. Direct taxes: Direct taxation in Tunisia is characterised 
by the superimposition of two different categories of taxes: 
-a set of schedular taxes (specific income tax vs. general) 
with proportional rates that separately affect each type of 
revenue (revenue from financial assets, industrial and 
commercial profits, non-commercial profits, fixed earnings and 
salaries) with no distinction being made between individuals and 
entities; 
-an additional tax with progressive rates, called 
contribution personelle d'etat or personal state contribution 
(CPE), that affects the overall revenue of individuals (Magnet 
1 96 9) • 
The schedular taxes are as follows: 
-a tax on industrial and commercial profits. which is levied 
on partnerships, corporations and individuals. It is composed of 
a right of activity and a proportional right. '!he former 
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replaced, in 1968, a fixed right that was a forfeit tax on ::mall 
artisanal and traditional activities; it is equal to 1 per cent 
of total sales of the tax paying body. 'lhe proportional right is 
levyied with a differential rate depending on the nature of the 
taxpayer and on the sector of activity, be it industry, 
handicraft or tourism (40.1 per cent for societies and 29 per 
cent for individuals) or commerce ( 46 .5 per cent for companies 
and for individuals). 
-a tax on the profit of non-commercial. activities which is 
levied on individuals and entities that are active in a liberal 
profession or any other profession which is not included in the 
previous tax; it is canposed of a uniform right of 0.5 per cent 
or 1 per cent of sales and of a proportional right with a 
uniform rate of 30 per cent of net revenue. 
-agricultural taxes again comprise two categories: on the 
one hand, specific taxes on consumption products (cereals, wine, 
olives), each affecting a specific product and being applied to 
the incane fran danestic or foreign sales; on the other hand, a 
general agricultural tax instituted in 1962 following the 
suppression of preexisting land taxes and applied to the annual 
gross income of the farm. 
-taxes on capita! include a tax on financial assets and a 
tax on real estate. 'lhe former goes back to the colonial period 
and has been repeatedly modified, while the second was 
introduced in 1 979. 'lhe tax on financial assets affects 
dividends and interest paid on bonds and other financial 
instruments. Rates var"J according to the nature of the revenue 
and the individual concerned • 
-a tax on fixed earnings and salaries: the law of 30 
December 1967 introduced progressiveness in this tax. 'lhe rates 
range fran 5 per cent for income up to 2500 dinars, to 8 .9 per 
cent for incane above 6001 dinars. 'lhe system of determination 
of the tax takes into account various salary complements 
(bonuses, fringe benefits, pensions, etc.) and allows for 
various deductions. 
The personal state contribution (CPE) was created in 1927 
and is added to the various schedular taxes. Total net 
disposable income after the abovementioned taxes are paid is hit 
by a progressive additional tax. 'lhe structure of rates has been 
repeatedly modified: the highest rate is 80 per cent. 
2. Indirect taxes: these are divided into three categories: 
a) taxes on domestic exPendi ture, which are further divided in 
general turnover taxes (production tax, consumption tax, tax on 
services), excises on consumption and revenue of fiscal 
monopolies; 
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b) taxes on trade and international transactions; 
c) rights on legal acts and services. 
Taxes on danestic expenditure generated a revenue of 310.6 
million dinars in 1981, equal to approximately one-half of the 
total from indirect taxation. 
Taxes on turnover were modified repeatedly. They are: 
- a production tax, imposed on pro.ducers' prices at a rate of 
14.40 per cent, and applied to goods made in Tunisia or imported 
fr an abroad; 
- a consumption tax, which is generally added to the production 
tax to increase the fiscal load on goods which are not basic 
necessities; 
a tax on services, which is imposed on all commercial 
operations except merchandise sales, including sales of services 
fran self-employed individuals; the general rate for this tax is 
5 .8 per cent. 
Excises are levyied on particular products (alcohol, tea, 
coffee, oil products) and are different for each product. 'lhe 
contribution of hydrocarbons to this category has become 
dominant in recent years (76 per cent in 1981). 
Finally, products whose manufacture, import or sale are the 
object of a state monopoly (tobacco, matches) include in their 
sales price an important consumption tax which accrues to the 
state. Furthermore, units that produce or distribute these 
products transfer a part of their profits to the general budget, 
where it is registered as revenue from indirect taxation. 
Taxes on international trade and transactions gave to the 
state budget a revenue of 338.2 million dinars in 1981, equal to 
50.8 per cent of indirect tax revenue. Rates applied to the 
majority of import products varied between 20 and 40 per cent. 
The tariff of 1973 aimed at encouraging certain industrial lines 
of production (mechanical industries, automobile 
contracting ••• ). Higher rates were imposed on 1 uxury items to 
increase the revenue derived from these products. Agricultural 
production generally receives 'greater protection than industry 
does, that includes also products whose danestic production is 
insufficient to meet demand in the country' (IMF 1977: 33). 
Imports must also pay the turnover tax and a tax for custom 
processing, imposed at a fixed rate per gross ton of 
merchandise, with a minimum of 2 .5 per cent of declared value. 
Taxation on imports accounts for almost all taxes on 
international trade and transactions, reaching 335 .4 million in 
1981 ( 157 .6 million for the customs rights and 167 .8 for the 
other import levies). 
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Taxes on exports affect only a limited number of products 
(pepper, peanuts). The tax is fixed per gross ton of exported 
produce with a minimum of 1 .5 of the value of merchandise. 'lhe 
revenue fran this tax accrues directly to the caisse de 
canpensa ti on. 
The custom tariff that was in use at the time of 
independence was left unchanged until 1973. 'lhe tariff on 
investment goods, raw materials and intermediate products was 
lowered in an attempt to encourage investment and production in 
the industrial and agricultural sectors. On the other hand, 
duties on products canpeting with dcmestic production were 
increased. 
3. categories of revenue generate only marginal resources. 
They are generally levied on the occasion of certain legal acts 
or occurrences. The total of these rights reached 16 .4 million 
dinars in 1981 (of which 4 .2 million were stamp rights). 
B. Non-tax revenue is essentially derived fran state properties. 
Reaching a total of 316 .8 million dinars in 1981, it represents 
almost a third of total fiscal revenue (31 .2 per cent) and are 
far more important than indirect taxation. In the total of 
budget resources (i.e. the total of current revenue and gifts) 
it accounts for a share of 23.7 per cent. This important 
contribution is derived primarily fr an the oil sector. 
In Tunisia, the pub! ic and semi-pub! ic sector is also 
greatly developed. 'lhe state is the sole owner of numerous 
enterprises and jointly owns the capita! of other enterprises, 
thus realising an association of private and public ca pi ta! 
under its contra!. In this way, the state owns 'a huge portfolio 
whose total size is difficult to estima te 1 (Ben Achour 1981: 
134). State participation occurs in all economic sectors, such 
as transpor ta ti on, energy, mechanical industries, banking. 'lhe 
primary goal of this participation is to command levers in 
strategic sectors of the economy whose huge capital needs and 
low rates of return discouraged private ca pi ta!; at the same 
time the state also has an interest in potentially profitable 
activities that may add to the revenue of the Treasury. However, 
management problems afflict· the public sector and oil revenue 
is almost the only form of revenue which the state derives fran 
its holdings. 
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MOROCCO 
General Framework 
It is impossible to analise public finance data independently of 
the general framework of Moroccan economic evolution, with 
particular reference to the financial si tua ti on. The M:>roccan 
economy is experiencing a prolonged crisis which began in 1978. 
Growth rates are small (2 per cent yearly on average), 
i nvest.ments have decreased, traditional exports ( phos!ila tes, 
citrus and early ripening fruits and vegetables) are stagnnte. 
As a consequence the trade balance and the balance of pafIDents 
show increasing deficits. Twice, in 1978 and 1983, the 
goverrment imposed restrictive policies in order to reduce the 
deficits in the State budget and in the balance of payments, yet 
the former has always been greater than 10 per cent of GDP since 
1979 and was heading to 16 per cent in 1983 (at 16 billion 
dirhams), while the latter was equal to 12 .9 per cent of GDP in 
1983. Foreign indebtedness was in 1 983 equal to 70 of GDP and 
debt service went from 34 per cent of current balance of 
payments receipts in 1982 to 42 per cent in 1983. 
A recovery plan was elaborated in cooperation with the IMF, 
aiming at limiting the deficit in the balance of payments to 9 
per cent of GDP in 1983 and 7 per cent in 1984. 'Ihe new policy 
was applied in three phases: 1) in July 1983 a corrective law of 
budget was approved, eliminating expenditure under certain items 
and credits for the purchase of automobiles, and reducing price 
subsidies on sugar, nour, butter and oil (prices increased 18 
to 70 per cent as a consequence), increasing the price of oil 
products and fertilisers, increasing taxation and, in 
particular, the standard rate of the TPS - the urban tax - the 
national solidarity tax and stamp and registration rights; 2) in 
a second phase the budget law for 1 984 reinforced the 
restrictive policy by cutting expenditure by 5 per cent; 3) 
finally, in April 1984 a further corrective budget law kept 
expenditure constant on most items but tried to increase revenue 
through new extraordinary taxes and a fiscal amnesty. The 
goverrment was obliged to defer price increases on basic 
consumption products, because of widespread opposition that had 
been manifest since January of that year. At the same time 
liberalisation of foreign trade was pursued by reducing a 
special tax on imports from 12 to 10 per cent, as well as 
lowering custom duties. The 1 985 budget law followed the same 
lines and further reduced the special tax on imports to 7 .5 per 
cent. 
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The Structure of the Moroccan Budget 
Table 8 depicts the evolution of the Moroccan budget in 1978-84 
and highlights the gr0t1ing constraints since 1978. 
As the table sh0t1s, current consumption expenditure on the 
part of the State gra1 but after since 1978. However, transfers 
to the Caisse de compensation administering price subsidies grew 
regularly frcm 1978 ( 389 million dirhams) to 1985 ( 2,375 
million), notwithstanding the repeated price increases. At the 
same time, the service charge on public debt to foreign 
ere di tors continuously increased and passed from 1 ,047 million 
dirhams in 1978 to 4,118 million in 1984, after rescheduling. 
Such a continuous increase is due to the accumulation of foreign 
loans on the international financial. market between 197 4 and 
1980. 
Budget revenue was insufficient to cover working expenditure 
(depenses de fonctionnement) and amortisation of public debt in 
1984. Fiscal revenue reached a total of 21,545 million dirhams, 
of which 5 ;300 came fr cm direct taxes, 4 ,885 million fr cm custom 
duties, 9, 100 million frcm indirect taxes and 2,260 million frcm 
registration and stamp rights. In 1984 fiscal revenue covered 
69% of actual State expenditure: a relatively high percentage 
which can be explained with the reduction in investment 
expenditure that was financed with foreign credit. In 1982 the 
same ratio stood at 55 percent. 
Revenue from the public sector supplies but a small 
contribution to the budget. In 1984 public enterprises 
contributed 1,608 million dirhams to the Treasury, of which 
1,100 million came frcm the Office Cherifien des Phosphates 
(OCP). Thus, public enterprises contributed less than 4 percent 
of the total state budget. 
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Table 8: Morocco, Evolution of the Structure of the Budget 1978-84 (millions of 
MD) 
1 978 1 979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 
Ordinary revenue 11 .6 93 13.802 15' 1 93 17.838 20 ,480 21.o94 23.815 
Direct taxes 2,625 3,202 3 '231 3 ,650 4'120 4 ,599 5,300 
Custans duties 2 .568 2.897 3,530 4,208 4,943 4,452 4,885 
Indirect taxes 4' 168 4 ,659 5 ,487 5,784 7 .376 8 .290 9' 100 
Registration and 
stamp 832 1 '1 86 1 ,338 1 ,3 96 1 ,702 1 ,7 56 2.260 
Monopolies 295 215 167 546 1 ,015 570 500 
Public domain 56 50 57 56 55 57 50 
Other revenue 349 893 583 901 729 620 620 
Office Cherifien 
des Phosphates 800 700 800 1 .297 540 750 1'100 
Current 
eX}2endi ture 10 .420 12.073 15.310 18,898 20,475 21 ,525 23 .644 
Public debt 
service 1 ,047 1 .360 1759 2.924 3'144 3.526 4, 118 
Working 
expenditure 8,984 10.102 12' 124 13 ,87 2 15.331 16.367 17' 1 51 
Subsidies 389 611 1'427 2'102 2.000 1 ,632 2.375 
Current deficit 
or sur2lus +1273 +1 ,729 - 117 -1 ,060 +5 -431 +171 
Investment 
expenditure -6629 -9.016 -8.565 -9.612 -12.481 -7.979 -7.410 
Extra-budgetary 
expenditure - 739 +1,018 +1 .112 - 426 +1 .368 + 407 
Financial deficit -6 ,095 -6 .269 -7.510 -110 98 -11108 -8,003 -7 .239 
Funding +6 .095 +6,269 +7.510 +110 98 +11108 +8.003 +7 .239 
Foreign credit 3.364 4.016 3 '911 7'116 6 '471 3 ,392 4.769 
Bank loans 2 .287 1 .31 9 2,888 3,788 2'197 6 ,703 2, 170 
Bank of Morocco (1, 007) ( 71 5) (1,259) ( 1 ,648) (1,342) (2 .543) 
IMF ( ) ( - ) ( 781 ) ( 821 ) (2,885) ( 83 9) 
Deposit banks ( 1 .280) ( 604) ( 848) (1,319) ( 654) (3 .321) 
Non-bank loans 569 959 447 325 379 190 600 
Reserves -125 -25 264 -131 2 ,061 -2 .282 -300 
Source: Goverrment of Morocco, Ministry of the Treasury 
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Investment expenditure was mainly financed from resources 
fran abroad. Its growth has considerably abated since 1978, 
contrasting with the fast growth in previous years: from 6 ,229 
million dirhams in 1978 to only 7,410 million in 1984, with a 
peak of 12,481 in 1982. Investment was the first to be reduced 
in the successive restrictions of 1978 and 1983. 
Public debt as a source of revenue became more and more 
important, both to cover investment expenditure and to service 
preexisting outstanding debt. Foreign long term indebtedness 
graJ frcm 3,364 million dirhams in 1978 to 7,116 million in 
1981. It stood at 4,769 million in 1984. 
The structure of budget revenue 
Budget revenue is made up of tax revenue, tranfers fran 
public enterprises and public debt. 'lhe budget law for 1985 
includes the following breakdown of fiscal resources: 6,710 
million dirhams fran direct taxes, 4,749 million dirhams from 
custom duties, 10 ,275 million dirhams fran indirect taxes and 
2 ,326 million dirhams from registration and stamp rights. 'lhe 
tax revenuetotal thus comes to 24,060 million dirhams, equal to 
63 percent of total budget revenue. 
Indirect taxes are by far the most important source of 
revenue, yielding 72 .2 p~rcent of the total, while direct taxes 
yield 27 .8 percent. This is a manifestation of Moroccan economic 
underdevel.opnent, characterised by low personal inccmes and the 
lack of a source of rent fran the rest of the world. 
'lb.ere are ten direct taxes; agricultural revenue, that was 
traditionally undertaxed, was totally exempted in 1982. The two 
most important taxes are the tax on professional revenue (3 .160 
million dirhams according to the 1985 budget law) and the 
withal.ding tax on salaries (2,180 million). 'lhe national 
solidarity tax, created in 1979 as a complementary direct tax to 
finance the defense effort imposed by the war in the sahara, is 
third with 551 million; the three together ·account for 88 
percent of total revenue fran direct taxes. 
The limits of the direct taxation structure are shown by its 
low yield and excessive ccmplexi ty. 'lhe ten schedular incane 
taxes (specific income tax vs. general) have evolved 
independently of each other through various legislative 
transformations, with a total lack of coherent and organic 
design. A general personal inccme tax is absent, al though the 
creation of the general complementary contri bu ti on at the end of 
the 60s contributed to rationalise the Moroccan fiscal system 
and introduced progress! ve taxation to improve the tapping the 
of individuals' in cane. 
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In May 1985, the goverrment introduced in parliament a 
fiscal reform project which replaces schedular income taxes with 
a general incane tax, which would increase equity, improve the 
determination of the tax base and collection procedures and 
unify deductions. '!he general incane tax is to be applied to 
professional income, agricultural income, salaries, income fran 
real estate and from financial assets. 
Indirect taxation is composed of taxes on domestic 
consumption, a tax on turnover, custan duties and registration 
and stamp rights. 
Taxes on domestic consumption yielded 2,430 
i.e. 25 percent of the total raised through 
These consumption taxes are mostly excises 
products whose prices are fixed directly by the 
important being tobacco ( 1 ,421 million, or 58 




imposed on 1 3 
state, the most 
percent of the 
percent of the 
The tax on turnover was created in 1962 to replace a tax on 
transactions, and as a prelude to a tax on value added. It is a 
cornerstone of fiscal revenue, yielding 7 ,845 million dirhams. 
It is canposed of two taxes: 
a) a tax on merchandise, yielding 5 ,613 million dirhams, of 
which 64 percent canes from imported products. It is levied on 
all products, either as they are imported or as they are sold, 
and has an array of 8 different rates, from a maximum of 30 
percent on luxury products to a minimum of 6.38 percent, basic 
necessities are exempted al together. 
b) a tax on services, yielding 948 million dirhams, with three 
rates of 4 .17, 7 .SO and 12 percent respectively. This tax is 
entirely cumulative. 
In the framaiork of the proposed fiscal reform, a tax on 
value added should be introduced, taxation extended to wholesale 
trade, deductions generalised to guarantee the neutrality of the 
price structure,. the two. existing taxes unified and the rates 
reduced to four, with a standard rate of 19 percent, a high rate 
of 30 percent and two reduced rates of 14 and 7 percent. 
Custom duties generate significant resources (more than 
4,749 million dirhams). They are based on two essential 
elements: import duties (2,184 million dirhams) and the special 
import tax (2 ,290 million). Custan duties on exports are 
insignificant, contrary to the Arab oil producing countries. For 
a long time the Moroccan goverrment was inclined to increase 
taxation on imports to protect local production as well as to 
increase state revenue. More than ever before, this was the case 
between 1978 and 82 to reduce disequilibria in the Treasury and 
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in the balance of trade. But the li beralist tendencies that have 
prevailed since 1983 have led the goverr111ent to reduce import 
duties as well as the rate of the special import tax. This new 
policy gives priority to competition and may negatively affect 
the effort to overcane danestic financial disequilibria, as well 
as the snall and medium enterprises that cater to the local 
market. 
Registration and stamp rights yielded 2,326 million dirhams, 
of which 686 million from registration rights, 1 ,510 fran stamp 
rights (of which, in turn, 1 ,005 million were received fran the 
customs authority), and 130 million fran a special tax on 
automobiles. 
Thus indirect taxation plays a dominant role on total tax 
revenue and sane 45 percent of the revenue it yields is 1 evied 
directly or indirectly (duties, turnover tax, stamps) on 
imports. 
Transfers fran public and semi-public enterprises are but 
4 .5 percent of total budget revenue and 64 percent of the 
revenue under this category comes fran the OCP. The rest is 
transferred from the Bank of Morocco ( 250 million), the postal 
authority (120 million), the caisse de depot et de gestion (85 
million) and the National Office for Transportation (50 
million). 
Thus, 700 public and semi-public enterprises contribute only 
marginally to the financing of the budget. '!he weakness of their 
transferable surplus is largely linked to the stagnation in the 
sales of unprocessed phosphates, partly offset by increased 
sales of derivatives such as phosphoric acid. It is also due to 
the failure of public enterprises, most of which receive 
subventions to cover current and investment expenditure and to 
finance deficits that are caused by faulty management, to the 
excessively low prices motivated by social considerations, and 
to constraints imposed on exporting enterprises by international 
markets conditions. 
The difficulties of the public sector are heatedly discussed 
in the country. The prevailing orientation envisages a reduction 
of subventions, greater attention to costs in the determination 
of prices, and the conclusion of special agreements between the 
state and the most important enterprises to improve their 
management and to transfer sane of their lines of activity fran 
the public to the private sector, in particular, in agriculture. 
Public debt has played an important role in the financing of 
the budget, particularly since 1975. The decline in phosphate 
demand and prices caused a considerable decrease in financial 
resources, which had increased in 1973 during a period of 
33 
Oualalou and Jaidi - Fiscal Resources in the Ma.ghreb 
passing euphoria and caused a significant jump in the level of 
public investment. To compensate for the decrease, the 
goverment massively resorted to foreign borrowing, encouraged 
by international financial operators who were suffering fran an 
excess of liquidity in the 70s. 'lhus external financing became 
the prime mover in the undertaking of investment projects on the 
part of the goverment, public enterprises or financial 
intermediaries. 
While investment expenditure was soon reduced, the limits 
of danestic sources of revenue caused a further accumulation of 
external debt between 1978 and 1982. As a consequence, the debt 
service load continuously increased from 1. 7 million dirhams in 
1978 to 5.7 million in 1983, bringing the debt service ratio 
(debt service exports + migrants remittances) to 45 percent in 
1983. The evolution of total outstanding debt is represented in 
table 9. A first rescheduling was agreed upon in 1983 in 
cooperation with the IMF, affecting the years 1983-85. 
Table 9: Morocco, Outstanding Debt of the State and of the 
Public Sector 1980-84 (million Us$) 
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 
Budgetary out-
standing debt ( 1) 4813 (2) 5,733 8,048 8 ,361 8,516 
IMF 153 308 704 841 864 
Debt of the 
public sector 2224 2,435 2,713 2,505 2,844 
'IOTAL 7, 190 8 ,476 11 , 46 5 11 , 6 80 12,224 
( 1) Excluding short-term aid 
( 2) Exel udi ng military debt 
Source: Morocco, Ministry of Finances 
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Danes tic debt has a limited role because of the weakness of 
local savings. It is expected that revenue fran domestic loans 
will reach 1 billion dirhams in 1985, while the level of 
discounted external loans would be over 6 billion. Revenue from 
domestic loans is composed of two categories: 
a) the first, revenue from the sale of Treasury bonds, 
essentially to financial institutions and the Caisse de d~pot. 
In February 1985 the Treasury for the first time issued bonds 
directly to the public. This issue was a total success because 
of the high rate offered (14 percent) over a three year period. 
b) the second, the receipts of a compulsory investment reserve, 
imposed on corporations paying taxes on profits and yielding 200 
million dirhams. This form of forced loan is due to disappear 
under the proposed fiscal reform. 
LIBYA 
Following independence and until the beginning of the 70s 
Libya was a country under the control of external forces and was 
unable to mobilise the financial resources that were necessary 
for its develoµnent. In the 50s, the Libyan state was one of the 
poorest in the world. Sparse agricultural resources spread over 
a huge territory with fa1 natural endcwments could not offer to 
the state sufficient means to engage in the building of a 
country. Foreign aid, a fluctuating and self-interested source 
of income, was geared to keep the Libyan economy in a condition 
of mere survivability. The discovery of the first oilfield in 
1957 was the beginning of a process of assured and continuous 
growth in ·the state financial resources. Nevertheless, the oil 
cartel 1 s domination of the exploitation of oil. distortions and 
botUenecks introduced in economic structures by the hegemony of 
the oil sector, and the uprooting of traditional social 
structures contributed to creating a favourable enviroment for 
institutional change, which took place in 1969. This was the 
beginning of a process of pal.icy redefinition, star ting with the 
reappropriation of national resources, which with the help of 
increases in oil prices, led to a substantial increase the 
revenue of the state. Taxation on the oil sector became the most 
important, indeed almost exclusive source of budget revenue, and 
the total revenue it generated increased enormously. An 
exogenous source of revenue fueling the intervention capacity of 
a state keen on spending, it pushed the endogenous sources of 
goverrment revenue to a mere complementary role. The growth in 
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absal ute terms of non-oil taxation is partly connected with 
economic activities or income redistribution indirectly 
supported by the oil sector. 
Knowing full well that establishing control over its future 
requires not only centralisation of financial resources and 
freedom fran the limits imposed by the oil companies, but also 
the overcoming export of concentration exports on a single 
commodity, albeit a strategically important one, Libya espoused 
an active but incoherent pal.icy of diversification of its 
economic structures. 
The unfavourable turnaround in the oil market, together with 
danestic obstacles to dev elo J;J11ent, frustrated its ambitions. 
This, again is a mani.festa tion of the precarious financial 
condition of a state which depends on the sale of one raw 
material on the international market. The precari ty is relative, 
however, when compared to the situation in other Third World 
countries. 
E'.rom independence to the revolution of 1969: royalties 
substitute for external aid as a source of budget revenue 
In the first decade after independence, Libyan economic 
structures remained very fragile and could not offer a base for 
taxation and revenue for the state. Personal in cane and 
consumption generated but modest sources of revenue. · The 
Treasury was as the same time called on to pay for an expanding 
administrative structure, and foreign aid was required to fill 
the resulting gap. 
Between 1954 and 1961 total expenditure increased three 
times and danestic revenue equalled an average 63 percent of 
expenditure. This level was reached thanks to revenue fran 
custan duties. Foreign creditors supervised the utilisation of 
aid. The Libyan Public DeveloJ;J11ent stabilisation Agency (LPDSA), 
created in 1952 and staffed by nationals of the donor countries, 
managed the funds made available. A second commission, the 
Libyan-American Reconstruction Commission (LARC) created in 
1956, was in charge of controlling the projects funded by the Us 
at a time when American aid began to overtake both English and 
multilateral aid. The Libyan goverrment was rarely consulted on 
the utilisation of funds (First 1974: 142). 
In 1959 Esso standard discovered the famous Zel ten oilfield 
and was soon foll owed by a rush of other ca:npani.es. 
Oil production expanded at a rate of almost 45 percent per 
year between 1963 and 1969 (Talha 1981: 205). The Libyan state 
was able to increase its revenue fran oil, but this was still a 
modest fraction of the turnover of the oil companies. The 
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canpanies themselves imposed their rules in the definition of 
relations with the Libyan state. The oil revenue of the Libyan 
state came from royal ties of 12 .5 percent of oil sales and fr an 
a tax on profits of corporations at a rate of 50 percent. These 
parameters being rigidly fixed, the state could only increase 
its revenue through an increase in production and/or prices. But 
the index for prices of Libyan crude went from 100 in 1961 to 71 
in 1966, then to back to the level of departure by the end of 
the decade. 'lhe state lost revenue, and the loss was aggravated 
by the manipulations of the oil companies. 
'!he state introduced certain modifications in legislation, 
and as a consequence, while between 1961 and 1966 it received 
only 20 percent of the value of gross exports, starting in 1965 
this ratio rose to over 40 percent. 
Royal ties and taxes on the oil canpanies reached 75 percent 
of budget revenue, and state expenditure was essentially paid by 
oil money (table 10). 'lhe contribution of other taxes was almost 
neg! igi bl e. 
The gra1th in oil revenue pushed the goverl'lllent to increase 
expenditure. Working expenditure increased four times between 
1963 and 1969, and notwithstanding the contribution of oil 
revenue budget equilibrium was reached only after two years. 
(65/66 and 66/67). 
Fran the Revolution of 196 9 to the Beginning of the 80s: the 
Dominant Role of Oil Revenue 
The revolution of 1 September 1969 was more than a simple 
change in pal.i ti cal institutions. A new pal.icy was inaugurated, 
especially in relations with oil companies. The goverment 
pursued a develoµnent pal.icy based on diversification of the 
productive base of the econany, and taxation was an important 
instrtunent to this end. Taxation other than on the oil sector 
was reformed to comply with the new official doctrine, but its 
economic and social effectiveness remained limited. 
After the revolution, two phases may be distinguished in the 
Libyan economic pal.icy in general and taxation pal.icy in 
particular. A first J;ilase ( 1970-75) was centered around the 
recovery of national resources and characterised by an abundance 
of financial resources. A second phase (1977-82) was 
characterised by the effort to diversify the economy and create 
an economic and social infrastructure, but also by the reversal 
in international oil conditions and the emergence of domestic 
bottlenecks. 
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Legislation regulating the oil sector was repeatedly 
modified (in April 1971, July 1973, January 1975) providing a 
framework allowing the state to rationally control this sector 
as well as to improve its capability to tap oil revenue. In 
1975, the state received 75 percent of the national production 
Of Oil. 
Direct control of the state was not limited to the oil 
sector. Banks and insurance companies were restructured and 
their assets concentrated in the hands of the state. A variety 
of public enterprises were created in various sectors to be the 
instruments of sectorial policies of the goverrment. The policy 
of reappropria ti on of national resources all owed the state to 
maximise benefits frcm oil price increases. Oil revenue accruing 
to the state went from 447 million dinars in 1969 to 1741 
million dinars in 1975 (table 11), almost a fourfold increase. 
The relative contribution of non-oil revenue correspondingly 
decreased frcm 18.7 percent in 1969 to 12.1 percent in 1974. Its 
growing importance in 1975 is simply a consequence of decreasing 
oil exports in that year. Modifications in the fiscal 
legislation affecting the non-oil sector, and in particU!ar, the 
increased pressure brought by laws in 1964 and 1973 affecting 
the tax on in cane and economic activity, certainly improved the 
efficiency of ordinary direct taxation, but they had no effect 
on the relative role of this type of taxation on the total 
resources of the state. 
Oil revenue permitted an increase in budget expenditure, in 
particular in 1974. Current expenditure was affected primarily 
by the increase in civil servant pay. Special expenditures, 
which absorb a third of the budget, were concentrated in the 
stabilisation of the price of certain basic necessities (flour, 
wheat, rice, sugar, tea, coffee ••• ) and in aid to foreign 
countries. The law of 26 October 1970 reserved a minimum of 70 
percent of oil revenue to financing dev eloIDent projects, 
explaining the strong increase in the investment budget in 197 4 
and 1975. In 1973-75, 2,571.2 million dinars were destined to 
investment, and of this total the contribution of the private 
sector was 370 million, i.e. 14 .4 percent of public investment. 
The state pursued such interventionist policies that the 
goverrment was obliged to go to the banks three times (in 1972, 
73 and 75) to finance a deficit in the budget. 
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Table 10: Libya, Evolution of Budget Revenues (millions of LD) 
63/64 64/65 65/66 66/67 67/68 
- Customs 15.000 15.500 15.000 20' 000 24,000 
- Monopolies 1 .900 2,250 3,200 3,200 3 ,3 07- -
- Charges 4 ,788 6,500 7'150 9 '275 10,430 
- Taxes 1,650 1 ,81 0 3,250 3 '750 4.450 
- P.T.T. 1 ,250 1 .350 2.000 2'100 2,250 
- Ports 1 '1 25 1 ,350 3 .600 4,000 4,067 
- Civil aviation 300 280 1 .ooo 1 .ooo 1 .ooo 
- Agriculture, wood 70 100 100 100 175 
- Public services 1 .ooo .5 1 .200 1 ,300 1 ,400 1 ,436 
- Others 728 650 800 1,465 1 ,5 21 
- Miscellaneous 1 ,600 1 ,490 2.000 2,610 3.364 
- Total receipts 29,411 .5 32,480 39.400 48,900 56.000 
- Oil revenues 29.411 .5 32.480 39 '400 48 '900 56 .ooo 
- Petrol reserves 23,000 46,500 116,000 138,800 170.000 
- General reserves 1 ,457 .4 
- Revenue surplus 8,000 
- charges, taxes 1 ,600 
- Temporary 
investments 835 16 5 
- Foreign assistance 9,500 6,821.4 
'IDTAL 63.368.9 85,801.4 165 '835 187'865 226 .ooo 
Source: Annual ReQort 66/67 et 67/68, Bank of Libya, Chronig ue 
~conomig ue, AAN, 1 967 
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FrQD 1976 to 1982 
While oil revenues continued to increase until 1980, Libyan oil 
production systematically declined. Decrease in world demand and 
political tensions with the United States, over and above the 
Libyan preoccupation for exhaustion of reserves, are the main 
causes of the decline. Exports plummeted in 1981 and 82, while 
Table 11: Libya, Revenue and State Budget 1969-75 (millions of LD) 
1969 1970 1 971 1972 1974 1975 
STATE RE.VENUE 447 .1 535.9 737 .2 753.9 548.2 1 ,863 .8 1 , 7 41 
Oil revenue 363.5 453.2 651 ,3 646 .4 429.5 1 ,638.0 1 .283 
Non-oil revenue 83 .6 82.7 85.9 107 .5 118. 7 225.8 458 
of which: customs 
duties 37,7 35.2 41.6 55.8 
ORDINARY BUOOET 291 ,9 288.9 361.9 437 .1 223.5 430.9 460.0 
SAVINGS B UOO ET 155.2 247 .5 376.3 316.8 324.7 1,432.9 1 .281 
EI2UIPMENT BUOOET 113. 1 146 .1 247 .6 397 .3 413.7 866 .o 941 
SPECIAL BUOOET (2) 59.8 189 .6 549.7 746 
DEFICIT +42 .1 +101.4 +128.7 -140.3 -278.6 +17.2 - 406 
Source: 69-72: Y. Gazzo, Petrole et d~e.loppement: Le cas Libyen, p. 70 and 89 
73-74:IMF,: Libyan Arab Republic: Recent Economie DeveloJlllent, August 1976 
75-76: FMA: Principaux aspects des ~conomies des Etats Arabes, FMA April 







1 , 1 90 
849 
-19 
(1) As of 1 Jan. 1974, the budget g-oeswith the calendar year (frcm 1 Jan to 31 Dec) and 
not the fiscal year (from 1 April to 31 March). Therefore, 1973 is reduced to nine months 
(April to December). 
(2) The special budget inclused subventions to basic products, aid to foreign countries 
and military eq ui Jlllent expenditures. 
prices, which had increased until 1981, started to decline in 
1982. Oil revenues increased until 1980, reaching 23,200 million 
dollars, frcm 7 ,500 million in 1976. (see Table 12) • Thus, budget 
revenue increased until the end of 70s and started to d~cline in 
the 80s, in 1981 it was 31 percent off the previous year (Talha 
1 981) • 
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This turnaround took place at a time when the Libyan 
government had a pressing need for funds to finance its 
developnent projects. Under the 1976-80 five-year plan, a costly 
policy of diversification was begun, whose benefits could only 
cane in the longer term, and which needed to be sustained by the 
plan for 1981-85. But the ordinary fiscal system, parcellised in 
a mulUplicity of low-yield taxes, contributes only to a limited 
extent to the mobilisation of domestic resources. While the 
revenue derived from it has increased, a large part of it is 
still directly or indirectly linked to oil activity: state 
expenditure on salaries to danestic and foreign workers broadens 
the base of personal income tax; consumption induced frcm 
distribution of the oil revenue increases the yield of excises 
and custom duties, etc. At the same time, the pol icy of the 
goverrment has led to a shrinking of the private sector, and 
consequently to a loss of budget revenue. 
Nevertheless, one has the impression that the potential for 
raising revenue domestically has not been fully exploited. 
Table 12: Libya: Oil revenue and state budget 1 976-80 
(mill ion Libyan dinars) 
1976 (1) 1977 1 978 1 979 
state revenue 2,468.6 3.098.3 2.714.8 4 .262.2 
- of which: 
oil revenue 2 '093 .6 2.102 .3 2,253.4 3 ,762.2 
state budp;e t 
(total expenditure) 2' 5 82. 8 2.818.3 3,278.5 4,101.8 
- of which: 
current expenditure 564.0 669.3 796 .5 770.0 
Contribution of 
oil revenue to budget 
resources ( percent) 84.8 87.2 83 .o 88.3 
Source: Gazzo, y ( 1980) 
1 980 ( 2) 
4' 144. 7 
3,138.1 
1 ,273 
( 1) Data for 1 976 do not correspond with data for the same year in 
the preceding table because of accounting differences. 
( 2) Data for 1 980 are frcm Tal ha 1 980 
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MAURITANIA 
The components and final equilibrium of the Mauritanian budget 
are intimately linked to those of the balance of payments. 
Revenue is essentially derived fran the tax affecting the 
exploitation of iron resources, from royalties paid by foreign 
fishing vessels operating along the Mauritanian coast and by 
official gifts and transfers or loans fran abroad. 
Immediately after independence, and until MIFERMA began 
exploiting iron ore in 1 964, tax resources did not suffice to 
pay for operating expenditures, notwithstanding the latter's 
paucity. For four years in a row, France funded the budget 
deficit in view of the special ties between Mauritania and 
Paris. 
In the second half of the 60s revenue fran exports of iron 
ore constituted between 23 and 27 percent of the total current 
revenue. One should also add customs duties, which generated 36 
percent of the revenue: it is evident that public consumption 
was strictly linked to foreign trade. Table 13 pictures the 
evolution of the current revenue of the Mauritanian state. 
Table 13: Mauritania, 
(millions of Kl) 
Year Current French aid 
expendi-
ture 
1 960 626 57 % 
1 962 909 11 % 
1 964 806 0 
1 967 1.222 0 
1 970 1 ,498 0 
1975 4,061 0 
1977 7,008 0 
Financement of Current Expenditure 
Iron ore Customs duties 
revenue 
0 19. 5 % 
11.8 % 38.5 % 
16. 8 % 40.7 % 
28.5 % 28.9 % 
23 .1 % 25. 8 % 
19.7 % 35.5 % 
0 39. 5 % 
Source: Ver gal a, L' economie Ma uri tani enne et son 
deveJ. 01212ement 
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'lhe rEmaining revenue came fr cm taxation. 
a) the contribution to support the national defence effort, 
which reached 745 million oukiyas in 1977 when Mauritania 
intervened with Morocco in the Western saharan conflict. 
b) direct taxation, ccmposed of a tax on fixed earnings and 
salaries (yielding 675 million oukiyas in 1979); an income tax 
(300 million oukiyas); a tax on profits (475 million oukiyas) 
c) indirect taxation, including: a tax on the export of 
copper, which yielded sane 40 million oukiyas in 1974, when 
mining of copper was ended; an excise on consumption of 
hydrocarbons (200 million oukiyas); a consumption tax (69 
million); a tax on tobacco (39 million). 
'lhese figures show the stringent limits of tax revenue, both 
direct and indirect, due to the small dimension of the 
Mauritanian economy. At the same time, the opera ting budget 
increased rapidly after 1974 because of the abandonment of the 
pal.icy of austerity which had continued since 1960, the exodus 
of ncmads frcm the desert following the drought of the 70s, and 
the national defence needs between 1976 and 77. 
The investment budget is funded frcm three sources of 
revenue: fishing royal ties, transfers from the public sector and 
the surplus on the current budget (table 14). Four observations 
deserve to be made regarding these figures: a) the invest.ment 
budget has considerably increased; b) royal ties paid by foreign 
fishing vessels has be cane the main source of in cane; c) 
transfers frcm the pub! ic sector reflect the national isa ti on of 
MIFERMA. '!hey ceased in 1977 because war in the Sahara brought 
iron ore production to a ha! t. The surplus in the current budget 
disappeared in 1974, because of the increase in current 
expenditure. 
In Mauritania, goverrment invest.ment projects are also 
financed out of special accounts of the Treasury and resources 
of pub! ic or semi-pub! ic enterprises. Gifts and loans frcm 
abroad are credited to the special accounts. '!hey totalled 
some 5 billion oukiyas in 1975, 77 percent of which came frcm 
the Arab oil producing countries and were intended to fund 
industrial projects whose profitability was later questioned (an 
oil refinery, a sugar refinery at Nouadhi bou, etc.). 
Fiscal pol icy si nee 197 9 
The deterioration in the economic situation, the worsening of 
dcmestic and foreign financial equilibria and constraints 
brought on by Ma.uri tanian intervention in the saharan conflict 
led to the fall of President Moktar Ouldada. Since then, despite 
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Table 14: Mauritania, State Irwestment Budget (millions of M'.:>) 
Years Total Fishing Transfers fran surplus of 
irwestment royal ties public sector the current 
expenditures budget 
1970 159 
1972 282 40 0 200 
1974 335 215 120 0 
1977 600 400 200 0 
1978 600 
1979 2,000 
Source: Verga.la, L' ~conomie Mauri tanienne et son developpement 
almost pennanent pal.i ti cal instability, all goverrments have 
been obliged to follow a policy of restrictions on expenditure. 
'Ihe budget for 1982 aimed at equilibrium: custan duties and 
direct taxes were increased and the minimum personal revenue 
exempted fr an taxation passed from 45 ,ooo to 80 ,ooo oukiyas. 
Taxation on houses was reduced to encourage building activity. 
However, stagnation of iron ore exports, not entirely 
compensated by the increase in the value of the dollar, and 
insufficient agricultural production led to a widening of the 
financial gap and obliged the goverrment to tighten its 
austerity pal.icy, in accordance with the IMF; 
Foreign debt reached an intolerable level because the 
revenue of maey projects funded from abroad was very limited: 
the oil refinery, the sugar refinery, the power generating 
canplex, the Nouadhibou harbour, the road from Nouakchott to 
Noumia. Debt service was more than 3 billion oukiyas in 1978, 
i.e. 39 percent of exports, while foreign outstanding debt was 
estimated at 711 million Us dollars. 
The economic pal.icy fallowed since 1979 can be summarised as 
follows: rescheduling of the foreign debt; financing of the 
budget deficit in the budget thanks to funds from the EEC, the 
IMF, Iraq and France; realisation of projects with an assured 
capacity of generating revenue (in particular the iron 
enrichment plant in Guel bs) and postponement of others; priority 
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to the agricultural sector; creation of joint ventures in 
fishing activities with countries whose ships are active in 
Ma.uri tanian waters (Spain, USSR, Japan, South Korea). 
Following the accession to power of Lt. Maaouya Sid Ahmed 
Ould Taya in December 1984 the pol.icy of financial restriction 
was further reinforced. With a total outstanding debt of 1 .7 
billion dollars, €qUal to twice its GDP, Mauritania bowed to IMF 
recommendations. The price of basic necessities, such as rice, 
was increased 10 to 20 percent, and the price paid to producers 
was also increased. Parallelly, Mauritania allowed the oukiya to 
1:1.oat and lose about 15 percent of its value. This facilitated 
negotiations for a new rescheduling of foreign debt. 
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF M.AGHREBI TAXATION SYSTEMS 
The fiscal systems of the Ma.ghrebi states have a common origin. 
M:>dern taxes were created during the colonial period. The old 
taxes, based on religion, sovereignty or customs, lost 
importance after the disgrega ti on of pre-ca pi tali st modes of 
production, in spite of numerous attempts at reform which 
preceded colonial intervention. '!he colonial administrations 
pursued an increase in fiscal revenue by, on the one hand, 
modernising sane old taxes, particularly those on agriculture, 
and, on the other hand, creating new taxes, modelled on those of 
the colonising power. Progressively new taxation systems, 
including direct and indirect taxes, were introduced in the 
Ma.ghreb. t-bst of the present-day taxes date fran this period. 
The second World War had an important influence on the 
revenue of these taxes, linked to international economic 
conditions.. Because of restrictions on international trade, 
custans duties and dcmestic consumption taxes yielded decreasing 
revenue. At the same time expenditure was growing, thus 
necessitating the creation of further direct taxes. Thus, a tax 
on fixed earnings and salaries was imposed in Tunisia ( 1937) and 
Morocco (1939), while taxes on corporations were sharpened (in 
Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria). 
Cr ea ted by the colonial pow er s to serve their own purposes, 
taxation systems in the Ma.ghreb are not functional to the 
developnent needs of the countries. Following independence, the 
social and economic turmoil brought by decolonisation and 
economic developnent r€quirements underlined the need to 
restructure these systems. Yet, more than two decades later, 
these systems are still essentially the same. Goverrments have 
only increased rates, made a few technical adjustments, and 
implemented partial reforms to substitute new taxes for al d ones 
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(e.g. substituting taxes on products and services for taxes on 
transactions, the agricultural tax for tertib, etc ... ). These 
partial measures have not greatly affected state revenue or the 
economy of the Ma.ghrebi countries. Countries which had the most 
pressing revenue needs (Morocco, Tunisia, Ma.uri tarti.a) enacted 
the most important changes, at least quantitatively speaking. 
All the same, the need for in-depth fiscal reform is on the 
agenda in all the states of the Ma.ghreb. 
Even while sharing a canmon historical origin, the Maghrebi 
fiscal systems reflect the realities of the individual economies 
in which they are applied. Yet certain common constituent 
elements can be found. 
Thus, schedulari ty is a fundamental characteristic of all 
Maghrebi fiscal systems. Taxation of incane may be diversified, 
but it certainly is also excessively fragmented. schedules are 
approximately the same, with similar elements of 
progressiveness: taxes on industrial and commercial profits, on 
professional incane, on incane from real estate and financial 
assets, on fixed earrti.ngs and salaries. To these is added 
canplementary taxation. On the other hand, taxation on ca pi ta! 
is but partial: it affects capita! only occasionally, as with 
the inheritance tax (in Algeria) and taxes on transfers. 
Taxation on consumption also occurs under similar 
conditions. Custan tariffs are diversified and pursue the 
objective of providing effective protection to domestic 
production. Excises are imposed on the consumption of specific 
products such as tobacco and alcohol. Finally, taxes on 
transactions affect both tangible products and services at 
differentiated rates. 
This extreme schedularity may have the advantage of 
spreading taxation over numerous sources of revenue and 
expenditure, but it al so leads to a lack of hanogenei ty and 
simplicity, which in turn may generate di st or tions and 
inequalities, while favouring evasion. 
In all Maghrebi countries a disproportionate share of the 
fiscal revenue comes fran indirect taxation. Taxes on products 
and services and custan duties generate between 45 and 50 
percent of ordinary budget revenue (excluding oil revenue in the 
oil exporting countries). A characteristic of underdeveloped 
countries, the predominant importance of indirect taxation is 
that it serves to restrict consumption in accordance with the 
need to save and invest and also reflects the fact that direct 
taxes are less flexible. 
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Direct taxation is gaining importance, but is nevertheless 
relatively slight (see table 15). This reflects the limits of 
the contribution of the productive sectors and economic 
entities. This 1 imit becomes even clearer when it is recalled 
that an important part of the inca:ne base is made up of the 
revenue of state-controlled enterprises (OCP, Sona trach) and of 
budget expenditure under the fonn of fixed earnings and 
salaries. 
Al though taxation rates on the profit of enterprises, be 
they private or public, are progressive and relatively high, 
production units give but a snall contribution to state revenue. 
Develo1J11ent policies based on the creation of develo1J11ent poles 
(such as in Algeria and Libya) generate large uni ts, financed by 
slowly maturing investment, opera ting in an envirorment with no 
economic rationality and offering little potential for growth. 
It is, then, to be expected that enterprises will not generate a 
financial surplus that may be a base for state taxation. 
Alternatively, the policies based on light industry (Morocco and 
Tunisia) and export-oriented small and medium enterprises are 
accompanied by taxation policies favouring international 
competitiveness. In this context they benefit fra:n important 
fiscal advantages which translate into revenue lost to the 
gov er rment. 
The weakness of direct taxation in Maghreb pub! ic finance 
is, more generally, a consequence of the pattern of growth in 
the respective economies. Growth is unbalanced, the industrial 
sector is weak and disintegrated, the agricultural sector 
archaic, the services sector plethoric. Deficiencies in 
productive structures explain the peculiar behaviour of the 
elasticity of direct fiscal revenue with respect to GDP. This 
elasticity is strongly linked to exogenous factors (oil and 
mining) and to modifications in fiscal legislation. 
The tendency to introduce numerous mi nor changes in 
legislation each year (especially in non-oil countries) 
manifests the need of the states to regularly increase their 
revenue to fund their growing commitments, and imp! ici tly, al so 
the lack of a direct link between economic growth and fiscal 
revenue. In other words, this elasticity is neither automatic 
nor endogenous; it is an input from the rest of the world or 
follows legal and/or technical changes. 
Consequently, goverrments have but little control of their 
tax revenue and cannot use fiscal pol icy as an efficient 
instrument of short-term economic policy or long-term planning 
of revenue and expenditure. Foreign demand determines a large 
part of fiscal revenue, both directly and indirectly. Because 
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Table 15: Maghreb, Canparative Structure of Current Budget 
Revenue 
Morocco Tunisia Mauri- Libya Algeria 
1981 1981 tania 1981 
1985 
Income taxes 18 .20 15.28 23.93 13.98 5.60 
of which: on individuals 8 .34 6.68 1 9. 81 7.58 
on enterprises 8.77 7.88 3.55 6.38 
Pro:t!erty taxes 2.04 1.97 0.77 
social security 
contributions 5.31 8. 79 6.57 2.39 
Ta~s on &QOds and services 31 .06 23 .38 18.16 36.82 18 .58 
Taxes on trade and inter-
national transactions 20.5 25.45 26.46 6.38 5.73 
Oil revenues 4.86 1.23 0.25 19.48 67.20 
Non-oil revenue 18 .03 23 .90 23.86 10.24 2 .59 
of which: property revenue 8.89 21 .89 2. 72 10 .24 0.07 
Source: for Morocco, Mauritania and Tunisia, IMF, 1984 (GFs): for 
Libya and Algeria our elaborations on data fran budget laws. 
fiscal variables cannot be controlled, formulation of long-term 
objectives is a myth, rather than an exercise in rational 
planning. Fiscal constraint and the absence of al terna. tive 
fiscal policies nullifies all attempts at autonomous 
develoIJDent. 
Despite similarities in their ordinary systems of taxation, 
the countries of the Maghreb finance their budgets in quite 
different ways. This differentiation originates in the role of 
oil revenue (Libya and Algeria) or of external debt (Mauritania, 
Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria). Thus, the tendency for public 
savings to disappear emerged in certain countries (Morocco and 
Mauritania) making current expenditure partly dependent on 
foreign loans or advances from the central bank (Morocco) or 
even on foreign aid (Mauritania). On the other hand, the 
allocation of oil revenue to current expenditure allcws the oil 
countries (Algeria and Libya) to bridge the gap between ordinary 
revenue and current expenditure, while the remaining surplus is 
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devoted to capital expenditure. Tunisia still is in 
intermediate position, as current revenue and expenditure 
basically kept in line. 
an 
are 
While Libya managed to invest a considerable financial 
surplus abroad in the good years and limited her dependence to a 
few insignificant loans, Algeria and the other countries 
regularly tapped international financial markets to acquire the 
funds needed to speed up economic developnent. Nevertheless, the 
debt situation is different in each country of the Ma.ghreb. 
Morocco, which relied more than others on this source of 
financing, was brutally confronted with the pro bl em of managing 
its international debt, with the usual consequences in relations 
with creditors (debt rescheduling, structural adjustment 
program). Algeria and Tunisia have avoided coming under pressure 
from international financial institutions, and keep their level 
of debt within proportions that are compatible with their 
ability to repay. 
The interplay of the three main sources of state financing 
{danestic tax.a ti on, international taxation - mostly rel.a ted to 
exports of hydrocarbons - and foreign debt) may serve as the 
base for a taxononw of the five countries of the Ma.ghreb. 
Oil or extrative rent. 
Since the beginning of the 70s, oil rent has become the most 
important source of funds for the budget in Libya, which may be 
compared to the countries of the Gulf, and in Algeria, where oil 
and gas replaced the other productive sectors in supporting the 
state Treasury. In these two countries the enormous increase in 
public expenditure is the direct consequence of the rapid 
increase of resources linked to hydrocarbons. 
In Ma.uri tania budget financing is also fundamentally linked 
to iron exports, but the rent is more fragile and fluctuating 
because of unfavourable conditions in the international 
markets. 
Tunisia al so benefitted fran the hydrocarbon boom, because 
its oil resources, albeit limited, contributed to creating a 
certain financial ease in the last 15 years. In Morocco, on the 
other hand, hydrocarbons are totally lacking and the extractive 
sector does not significantly contribute to the Treasury, as the 
period of increasing phosphate prices was very sh or t-1 iv ed. 
It is clear that the importance of rent is inversely 
proportional to that of danestic taxation. 
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Domestic taxation 
ltlrocco is the only country in the Ma.ghreb that finances a 
substantial part of its current expenditure frcm taxation. But 
the weakness of individual income and the importance of 
exemptions extended to investors under the investment codes, or 
to entire sectors such as agriculture and real estate, lead to a 
differentiation of fiscal pressure which weighs mostly on 
consumers and salary earners. The importance of taxation in 
Morocco explains the initiation of a reform aimed at 
simplifying, modernising and rationalising the fiscal system. 
similarly to Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia inherited from the 
colonial period a taxation system which is outdated but still 
operational, although its importance has been diminished in 
Algeria through the predominance of oil revenue. 
In Ma.uri tania and in Li by a, on the contrary, there is no a 
fiscal tradition. This does not bother the Libyan state, but 
certainly is one of the structural disequilibria in Mauritanian 
public finances. 
Foreign Debt 
In this respect, Libya is the exception, as it has seldom tapped 
foreign sources of credit. 'Ihe other four countries have all 
linked their investment budgets to credit fran international 
financial institutions, fr cm the developed or oil exporting 
countries, or fran international financial markets. 
The level of indebtedness of the four countries is 
relatively high. In absolute terms, Algeria is first, followed 
by Morocco, Tunisia and Ma.uri tania. But Morocco and Ma.uri tania 
face the most critical situation, if their outstanding debt is 
measured against their GNP, total public expenditure or export 
capacity. Since 1 981 the IMF has intervened in both countries to 
recamnend reductions in public consumption and investment and to 
help in rescheduling their debt. 
Tunisia is in a precarious position, while Algeria risks 
being driven into one by the decrease in oil revenue. 
In the second half of the 1980s the situation of public 
finance in the five countries appears far fran brilliant. 
ltlrocco will face the need for austerity at least until 
1990. While external resources stagnate and import costs 
increase fran one year to the next, the ltlroccan state must 
tighten restrictions on consumption and investment and cut 
subsidies while 1 iberal isi ng foreign trade. 
Mauritania is in total disarray. Revenues from iron exports 
and royal ties on fishing are insufficient to cope with drought 
and exodus, and the state must drastically restrict expenditure 
and accept IMF recipes to obtain a rescheduling of debt. 
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The financial situation in Tunisia is also critical at 
times. Goverrment attempts at reducing subsidies on food items 
are pali tically unacceptable. 
In Algeria, oil rent permitted a twenty-year period of 
abundance, with important subsidies being extended to consumers 
and nationalised enterprises. But a growing foreign debt, 
continuing technological dependence and the decrease in 
hydrocarbons revenue may lead to unexpected disequilibria. 
Finally, in Libya the ratio of oil revenue to population 
still allows for a relaxed fiscal management but the times of 
surpluses are clearly gone. 
Overcoming disequilibria calls for a reorientation of the 
means of financing and greater reliance on the danestic economy. 
Fiscal systems must be revised and enriched to mobilise a 
maximum of the national surplus and reduce reliance on funding 
fran abroad. 
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GOVERNMENT INCOME SOURCES AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE TAXATION 
SYSTEM - 'IEE CASE OF JORDAN, EGYPT AND KUWAIT 
Hesham Gharaibeh 
INTRO DU CT I ON 
It is a well established fact that goverrments in less developed 
countries assume a major economic role, especially when compared 
to the developed countries. This si tua ti on is dictated by the 
ideological inclinations of the governments and the 
socioeconomic composition of the population. 
The importance of goverrments in economic life is even 
greater in the Arab world. Regardless of the political and 
economic ideology of any country in the Arab world, the economic 
role of goverrments remains central and vital. 
Until recently all Arab countries were classified as poor 
countries with varying degrees of poverty. The massive and 
consecutive increases in oil prices created a clear distinction 
among Arab countries. For those that produce oil, the massive 
now of oil revenues moved them from the poor or middle incane 
group and placed them among the wealthiest countries in the 
world, while the rest of the Arab countries which are deprived 
of oil weal th struggle to maintain and sustain their economic 
growth with varying degrees of success. Thus, the flow of oil 
revenues created a 'wealth gap' in the Arab world with social 
and Political consequences. 
As a result, one can classify goverrment revenues as being 
dependent on oil incane finoil producing countries, coupled with 
meagre or non-existent tax systems. For non-oil producing 
countries, one can expect the existence and importance of tax 
systems to generate revenues to compensate the lack of sizeable 
oil incane generated elsewhere in the region. Taking into 
consideration the spill-over effect and linkages among Arab 
countries represented by the financial flows among them through 
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financial aid and workers' remittances, it becanes clear that 
the massive revenues of some Arab countries have widened the gap 
between those who have oil weal th and those who do not. This 
matter has resulted in free tax societies as opposed to heavily 
taxed ones. 
As the oil sector in the Arab world is entirely controlled 
by goverrments, it is expected that those particular goverrments 
are the direct and primary recipients, of oil revenues. This in 
turn, dictates and necessitates that goverrments should be the 
biggest employers, spenders and investors. Thus, one can feel 
the role of goverrments in all aspects of economic life. This 
fact is even more relevant in Arab countries since, in addition 
to goverrments controlling revenues and expenditures, the newly 
existing private sector is underdeveloped and there is a lack of 
entrepreneurial spirit in the sector. 
It is the purpose of this paper to analyse and compare the 
sources of revenues in a sample of Arab countries, and in 
general to answer the following questions; 
1. How important are the sources accruing to the state 
budget, and how have they grCMn in the last 15 years? 
2. How important are the financial revenues accruing from 
taxation versus other sources? 
3. If taxation is an important financial source, what part 
of it is fran personal income tax, corporate income tax 
and other direct and indire.ct taxes? 
4. How is the taxation system structured: what taxes are 
levied, what segments of the population are effected and 
hCM important is tax evasion? 
5. How important is the non-tax incane, its nature and 
sources? 
A sample of three Arab countries will be under focus to 
analyse the relative importance of the different sources of 
revenues. The sample includes the following countries; Jordan, 
Egypt and Kuwait. The sample is thought to be representative as 
it includes an oil-rich country Kuwait, a semi oil-rich 
country - Egypt and a non-oil rich country - Jordan. 
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SOORCF.S OF GOVERNMENT REVENUES 
As mentioned earlier, higher oil prices and the consequent 
large oil revenues for oil exporting countries area ted a clear 
distinction between Arab countries. For oil weal thy countries, 
revenues generated frcm oil exports considerably exceeded 
domestic needs and encouraged goverments to engage in extensive 
internal and external transfers. Goverrments of oil exporting 
countries transfered weal th to the private sector by providing 
free services and subsidies, and developing societies in which 
taxation is absent. The accumulation of oil weal th also induced 
oil exporting countries to engage in large unilateral transfers 
to other Arab and foreign countries. The non-oil exporting Arab 
countries had to rely on their danestic revenues requiring the 
devel oµnent of a taxation system, in addition to external aid 
received fr cm oil exporting countries. In other words, oil 
revenues induced oil countries not to impose aey significant 
taxes and remain with an underdeveloped dcmestic taxation 
system, while the rest of the Arab countries were obliged to 
impose different types · of taxes to partly finance their 
develoµnent programs. This, in turn, led to the establishment 
of a relatively modern taxation system. 
Recent develoµnents in the oil market, which resulted in a 
sharp decline in prices and volume of oil exports, caused sane 
Arab oil exporting countries to start thinking about 
establishing a taxation system to generate more revenues to 
offset the deficit in external revenues. However, these efforts 
are inadequate for replacing the significant loss in external 
revenues. The develoµnent of a taxation system is needed not 
only to raise revenues, but also for its redistributional 
effect, as weal th is concentrated among a relatively snall 
number of people. 
TAXATION S TRU CTU RES 
A general look at Kuwait, Egypt and Jordan provides an accurate 
classification of their revenues. While Kuwait is considered a 
major oil country as most, if not all, of its revenues are 
generated from oil exports, Egypt is a semi-oil country meaning 
that some revenues are generarted fran oil, and the rest are 
generated from other tax and non-tax sources. Jordan is a 
non-oil country: sources of revenues are confined to internal 
sources of incane such as taxes and fees, in addition to foreign 
aid. For the purpose of detailing sources of' revenues, we will 
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point out the major sources of tax revenues and the structure of 
the taxation systems in the three countries. Of the three 
countries, only two, namely Jordan and Egypt, have a 
comprehensive taxation system. Oil and external sources of 
revenues are self explanatory. 
Sources of Tax Revenues 
Among the three countries in the sample, only two, namely Jordan 
and Egypt, have a canprehensive taxation system. '!he folla.1ing 
is a brief description of taxation structures in the sample 
countries. 
Taxation structures 
When a taxation structure is carefully de signed and organised, 
it is likely that such a structure will be highly influential in 
generating revenue for the goverrment. In general, experts 
agree that a good taxation system should have as its fundamental 
criteria: equity, consistency, economic effectiveness, 
elasticity and feasibility. '!he equity pertains to the ability 
to pay taxes in a fair way; consistency refers to the taxation 
being in harmony with overall economic policies; economic 
effectiveness refers to the positive effect taxation should have 
on econanic develoµnent; elasticity is the degree to which the 
taxation system will increase revenues in response to the gra.1th 
in incane; and feasibility is the extent to which an equitable 
and et'ficient tax system can be implemented (Enthoven 1973: 
210). Because of sane differences in the tax structure in the 
sample countries, a brief description will be given for each 
country. 
Tax Structure in Jordan 
After the economic boom in Jordan which covered the period fran 
1974 to 1982, the goverrment found it very necessary to change, 
amend, and UP-date the taxation structure in response to the 
changes in incane, cost of living and other economic variations. 
The most significant changes in the tax structure were 
introduced and became effective in 1982. '!he new tax law 
featured many important changes such as: 
Self-assessnent: where each person is responsible for 
reporting his income from different sources to the tax 
departlnent by the end of April each year. Where before the new 
law was introduced, income used to be estimated by tax 
departlnent employees based on whatever documents they may have 
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had. Under the new law, a tax return is still not unless it is 
approved by the tax departJnent, but in general, taxpayers have 
much more freedom in estimating their incane. 
Tax exemptions: the new law gives somewhat generous 
exemptions when compared to the law that existed before. 'lhese 
changes include more exemptions for families, education, house 
rent and sane sources of incane such as agriculture. 
- Larger tax brackets: under the new law, a progress! ve tax 
is imposed on net in come a cc or ding to the foll owing 
rates. (Jordan Tax Departtnent 1982: 10) 
from 0 to 1000 J. D. pays 5 % 
fran 1001 to 2000 J.D. 10 % 
from 2001 to 4000 15 % 
fran 4001 to 6000 20 % 
from 6001 to 9000 25 % 
fran 9001 to 12000 30 % 
from 12001 to 16000 35 % 
fran 16001 to 20000 38 % 
from 20001 to 25000 40 % 
fran 25001 to 30000 45 % 
from 30001 to 36000 50 J 
Aey additional taxable income pays 55 % 
'Ihe tax rate reaches the maximum at 45 per cent for personal 
tax. Under .the previous law the width of tax brackets was 400 
dinars. In other words, the new tax law introduced more 
exemptions and wider brackets to the effect that if a taxpayer 
earns a taxable incane of 200 dinars per month, he is not 
required to pay income tax. In addition to that, income is 
taxable only when consistent and renewable (Khasawneh, Saleh 
1981: 25) Income fran agriculture and interest earned fran 
goverrment bonds is totally exempted. 
Tax deductions The following deductions fran taxable income are 
allowed for all income earners residing in Jordan: 
400 dinars for singles and 600 dinars for married 
taxpayers 
200 dinars for each child 
100 dinars for each other spouse 
500 dinars per person to cover higher education expenses 
50 per cent of the incane of goverrment employees is 
exempted fran taxes and 25 per cent of the income earned 
by employees in the private sector 
interest charges can be deducted fran income 
incane derived fran agriculture is entirely tax free 
57 
Garaibeh - Income and Taxation in Jordan, Egypt, Kuwait 
Corporate tax is also important in Jordan, especially after 
the economic boom in which maey new corporations were created 
and realised sizeable profits. The Jordanian corporate tax law 
distinguishes between corporations according to types of 
business, with a clear inclination to treat industrial 
corporations favourably. 
According to the new tax law, corporations are taxed at the 
following rates: 
industrial, health and educational corporations: 35 per 
cent; private and non-resident canpanies: 40 per cent; 
finance and banking corporations: 50 per cent; limited 
owner ship finance companies: 55 per cent 
Taxes on building and real estate This type of tax is 
imposed on the rent value of the building which is often 
underestimated. Tax on buildings is charged at the rate of 17 
per cent of rent value. A new amendment to this law was 
introduced in which 25 per cent of rent value is exempted in 
Amman and 50 per cent in other cities outside the area of the 
capital to encourage construction outside the heavily populated 
capital. 
Indirect taxes Indirect taxes in Jordan - as in the case in 
other countries - are not directly levied on taxpayers as much 
as on their economic activities. Thus indirect taxes can be 
avoided and transferred to others. 
Indirect taxes are the most important source of inccme for 
less developed countries -are not directly levied on taxpayers 
as much as on their economic activities. 
Indirect taxes are the most important source of income for 
less developed countries. The importance of this type of 
taxtation for goverrment stems frcm the general advantages of 
indirect versus direct taxation: indirect taxes are easy to 
collect and cannot be evaded. Therefore, the collection frcm 
this type of tax is sizeable. However, there are sane important 
disadvantages to indirect taxations such as social inequity, 
bacause .it is imposed on all people regardless of their 
income. M:>reover, indirect taxes tend to be unstable and vary 
according to economic cycles. 
Below are the most important indirect taxes used in Jordan: 
- Customs duties: a type of tax imposed on goods imported or 
exported. This type of tax is the most important in Jordan in 
terms of revenues. The rate varies according to the goods 
imported, luxury goods are heavily taxed, also imports with 
local substitutes are taxed differently to protect local 
production. 
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Taxes on exports are also used in Jordan at a flat rate of 1 
per cent of the value of exported goods. 
- Excise tax: this tax is usually imposed to restrict demand 
on certain goods in addition to generating revenue (Buchanan 
1 975: 307). Accordingly, this type 0£ tax is imposed on goods 
such as tobacco, cigarettes and alcoholic beverages. The tax 
ranges from 175 per cent at its highest levels on alcoholic 
beverages to 2 fills per 1 iter of gasoline. 
- Stamp tax: is an indirect tax collected on documents 
obtained fran the governnent and on checks by means of a stamp -
of a certain value - affixed on each document. 
Taxation Structure ir. Egypt: 
The introduction of taxes in Egypt dates back to the 1930s, thus 
making Egypt the first country in the Middle Fast to introduce a 
complete taxation system. Tax structure and rates changed fran 
time to time according to inflation, economic devel.o!lDent and 
goverrment budget. It has also been noted tha.t the increase in 
taxation rates is largely used to finance the increase in public 
consumption rather than to reduce the share of aggregate 
consumption in the economy (Mabra 1974: 183-4). In other words, 
taxes are imposed mostly for their revenue effect rather than 
for distributional or consumption purposes. Fallowing are the 
major types.of taxes used in Egypt~ 
Income Tax. Egypt, like Jordan, employs a progressive income 
tax rate. !income tax rates according to law 157 which was 
introduced in 1981 and is still valid (Egyptian Ministry of 
Finance) are given below: 
2% on the first LE 480 
5% on the next LE 480 
10% on the next LE 960 
15% on the next LE 960 
18% on the next LE 960 
22% on any amounts in excess thereof 
Incane up to LE 960 is exempted from incane tax. The tax law No 
157 featured some changes when compared to law No 199 and other 
laws introduced in 1974 and 1978. These changes are reflected in 
greater income exemptions, wider taxable income brackets and the 
degree of progression. 
For schedular taxes, 
According to 1 aw No 1 57, 
of income, dividends and 
the highest tax rate is 50 per cent. 
schedular taxes are paid on four types 
interest, profits, professional income. 
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wages and salaries. Incane brackets under schedular taxes are 
different fran general income tax in that they starting with LE 
1000 for incane reaching LE 9000 and with LE 5000 or more for 
high er income. 
Corporate Income Tax. A tax imposed on the net profit of all 
establishments on an annual basis. Before the new law of 1981, 
corporate incane tax was a na t 40 per cent of net profit earned 
by corporations. The new law 157 makes a distinction between 
public sector canpanies and other individual and partnership 
companies. Public sector companies pay 3 2 per cent of their net 
profit as tax, while individual and partnership canpanies pay 
progressive tax rates according to the follCMing: 
20 % on first LE 1000 
23% on the next LE 1500 
27% on the next LE 2000 
32% on the remaining profits. 
'lhe above tax rates represent a reduction of taxes levied on 
partnerships and individual companies fran a flat 40 per cent to 
a progressive rate with a maximum of 32 per cent. 
Taxes on Prooertv. These taxes are levied on property of 
agricultural land or buildings. Taxes levied on arable land were 
abolished in 1981, but local taxes imposed by governorates are 
still in existence at the rate of 14 per cent of the annual rent 
value of arable lands. 
The tax on buildings is assessed on the actual rental value, 
or imputed rents if building is occupied by CMner. 'lb e 1981 tax 
law also abolished taxation on buildings, but local governorates 
impose building tax at the rate of 10 per cent for 
non-residential buildings and a progressive tax fran 10 to 40 
per cent for residential buildings. 
Indirect Taxes. As is the case in Jordan and indeed most 
less-developed countries, indirect taxes are the most 
signi.ficant source of revenue in Egypt. '!here are many types of 
indirect taxes used in Egypt. The following are the most 
important types: 
Custan Duties 
The most important source of tax revenue in Egypt. Custom duties 
range widely from 0 to 3000 percent depending on the type of 
imports. Favourable tax treatment is given to capital goods with 
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no or vecy little import tariffs, whereas consumer and luxucy 
i tans are highly taxed to a rate which can reach 3000 percent on 
al cohal.ic beverages. 
Custom duties are levied on imports based on their CIF 
import prices. Foreign exchange is translated into Egyptian 
pounds according to the Central Banlc exchange rate. 
Devel.opnent tax: a tax levied on most imports in addition to 
custom duties to finance economic devel.oµnent. The current 
devel.oµnent tax is about 5 per cent levied on most imports. 
Export custom duties: A selective tax imposed on a few goods 
when exported. These goods include raw hides and sld..ns, metal 
scraps and wastes and antiques. This type of tax ranges 
according to the product exported The highest rate is 5 per 
cent imposed on antiques of an age exceeding 100 years. 
Consumption tax: A selective tax imposed on a list of 53 
commodities regardless of their origin (local or imported) such 
as coffee, tea, cigarettes and beverages. 
Stamp Tax: tax levied on a wide range of documents, 
requiring users to affix a stamp of a certain value on the 
document. 
Some attempts were made to analyse the tax efforts in 
selected developing countries. The most important and 
comprehensive study was done by Alan Tait in which he ranlced the 
efforts in Egypt as eleventh in a sample consisting of 44 
developing countries (Tait 1979; IMF Staff Papers 1979). 
However, the rapid changes in tax rate and structure make it 
difficult to analyse the tax capacity or efforts in Egypt. 
Taxation Structure in Kuwait 
CW ing to the abundance of oil revenues, Kuwait has never used 
taxation as a source of incane, nor a fiscal tool to influence 
levels of production, einployment, prices or the distribution of 
incane (Central Bank of Kuwait 1981: 49). '!he goverment of 
Kuwait levies no income, corporate or direct taxes. The main 
source of tax revenue canes from indirect taxes. A rel.a tively 
low custom duty is levied on certain imported luxury items 
imported. Custom duties were originally about 4 per cent of 
imported goods. The rate was increased to 10 per cent in 1971. 
Foodstuffs and raw materials, in addition to many commodities 
needed for local industcy are duty free. 
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GOVERNMENT REVENUES : JORDAN, EGYPT AND KUWAIT 
In this section, we will try to shed some 1 igh t on the major 
sources of goverrtnent revenues, how they have grown in recent 
years and will compare the importance of domestic versus 
external revenues for the sample countries. 
Goverment Revenues in Jordan 
Jordan is considered a snall country in terms of size and 
population, with an area of 91,000 square kilaneters and a 
population of 2.7 million (in 1985). In addition to a limited 
area of land sui table for agriculture, Jordan is not endowed 
with aey significant natural resources. But in spite of the lack 
of natural and financial resources, Jordan has managed to be one 
of the most prosperous among the less-developed countries. 
The fact that Jordan lacks both natural and 'financial 
resources is clearly reflected in goverment revenues. Except 
for a few years, external revenues have always exceeded danestic 
revenues both in volume and relative importance. 
The recent economic growth achieved by Jordan is mainly 
attributed to the oil weal th generated in neighbouring Arab 
countries. Accumulation of oil revenues triggered massive 
develolJllent plans implemented by oil-rich Arab countries. As a 
consequence, demand for skilled labour, administrators, 
engineers and other professionals soared to run the newly 
created facilities. Jordan stands as a major supplier of 
educated and skilled manpower. New job opportunities and higher 
pay induced Jordanians to migrate in a massive scale to the 
oil-rich countries. It is estimated that about 300,000 
Jordanians are currently working abroad, a number which is equal 
to the labour force in Jordan itself. 
Goverrtnent revenues in Jordan are classified according to 
their source, external and internal. Internal or local sources 
are also classified into two major groups: tax and non-tax 
revenues. Following is a detailed analysis of all sources of 
revenues. 
External Sources of Revenues 
As a result of the influx of Jordanian workers to the Gulf 
region, remittances to Jordan started to increase as the 
economic si tua ti on in oil-rich countries blossomed. Increasing 
remittances, coupled with other factors, caused an economic boan 
in Jordan itself, which led to increased tax and other revenues 
for the goverrtnent. 
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In addition to the remittances from abroad, Jordan was also 
a major recipient of foreign and Arab aid, which reached its 
highest absolute 1 evel in 1978 when total foreign and Arab aid 
reached 289.9 million Jordanian dinars, or 24.4 per cent of GDP 
for that year. It then started to decline. 
Table 1 shai s the magnitude and importance of foreign aid 
relative to GDP. 
Table 1 : External revenues, Jordan (in million JD) 
Year GDP External revenues % of GDP 
1970 134.4 37 .3 21.5 
1975 312.4 116. 7 37 .4 
1976 421 .6 86 .1 20.4 
1977 514.2 180.7 35 .1 
1978 632.2 172.4 27 .2 
1979 753 .o 247 .9 32 .9 
1980 979 .5 280 .,9; 28.6 
1981 1182 .5 289.2 24 .4 
1982 1343.2 246)t 18.3 
1983 1487 .6 233.5 15. 7 
1984 1529.5 252.5 1·6 .5 
Source Central Bank of Jordan, Annual Report, several issues 
Clearly, Jordan is among the very few countries in the world 
which heavily depends on foreign aid and grants. This situation 
was created as a result of lack of internal resources, which 
obliged Jordan to look for external revenues to compensate the 
shortage of danestic revenue. 
Following are the major items included under foreign 
revenues: 
Budget Support The most significant source of foreign 
revenues. Budget supper t mainly comes fran Arab oil-rich 
countries, which under the agreements signed in more than one 
Arab Summit conference, have pledged to financially support 
Jordan and other 1 confrontation line countries' to enable Jordan 
to defend itself and to have a sound economy. Thus, this kind of 
support takes the shape of financial grants that Jordan will not 
have to repay. 
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The main problem facing the goverrment of Jordan is the 
sharp fluctuations in Arab aid listed under budget support. 
Recently, most Arab oil-rich countries ceased their 
contribution, with the exception of Saudi Arabia, leaving no 
choice for the goverrment but to increase local revenues. 
Economic and Technical Assistance is the second source of 
foreign grants. Economic and technical assistance is mainly 
constituted by of equiIJDent, studies and other services rendered 
to Jordan without obligation. 'Ihe main countries providing this 
type of foreign aid are the USA., Japan and some European 
countries. 
Developnent Loans Jordan is increasingly depending on 
foreign loans to finance its developnent plans. Total 
developnent loans contributed abOut 44 per cent of all foreign 
receipts in 1983. Maj or suppliers of loans to Jordan are the 
USA., Germany, the United Kingdom and Japan. In the 'mid 70s, 
Arab oil-rich countries started to pr01Tide Jordan with loans 
through the 'develoJ;lllent funds established in Saudi Arabia, 
Kuwait, UAE and other countries. 
Table 2 shows the magnitude and relative importance of 
foreign revenues and the share of foreign revenues in goverrment 
expenditure. 
The dependence on foreign revenues proved to be risky for 
the goverrment of Jordan. We can notice frcm table 3 the 
instability of foreign aid, which makes it difficult for the 
goverrment to plan ahead. Furthermore, foreign aid is usually 
cut without advance notice, such as the stoppage of aid by USA, 
Libya, Iraq and Kuwait, thus leaving the goverrment no choice 
but to increase local revenues to compensate for the decrease in 
foreign revenues. 
Internal Revenues 
Internal revenues have gained significance in recent years after 
several countries halted their financial aid to Jordan. 
Increasing internal revenues is the only choice left to the 
goverrment to offset the decline in foreign aid. 
In the following sections, different types of internal 
revenues will be discussed: 
Tax Revenues Tax revenues constitute, on average, more than 
75 per cent of total local revenues. Tax revenues include bOth 
indirect and direct taxes: 
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Source: Calculated frcm the Central Bank of Jordan, Annual Report, different issues. 
Indirect Taxes Indirect taxes are the most important source 
of local revenue constituting more than 80 per cent of total tax 
revenues and one third of local revenues. Total indirect tax 
revenues have been increasing at a steady pace. Table 4 shows 
the magnitude and types of indirect taxes used in Jordan. It is 
clear that custom duties are the biggest source of local 
revenue. Custan duties often change in Jordan to increase 
revenues or to protect local industry. 'There has also been a 
positive rel.a tionship between increasing indirect taxes and the 
decrease in foreign aid. 
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Table 3: Sources of aid to Jordan 
Year Arab aid us aid Other aid Total aid 
1967 37 .57 7.62 6.39 51 .58 
1 968 46.25 1.19 5.63 53 .07 
1 969 41 • 15 1 .23 3 .41 45. 79 
1970 33.07 1.38 4.63 39.08 
1 971 19. 11 12.82 3 .56 35.49 
1972 23 .19 35 .95 6.82 65.96 
1 973 23 .66 30. 83 6.60 61 .09 
197 4 46 .60 25.31 12.52 84 .43 
1 975 105.65 22.44 9.92 138.01 
1976 77 .59 26 .13 19 .03 122. 75 
1977 132.31 15.62 19.01 166.94 
1978 66.26 18.56 17.81 102.63 
1 979 299.66 4 .5 9 13. 80 318 .o 5 
1 980 370.43 6 .1 5 14.27 390.85 
1 981 394.92 20 .41 415.33 
1982 335.83 27.89 363. 72 
1983 258.31 31 .25 289 .56 
TOTAL 2311.56 209.82 222.95 2744.33 
PERCENT 84 .2 7 .6 8.2 100.0 
Source : Central Bank of Jordan, Monthly Statistical Bulletin, 
several issues 
Excise tax has been on the increase in recent years with 
most of the revenues coming from tobacco and cigarettes. 
Licences also generated a good amount of revenue mostly fran 
vehicle licences, by which each car owner is supposed to pay a 
fixed licence fee on an annual basis. An additional tax is 
imposed on imports over and above custan duties. Fees are also 
charged on imports over mainly transoportation equiIJ11ent -in 
addition to custan duties. In spite of the steady increase in 
total indirect tax revenues has slighUy decreased in recent 
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years due to the rapid increase in direct taxes. Reasons for the 
gr<:Mth in direct taxe will be explained in the following 
section. 
Direct Taxes Direct taxes rank as the third most important 
source domestic revenues after idirect and non-tax revenues. As 
explained earlier, direct taxes are canposed of inccme and 
corporate taxes in adi ti on to other direct taxes imposed for 
different reasons. 
Table 5 sh<:Ms revenues generated frcm all types of direct 
taxes. Goverrment statistics do not separate between inccme and 
corporate tax. However, most of the revenues generated frcm 
inccme tax are generated frcm corporate inccme tax. Low salaries 
and generous tax exemptions mentioned in the previous section, 
have decreased the share of personal inccme tax in total direct 
tax revenues. Meanwhile, heavy corporate taxes and the 
significance of corporate profits realised during the economic 
boom have caused the share of corporate income tax to increase. 
Table 5 also shows the steady increase in direct tax revenues 
and the increasing share of direct taxes in total revenues. But 
in spite of the increase in direct tax revenues, the 
contribution of direct tax revenues never exceeded 20 per cent 
of total tax revenues. 
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Table 4: Indirect tax revenue, Jordan (in JD millions) 





%Change %of total 
tax 
revenue 
1967 8 .19 5.05 1.01 1.85 16 • 10 1 .2 88 .1% 
1968 8.84 5 .52 1.41 1.49 17.27 6.8 90.0 
1969 10.65 6 .08 2. 17 1.80 20.70 20.3 90 .o 
197 0 9 .10 5 .09 1.87 1.54 1 .35 18 .96 10.7 88.0 
1 971 7.68 6. 87 2 .13 2 .21 1 .50 20 .40 7.9 87 .5 
197 2 9.54 7.78 2.55 2 .6 9 1.92 24.48 20.0 88.2 
1 973 12. 1 9 7.77 3.90 3. 95 2 .39 30.22 23 .8 88.5 
197 4 16.85 8.98 4.97 4. 12 2.90 37.83 25 .1 86. 7 
1975 20 .90 10.65 5.91 7.66 3.64 48.78 28.8 83. 8 
1976 3 9.98 9 .o 9 10 .60 12.66 5 .28 77.63 59.3 87 .2 
1 977 63.99 9. 87 13 .1 0 8.36 6 .40 102.70 32.3 86 .4 
197 8 61.35 6.99 13 .29 13 .40 6 .17 101 • 23 ( 1 .5) 82 .1 
1979 72 .06 10 .56 16 .5 9 17 .06 8.00 123 .28 21 • 7 81.5 
1980 78 .03 13.21 18 .90 19 .54 10. 11 139 .89 13 .4 80.0 
1981 94 .07 16.88 25 .17 36.54 11 .52 1 84 .28 31.7 79.0 
1982 10 9. 75 24.11 24.81 38 .oo 12.69 209 .36 13.6 79 .4 
1983 121.61 35.38 25.70 40 .26 13.89 236. 84 13 .1 80 .1 
1 984 126 .50 37.00 28.50 43.47 16.00 251 .4 7 6.2 79 .6 
Source: 
issues 
Ministry Of Finance and Central Bank of Jordan, Annual ReQort, 
In addition to personal and corporate income tax, direct 
taxes also include types of taxes such as property tax, 
de par tur e tax and social services tax. .Among these taxes, 
departure tax is gaining importance after the imposition of 10 
.JD on every Jordanian leaving the country through the airport. 
The goverrment expects to collect 10 million JD fran this tax 
alone in 1985. 
Non-Tax Revenues Non-tax revenues rank second after indirect 
taxes in terms of importance in revenue generation. Non-tax 
revenues are mostly generated fran goverrment services or 
investments. Table 6 shows the major sources of non-tax 
revenues. As can be noticed, non-tax revenues have increased 
about 27 per cent annually in the last five years, surpassing in 
growth rate both direct and indirect taxes. 
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Table 5: Direct tax revenues, Jordan 
Year In cane Other Total direct % Change %of 
tax taxes taxes total tax 
revenue 
1967 2.05 • 10 2 .15 7 .5% 11 .5% 
1968 1.77 .44 2.21 2.7 9.4 
1969 2.24 .38 2.62 1 8?1 9.8 
1970 2.47 .23 2. 70 3.8 11.2 
1 971 2 .84 .53 3 .37 24.8 12.4 
1972 3.20 .60 3.80 15.1 11. 7 
1973 3 .84 .55 4.39 15.5 11 • 4 
1974 5 .32 .36 5 .68 29.3 13.2 
1975 9 .27 .85 10 .12 77 .8 16 .o 
1976 9.34 2 .09 11 .43 12 .9 12 .8 
1977 12.24 2.75 15.99 39.8 13 .5 
1978 18.56 3.50 22.06 38.3 17.8 
1979 22 .42 5.42 27 .85 26 .3 18.4 
1980 27.88 6.97 34.84 25 .1 19. 9 
1981 39.98 8.79 48.77 39.9 20.9 
1982 43.~4 10. 10 53 .64 10.0 20.5 
1983 45.92 10 • 11 56 .03 4.4 19 .3 
1984 49 .oo 15. 10 64. 1 1.1 20.4 
Source: Ministry of Finance and Central Bank Of Jordan, Annual 
Re12orts, several issues 
The major item included under non-tax revenue is the 
interest and profits generated by the goverment, most of which 
come fran the profit of the Central Bank of Jordan whose net 
profit for 1984 was 45 million dinars, or 91 .8 per cent of the 
total interest and profits item for that year (Central Bank of 
Jordan 1984: 47). 
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Table 6: Non-tax revenues, Jordan (in JD millions) 
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Source: Ministry of Finance and Central Bank of Jordan, Annual Reports, 
several issues 
Revenues fran post, tel.egraph and telephones have also 
increased at a steady rate. But the growth rate has accel.era ted 
in the last few years after the installation of a new tel.ephone 
network which now covers the entire country. 
Total non-tax revenues are greater than revenues fran direct 
taxation. This is partly due to 1 ow in cane and tax evasion. 
Non-tax revenues are not a function of income in most cases and 
more important, cannot be evaded. In addition to that, non- tax 
revenues are usually paid for a visible service, which people 
tend to be willing to pay. 
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Goverrment Revenues in Egypt 
The Egyptian economy witnessed maey drastic changes after the 
Second World War. 'lhese changes swung the economy frcm one 
system to another. Thus the economy operated under a liberal 
system until 1952, then was transformed to a socialist system. 
In 1974 liberalisation measures were introduced. Under all 
economic systems, the dominant role of goverrment was kept. 
Goverrment now accounts for 54 per cent of GDP, 40 per cent of 
total employment and 70 per cent of total investment (Ahmed 
1984). The increasing role of goverrment in the economy have 
caused public expenditure to increase at a faster rate than 
government revenues. The wide gap be tw eeen government 
expenditures and revenues is a major problem facing Egypt and 
will likely remain as a challenge for years to come. Total tax 
revenues finance about 38 per cent of public expenditure, while 
non-tax sources cover about 20 per cent of total expenditure, 
thus leaving a budget deficit of more than 4 billion pounds in 
1982. Dependence on foreign and local borrGiing seems inevitable 
to bridge the gap between expenditure and revenues. In the next 
sections we will discuss major sources of revenues for the 
goverrment. 
External Sources of Revenues 
As is the case in Jordan, Egypt also benefited frcm the economic 
boom in o:i,1-rich countries. But, unlike Jordan, the main 
benefit was the remittances frcm Egyptian workers abroad. Egypt 
was deprived of Arab aid because of the Camp David Agreement. 
Thus, Egypt received only little financial aid -mainly frcm the 
USA- but one cannot ignore the positive role of the remittances 
frcm about 2 million Egyptian workers in stimulating the economy 
and hence, indirectly increasing goverrment revenues. 
Table 7 shGis the amounts. of aid that Egypt received in 
millions of LE. 



















Source: International Monetary Fund, Government Finance 
Statistics Yearbook Val. VIII, 1984 
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As can be seen fran the table, foreign aid is insignificant. 
For 1975 and 1976 foreign aid accounted for 16 and 11 percent 
respectively of total goverrment revenues. But for the following 
years foreign aid accounted for less than 1 per cent of total 
revenues. It is believed that most of the foreign aid received 
by Egypt is of a military nature and comes fran one major 
source, the United States. 
The lack of foreign aid was compensated by heavy borr<:Ming 
from local and international sources. '!he amount of debt has 
reached a very high level lately. Total debt currently is about 
31 billion dollars. 
Internal Sources of Revenues 
Major internal sources of revenues are classified according to 
the source: tax or non-tax revenues, as detailed in the 
following section. 
Tax revenues Tax revenues constitute the most dominant 
source of revenues in Egypt accounting on average for 90 per 
cent of total goverrment revenues and 60 per cent of total 
public sector revenues (Ahmed 1984: 16). Tax revenues gra1 at a 
fast rate which averaged 28 per cent in nominal terms for the 
period fran 1974 to 1983. Rate of growth varied between 
different types of taxes as described below. 
Indirect Taxes 
Indirect taxes are the major source of local revenue, accounting 
on the average for 63 per cent of total tax revenues. For the 
period under study, indirect taxes i nor eased at an average rate 
of 22 per cent. 
Table 8 sh<:Ms the types and magnitude of indirect taxes. 
It is evident from table 8 that custan duties are the major 
source of indirect tax revenues. Custom duties increased at an 
average rate of 18 per cent per year in the period from 1975 to 
83, reflecting a slower growth rate in total indirect taxes. 
Consumption taxes are the second most important source of 
indirect tax revenues and have also increased at an average of 
24 per cent over the same period. 
Stamp tax is gaining importance and is increasing at a fast 
rate which has averaged 26 per cent per year. Other indirect 
taxes increased at an annual rate of 9 per cent for the same 
period and surpassing stamp tax in importance. '!he strong 
reliance of the goverrment on consumption and custom duties is 
obvious. '!he main problem with those types is their passive 
nature and the difficulty associated with increasing the rate of 
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taxation. However, one may argue that setting different exchange 
rates for imports may serve as an additional duty on imports, as 
long as exchange rates do not prove advantageons to imports. 
Table 8: Indirect Tax Revenues (in millions of LE) 
Year Cons ump Custan Stamps Others Total % Change 
ti on duties 
1975 231 .2 502.2 44.7 51.7 829 .8 
1976 283 .6 537.8 61 .2 55.5 938 .1 13 .1% 
1977 339.7 979 .4 89.8 71.4 1480 .3 57. 7 
1978 360 .3 919 .8 126 .2 96 .5 1502 .8 1.5 
1979 566 .8 905 .o . 154.8 150 .3 1776 .6 18.2 
1980 699.7 1329.4 167.9 174.6 2371 .6 33.4 
1981 812 .6 1573 .2 239 .3 230.5 2855 .6 20.4 
1982 1 217 .o 1651.0 254.4 222.5 3344.9 17. 1 
1983 1713.3 1719 .o 222.6 247 .8 3902.7 16.7 
Source: Ministry of Finance of Egypt 
Direct Taxes Direct taxes represent the second most 
important source of revenues in Egypt. The average contribution 
of direct taxes to total revenues exceeded 36 percent for the 
period fran 1975 to 1983. Direct taxes are also increasingly 
assuming an important role at the expense of indirect taxes. 
Recent years have show a fast growth rate for direct taxes. 
Table 9 shows types and magnitude of direct taxes. One can 
notice the fast growth in revenues fran indirect taxes which 
averaged 45 per cent annually for the period under study. 
Personal income tax achieved a moderate growth rate of 12 
per cent annually. The introduction of the new tax law which 
offered generous tax exemptions in addition to the relatively 
lcw incane contributed to the moderate increase on personal 
income tax. 
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Business profits contributed significantly to the growth of 
direct tax revenues by increasing at an annual average of 45 per 
cent. Much of the growth in business profits is attributed to 
Suez canal dues which started to come in very rapidly since it 
was re-opened in 1975. Table 10 shows the revenues from Suez 
which are included under business profits. 
Table 9: Direct Tax Revenues Egypt (in millions of LE) 
Year Personal Business Other Total % Change 
Income Profit Taxes Direct 
1975 42 .3 161 .8 94.4 300.4 
1976 47. 7 277 .6 90.3 415.6 38.3% 
1 977 54.9 387 .2 109.2 551 .3 32.6 
1978 51.9 538 .4 135.5 725.8 31.6 
1979 55 .1 655.7 159.3 870 .1 19.8 
1980 73 .2 1506. 3 244.4 1824. 0 209.6 
1981 85 .4 1577. 7 281 .6 1944.7 6.6 
1982 110.0 1554.3 419.0 1983 .3 7. 1 
1983 127 .3 1893 .6 502.2 2523 .1 21.1 





197 7 1 97 8 1 97 9 1 980 1 981 1 982 
167.4 201.1 412.1 464.3 621.8 657.8 
Source: International Financial Statistics Yearbook 1983 
Revenues from the Canal contributed on the average more 
than 40 per cent of the business pr of its item. 
Another major factor the led to the rapid increase in 
business profits is the surplus transferred fran the petroleum 
sector, and to a lesser degree, growth in taxes collected fra:n 
private industrial and commercial activities. 
Other taxes listed in table 9 include taxes on property, 
estate duties, taxes on immovable pr aper ty and 1 ocal goverrment 
tax revenues. The most important tax under this group is the 
property tax to which most of growth is attibuted. 
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Non-Tax Revenues 
Non-tax revenues rank third in terms of importance after 
indirect and direct taxes. Non-tax revenues contribute on the 
average to about 8 per cent of total goverrment revenues and 
increased at an average rate of 30 per cent annually for the 
period fran 1975 to 1983. 
Non-tax revenues consist of fees, local goverrment non-tax 
revenues and other revenues. 
Table 11 shows major sources of non-tax revenues. Fees are 
growing steadily but at a slower rate when canpared to other 
non- tax i tems. Local gov er rm ent revenues are al so 1 imi ted in 
scope, but growing at a slow rate. Miscellaneous revenues are 
the most significant because they incorporate manv items. 
Table 11: Non-tax Revenues, Egypt (in millions of LE) 
Year Fees Local Miscellaneous Total % Change 
Goverrment 
1975 32.4 16 .2 62.8 11 • 4 
1976 38 .2 17.5 63 .1 11 8 .8 6.6% 
1977 46 .8 23 .o 65.9 135.7 14.6 
1978 53.8 28.2 65.2 147 .2 8.4 
1979 81.3 32.5 153 .4 267 .2 81.5 
1980 123 .9 50.4 319. 7 494.0 84.8 
1981 127 .2 60.9 398.9 587 .o 18.8 
1982 248.3 71.3 472.4 792.0 34.9 
1983 272 .4 87.9 581 ,3 941 .6 18.8 
1984 297 .6 98.6 693 .4 1089.6 15.7 
Source: Ministry of Finance of Egypt 
The state budget for 1984 anticipated an increase in total 
revenues by 14 per cent but a budget deficits of LE 2425 was 
also anticipated (Central Bank of Egypt 1983: 12). Deficits are 
largely financed by additional debt, thus increasing the debt 
burden, which will remain as a challenge to goverrment in the 
future. 
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Goverrment Revenues in Kuwait 
Goverrment revenues in Kuwait differ greatly in sources and 
magnitude was compared to Jordan and Egypt. While Jordan and 
Egypt suffer fran a lack of financial resources, large budget 
deficit and mounting external debt, Kuwait, thanks to its oil 
exports, is far fran encountering such problems. The increase in 
oil revenues in Kuwait is more than the increase in public 
expenditure. For the period fran 1971 to 1983, Kuwait never had 
a deficit in the budget. Therefore, goverrment budgeting is 
primarily concerned with distribution rather than redistribution 
of wealth (Khouja 1979: 112). Tools necessary for redistribution 
of wealth are either non-existent or too weak to have aey 
significant i nf1 uence. 
The classical division of revenue, sources may not apply to 
Kuwait because this country has one major source of revenue 
namely oil exports. Revenues fran the oil sector are so 
signficant that it is unncecessary to impose taxes to increase 
revenues. 
Table 12 lists all sources of revenues for Kuwait. Personal 
and corporate taxes are non-existent, figures listed under 
corporate tax in column (2) are actually taxes imposed on 
foreign oil companies opera ting in Kuwait. Other industrial or 
commercial activities are tax exempted. Corporate taxes were 
significant in the first few years and then dropped to a very 
1 ow level after the national isa ti on of foreign oil companies. 
Property and fees listed in column 3 include property 
transfer fees, fines and administrative fees. Total revenues 
fran this item have gr"own at a very lCM rate. Total· revenues 
fran property taxes and fees have never exceeded 0.5 per cent of 
total revenues. Excise taxes are imposed on danestic goods and 
services. This item was relatively significant before the first 
oil price increase, but was 1 owered after the oil weal th started 
to flow. The average contribution of this item is al so less than 
1 per cent of total revenues. 
Kuwait does not impose heavy custom duties on imports but 
duties that do apply to certain types of imports usually are not 
more than 4 per cent of import value. Total contribution of 
custC111 duties averaged 1 .2. per cent of total revenues for the 
period under study. 
Oil revenues 1 isted in column 6 in the table, should be 
taken together with investment incane because both 1 tems belong 
to the oil sector. Both oil revenues and investment income 
contributed 95 per cent of total revenues. In spite of 
76 
Garaibeh - Income and Taxation in Jordan, Egypt, Kuwait 
Table 12: G overrment Revenues, Kuwait (in million KD) 
Year Corpor Prop Excise Custom Oil Invest Other Total 















fees ( 3) ( 5) ( 6) inccme tax( 8) nues 
( 7) ( 9) 
418 5 120 9 500 42 5 1099 
452 5 132 11 537 50 4 11 91 
928 6 298 17 584 89 14 1936 
398 6 16 21 2534 152 12 3130 
430 7 45 32 2793 328 10 3645 
109 8 33 38 2598 329 10 3135 
258 14 18 41 2575 384 23 3313 
80 18 19 45 3036 522 16 3736 
133 25 16 53 5940 880 12 7059 
154 32 30 68 4434 1744 38 6500 
91 33 25 86. 2764 1364 7 4361 
92 42 16 79 2967 1657 8 4861 
Calculated frcm Central Bank Of Kuwait, Economic ReQOl"'t 1962 
Statistics Yearbook 1984 
goverrment efforts to diversify sources of revenues, the oil 
sector is still dominating the whale economy. Oil revenues 
increased drastically after 1973 when oil prices started to 
leap. 
As shO\'n in table 12 oil revenues reached their maximum in 
1979/80 when oil prices reached 34 dollars/barrel and the demand 
for oil was high. 
Investment income is derived frcm the huge financial assets 
held by the Kuwaiti goverrment as a surplus frcm oil exports. 
Kuwait invests the surplus in industrial countries and mostly in 
the United States and the United Kingdom. Investment inccme 
matches oil revenues simply because investment income is a 
portion of oil revenues. 
Other non-tax revenues 1 isted in col tmn 8 consist of work 
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Total revenues fluctuated along with oil revenues, as the 
latter contributed 95 per cent of total revenues. Hawever, in 
spite of the decline in oil revenues for sane years, total 
revenues increased at an average annual rate of 19.3 per cent, 
thus exceeding the grawth rate in public expenditure. The net 
resul. t of this was a surplus in the budget for most of the 
period under study. 
CONCLUSION 
Fran the preceding analysis, we have noticed that types and 
relative importance of local revenues depend vastly on other 
financial resources available to government. A direct 
implication is that taxes are imposed mainly for their revenues 
in the first place; the redistribution or reallocation effect of 
taxes canes in second place in terms of importance and pal.icy. 
It has been proven that countries which lack financial resources 
have no choice but to depend on other local revenues, taxes 
being the most effective tool, whereas countries with huge 
non-tax financial resources, like Kuwait, do not impose any 
significant taxes simply because tax revenues are not needed. 
It has also been noted that the level of taxation matches 
the surplus or the deficit in goverrment budget. This point 
again emphasises the primary purpose of taxa. ti on as a source of 
revenue rather than an effective fiscal tool. 
Table 13 shews budget surplus or deficit for Jordan, Egypt 
and Kuwait. It is evident that Jordan and Egypt have had 
constant budget deficits, while Kuwait enjoyed a signif'icant 
surplus every year. The surplus in· Kuwait's budget made it 
unnecessary to raise additional revenues through taxa. ti on or any 
other means, while Jordan and Egypt developed their cwn tax 
structure to provide goverrment with the much needed revenues. 
Hawever, those revenues accruing to the states fran internal and 
external sources have failed to mat ch the rapidly increasing 
expenditure. In this case the goverrments, of Jordan and Egypt 
hade three choices to solve the problE!ll of budget deficit: 
1 Increase total revenues and in particular internal 
revenues, because countries can do vecy little to increase 
external revenues. 
2 Decrease expenditure, which ma;y lead to economic 
slow-dcwn and other social and economic problems. 
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3 Increase borrowing to offset the deficit in the budget, 
inevitably leading to more complicated problems. 
Both Jordan and Egypt, whose total revenues covered 80 and 
81 percent, respectively, of total expenditure in 1982, tried 
the first and third options with a trong recent inclination to 
cut down expenditures. 
Table 14 shows the ratio of total tax revenues to gross 
danestic product (GDP) for the three countries. This ratio is 
also known as tax burden ratio which measures the significance 
of tax revenues as a percentage of GDP. 
Table 14 gives a clear indication of tax efforts in Jordan, 
Egypt and Kuwait. Because of the heavy reliance on foreign aid, 
Jordan's tax burden ratio is less than Egypt's. The ratio 
nuctua.ted narrowly and kept a pace of changes in GDP. Egypt 
seems to have a relatively high tax burden which averaged 29.5 
per cent for the period from 1 975 to 1983. Kuwait is considered 
an extreme case in tax burden, due to the non-existence of maey 
taxes. But after the anticipated sharp decrease in oil prices, 
the Kuwaiti gov errment should think aoout introducing taxes, 
especially on incane, corporate. In fact, Kuwait could easily 
raise additional revenues of more than one billion dinars if the 
tax burden were increased to 20 per cent based on 1983 figures. 
Table 13: Budget Surplus of Deficit 
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3 025 .3 
566 .2 
92.5 
Source: Arab Monetary Fund, Statistical and 
Economic Data 1 975-1 982 
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Table 14: Tax Burden (Tax revenues GDP) (GDP in millions of 
local currency) 
JORDAN Eil YPT KUWAIT 
Year GDP TAX TAX GDP TAX TAX GDP TAX TAX 
RE.V. BURDEN RE.V. BURDEN RE.V. BURDEN 
1974 312 .1 58. 1 18.6 41 97 1130.2 26. 9% 3487 432 12.3% 
1976 421 .6 89.0 21.1 50.6 13 53. 7 26.7 3839 514 13 .3 
1977 514 .2 117.7 22.8 6165 2931 .6 32 .1 4049 1 87 4.6 
197 8 632.2 123 .2 1 9 .4 7534 2227.8 29.5 426'4 324 7.5 
1 979 753 .o 151 .o 20.0 9021 2646. 7 29.3 6743 149 2.2 
1980 979 .5 176.6 17.8 12101 4195.6 34.6 7451 209 2.8 
1981 11 82 .5 232 .9 17 .3 16552 4799.6 28.9 6764 261 3.8 
1982 1343 .2 263 .1 1 9 .5 19402 5428.2 27.9 5727 214 3.7 
1983 14 87 .3 292 .8 19.6 21324 6425.8 30 .1 6218 1 96 3. 1 
Source: calculated fran International Financial Statistics and tables 4, 5, 
9, and 12. 
In the long run, Jordan will have to develop internal 
revenues to decrease the reliance on foreign aid. Due to low 
income and limited business opportunities, the developnent and 
increase of local revenues will not be an easy task. Jordan can 
still borra..r fran local and international capital markets, but 
this is acceptable as a short tenn solution. Developing 
export-oriented activities may be a good solution in the long 
run. As for Egypt, Suez Canal dues are likely to increase but 
this increase will be absorbed by decreasing surpluses fran the 
oil sector. 
Kuwait is not 1 ikely to face any financial problems in the 
future, but imposing taxes may becane a necessary action at 
least for their redistributional effect, which will be necessary 
in the future. 
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Chapter 3 
MIGRATION AS A FACTOR CONDITIONING STATE ECONOMIC CONTROL AND 
FINANCIAL POLICY OPTIONS 
Ibrahim S.E. Abdallah 
Inter-Arab migration has become one of the most important 
phenanena in the Arab region, especially after the increase of 
oil prices during 1973 /74. The correction of oil prices after 
1973 widened the already existing gap in per capita incane 
between the scarsely populated Arab oil exporting countries in 
the Gulf area and North Africa and other Arab countries. 
The policies of accelerated growth and rapid modernisation 
adopted by almost all of the oil exporting countries, 
necessitated increasing dependence on expatriate workers. Demand 
increased rapidly for both Arabs and non Arabs. Demand included 
all levels of skills and types of professions. The wage and 
incane differentials between the oil and non oil-Arab countries 
was so great that it attracted larger and larger numbers of 
workers and professionals, ready to try their chances through 
migration. A large exodus of manpower and of temporary 
immigrants took place from the non-oil to the oil exporting 
states in the Gulf and North Africa. 
Without going into detailed figure about the expatriate 
labourers working in the area and the increase in their number 
during the seventies and early eighties, it is enough here to 
mention that more than 2 .2 million Arab workers were working in 
Gulf countries and Libya in 1980. Almost half of these came fran 
Egypt. More than 80 per cent of total Arab expatriate workers in 
the Gulf and North Africa are citizens of only three countries, 
namely Egypt, Jordan and the Yemen Arab Republic. Migrants fran 
these countries constituted an important proportion of their 
total manpower. In Egypt the segment of manpower working abroad 
was about 8 .5 per cent of total manpower in 1980. For YAR and 
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Jordan, the seginent reached 20 per cent and 28 per cent in the 
same year. 
THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF MIGRATION 
Such large migration from non-oil to oil Arab countries, 
resulted in major and deep changes in the structure of economies 
and in economic relations in the 'sending' countries. 
Remittances frcm migrant workers became one of the most 
important, if not the most important, ccmponent of disposable 
income in the labour exporting countries. Value of remittances 
bypassed traditional exports in many countries and became the 
main source of saving. They helped finance personal consumption, 
investments and exports. 
Data concerning recorded remittances show more than a 
ten-fold increase during the period 1973/80 in YAR. 'lh e increase 
in Jordan and Egypt during the same period was by a factor of 
about 14 and 30. Actual remittances were much higher. Recorded 
remittances are estimated to be only 50 per cent of total 
remittances that actually flow into the Arab labour exporting 
countries. Researchers in Jordan estimated transfers through the 
banking system and official exchange bureaus to be only 40-50 
per cent of the tlotal transfers frcm migrant workers. The same 
is true about Egypt and Sudan, where an imper tant part of 
migrant savings is exchanged through the black market to finance 
what is termed 'own-exchange imports'. 'lhe banking system in YAR 
serves only about 8 per cent of the population, leaving most of 
the transfers in the hands of non official agents. 'lhe following 
table gives. an estimate of the growth of remittances of migrant 
workers in the most important Arab countries from 1 973 to 1980. 
The fact that migration has resulted in large transfers of 
remittances, has not prevented heated discussions among 
economists concerning the net effect of. migration on economic 
and social conditions in the countries of origin. Certain 
economists, especially in the early stages of labour migration, 
looked positively to the new phencmenon and considered the 
availability of surplus labour in a group of Arab countries and 
surplus funds in others, reciprocally advantageous to both 
groups, as each group can gain frcm exchange of its surplus 
factor of production with the factor it lacks ( al-Sherbini 
1977). Later, while more and more economists doubted the 
reciprocal advantages to both groups of countries, they still 
considered that migration had both positive and negative effects 
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Table 1: Evolution of Remittances of Migrant Workers, 1973 -











































































311 538 589 
388 436 453 
574 657 944 





Source: Adopted from Ibrahim Saad el-Din and Mahmoud 
Abdel-Fadil, The Movement of Arab Workers, Problems, Effects and 
Policies, Table 2-1, p. 78. 
Note: The first group include countries exporting workers mainly 
to Arab oil exporting. 'Ihe second group includes North African 
countries exporting mainly to Europe. 
on the economies of the sending countries. While it is difficult 
to measure in an exact way the net result and to determine its 
nature, the fact that mi gra ti on cannot be prevented or 
eliminated makes the best policy on aimed at minimising the 
negative effects while maximising the positive ones (Abdel Fadil 
1979, 1980; el-Din and Abdel Fadil 1963; el-Din 1979; Anani and 
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ABdel-Jaber 1981). Few economists and social scientists, 
however, emphasised that migration of manpower and population in 
the present social context can only lead to a canplete waste of 
resources and to the spread of negative attitudes and values 
that will adverselly affect develoµnent in both the sending and 
receiving countries (Fergani 1980). 
Whether the net effects of migration to the sending 
countries are negative or not, it is nevertheless, useful to 
summarise the main effects of large scale migration on the 
economies of the sending countries. 
(a) It is an accepted fact by almost all economists that 
large scale migration fran Arab countries with surplus labour 
has helped lessen both disguised and open unemployment in the 
countries of origin. It is also agreed that the phenanenon has 
not disappeared canpletely. Migration does not necessarily draw 
upon the excess available labour. Demand for migrant workers is 
highly selective and biased toward higher skills. Figures 
concerning migrant workers in the Arab world show that outward 
nows of workers include all levels of skills and all types of 
professions, but the proportion of professionals and skilled 
workers to the total of migrant workers is much higher than the 
proportion of other categories to total manpower. Most of the 
sending countries, which originally suffered from shortages of 
professional and skilled workers, have suffered more as a result 
of migration. This is particularly true in the case of Sudan, 
Jordan and YAR. But it is also the case of Egypt. Large scale 
migration from Jordan has led to acute shortages in professional 
and skilled workers which has adversely affected the 
implementation of develoµnent programs, especially the creation 
of new i,ndustrial projects enlargement of the port of Aqaba and 
irrigation projects in the Jordan Valley, etc. (Anani and 
Abdel-Faber 1981). 
In the case of YAR, even though most of the migrant workers 
are non-skilled, a great number and a higher percentage of 
skilled and professional Yemenis leave their country to look for 
better employment possibilities in the oil countries, causing 
considerable shortages of skilled workers (Fergani, '?). The 
1976/80 develoµnent plan expected a shortage of manpower supply 
of about 38 per cent of total demand, mainly in skilled workers 
and technicians. 
In Egypt, the large increase in demand of construction 
workers by the Arab oil countries led to a Ve'C"J high increase in 
wages construction due to shortages in trained construction 
workers caused by migration. This led to recrui t.ment of 
increasing numbers fran the agricultural sector. Both migration 
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of farm workers to both the Arab countries and the construction 
sector led to a scarcity of labour in certain agricultural 
areas. 'lhese negative effects were strengthened by the weak 
occupational mobility in the local market (Choucri, Ekarns and 
el-Din 1978). Shortages in professional and skilled workers in 
other occupations led to the deterioration of maey services. 
University education suffered greatly from migration of 
professors (el-Din 1980). 
Besides the shortage of labour in the labour exporting 
countries, and because of it, is a high worker turnover, an 
increase of absenteeism and lack of discipline. Studies in 
Jordan, YAR and Egypt indicate a deterioration in work 
discipline in all three countries due to migration. 
(b) Increasing remittances are supposed to he! p finance 
develoIJ!lent and cover deficit in the balance of payment of the 
countries of migrating workers' origin. 'lhe fact is that such a 
positive effect of remittances has been limited by the way large 
scale migration of Arab workers to oil countries influences the 
consumption patterns in sending countries. The high income oil 
producing and exporting countries in the Gulf and North Africa 
are affluent societies, enjoying a very high standard of living 
and consuming mainly imported non-durable and durable goods. 
Workers who move to these countries are affected by the 
consumption patterns and the widespread consumerism in most 
countries. This 'demonstration effect' has a great influence on 
consumption in the labour exporting countries, because of the 
temporary nature of migration and the high turnover of migrants. 
Migrants returning during vacations or after they have finished 
their work, bring with them new modern imported goods that they 
demonstrate among their friends and neighbours, arousing their 
emy and pushing them to try to acquire similar goods either 
through migration or directly fran the local market, if they can 
achieve a higher income locally. The new consumption patterns 
that have spread in the last ten years in Arab labour exporting 
countries include maey imported durable and non-durable goods or 
commodi tes that have a very large import canponent. During the 
period 1971/79 the number of electric refrigerators consumed in 
Egypt increased by 26 per cent annually, washing machines by 25 
per cent, television sets by 37 per cent, private cars by 26 per 
cent and metal furniture by 24 per cent (el-Din and Abdel Fadil 
1963) • 
In Jordan, expenditure on personal consumption increased 
from 161 .1 million dinars in 1971 to 520 .5 million dinars in 
1979 at current prices while Jordanian imports of consumer goods 
increased in the same period from 33.44 million dinars to 215.21 
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million. Thus, while total expenditure on personal consumption 
increased little over three times, importation of consumer goods 
increased by nearly seven times (el-Din and Abdel Fadil 1 963). 
The same trend is true for the YAR and Sudan. Various studies in 
a number of Arab labour exporting countries have shown high 
carrel a ti on between migration remittances and importation of 
durable consumer goods. 
Such preferences for fancy imported goods or commodities 
with a high import content lead to the loss of an important part 
of the financial resources and savings that would otherwise have 
been available because of migration. 'lhe net beneficial effect, 
especially in the long run, of migration on facing balance of 
payments is now doubted by more and more economists. 
(c) Remittances add to personal income. Decisions 
concerning their allocation to consumption or savings depend on 
individual decisions, within the context and general rules and 
conditions governing the economy as a whole. 'lhe saved part of 
remittances play a an increasingly major role in determining the 
size of aggregate national savings of the labour exporting 
societies. Decisions of migrant workers concerning investment 
of their funds to a large extent determine the pattern and size 
of investment. Few studies have investigated the actual 
behaviour of migrant workers concerning the use of their saved 
funds. A survey by the Royal Jordanian Society in the summer of 
1980 showed that more than 50 per cent of families included in 
the survey did not make any investiment, while 22 per cent 
invested in real estate, especially in the ownership of small 
apartaments {al-Saket 1981). Table 2 is a summary of the 
findings of the survey mentioned above. 
Studies by the central bank of Jordan confirm the fact that 
only a minor part of migrant's remittances were directly 
invested during the period 1965/79, and that only a ::mall part 
of these invested funds were channelled to productive projects 
(al-Nabawi and al-Shaar 1982). 
In Egypt, sample surveys conducted on construction workers 
(Al-Ahram 1978), school teachers (M:!sseiha 1980) and university 
professors (el-Din and Omar 1980) shCMed that the greatest part 
of the savings of migrant workers is invested in real estate. 
While school teachers and university professors tend to invest 
in bank deposits, construction workers invest the largest part 
of their savings in private self-operated business (especially 
in the purchasing of taxis and partnerships in small shops). 
Table 3 is a summary of the results of the abovementioned 
surveys concerning the patterns of investment. 
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Table 2: Patterns of Investment of Remittances 
Workers, 1980 (per cent) 
High Groups Palestinian 
by Migrant 
Type of 
itwestment income with less 
group than high 
Camps Villages Total 
Returning migrants 
- Purchase of non-
agr i cultural land 1 .5 
- Purchase of non-
agri culture and 
non-industrial 
buildings 3 .4 
- Investment in 
ag. projects 
- Investment in 
ind. projects 1.0 
- Investment in 
govt. bonds 
- Investment in 
stocks 0.5 
- Others 8 .8 
not mentioned 4.2 
Present migrants 
- Purchase of non-
agricultural land 3 .2 
- Purchase of non-
gri cultural non-
industrial bldg. 4 • 2 
- Investment in 
agric. project 0 .9 
- Investment in 
ind. project 1 .4 
- Investment in 
govt. bonds 1 .4 
- Investment in 
stocks 1 .9 
- Others 2 .4 































































Canputed from al-Saket "Remittances by migrant workers and their 
uses" p. 116 and published in Ibrahim Saad El-Din and Mahmoud 
Abdel-Fadil (1981) Movement of Arab Manpower, Problems, Effects 
and Policies, Royal Scientific Society, Amman, p. 96. 
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Table 3: Investment Patterns of Remittance of Selected 
Occupational Groups in Egypt, 1978 
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Beirut Table 
In Sudan, the result of a sample study by Dr. A. Awad (1) 
and Gal al el-Din indicates that the major part of the savings of 
migrants to the oil countries were invested in the following 
fields: 
- Purchase of apartment houses already constructed and land 
for contruction in big cities, especially Khartoum 
- Construction and improvement of houses 
- Purchase of taxis and other transportation vehicles 
- Opening of small shops and cafeterias, etc. 
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Moreover a number of' observations indicate that migrants 
f'ran the rural areas in Egypt, Jordan, YAR and Sudan invest part 
of' their savings in the purchase of' tractors, agricultural. 
machinery and electric motors. 
Generally speaking, the portion of' savings that is invested 
in the productive sectors (especially agriculture and industry) 
is very limited. The largest part is absorbed by the real estate 
sector, fuelling speculation which pushes the prices of' land and 
buildings higher and higher. 
(d) If the net beneficial. impact of' large-scale migration 
and remittances on the balance of' payments def'ici t of' the labour 
exporting countries is a matter of controversy between dif'f'erent 
economists, it is an accepted f'act that remittances from migrant 
workers contribute to inflation in the sending countries during 
the seventies and early eighties. Inf'la tionary pressure 
increases through the fallowing processes all related to 
migration: 
- migrant worker remittances lead to an increase of' money 
supply and increased of' dEmand by migrants and their 
families f'or goods and services. Such increased purchasing 
power is not para!! eled by an increase in productive 
activity, as it is generated outside the local economy. 
Remittances are mainly spent in markets f'or durable consumer 
goods and non durable, business and personal services and on 
land and buildings. 'lhe inelastici ty of' supply in these 
markets means that increasing purchasing power creates 
demand surplus which leads to increasing prices. 
- Inel astici ty of' internal supply leads to an attempt to 
import to f'ace additional. demand. Increasing imports lead to 
increasing demand f'or foreign currency which is purchased 
from the black market at high exchange rates. This is 
compensated by higher margins and higher prices by 
importers. 
- Migration of' technical and skilled workers and increasing 
demand on labour internally to meet the demand of' migrants 
f'or more goods and services, especially apartments and 
buildings, lead to wage increases that af'f'ect costs in the 
productive firms, thus contributing to cost push inflation 
as well. 
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- The large difference of wages and incanes between migrants 
and workers in the local market, leads to a lack of work 
discipline and ethics, and thus to lower productivity, which 
al so contributes to the inflationary pressure in the labour 
exporting countries. 
e) Studies about the effect of large-scale migration of manpower 
on distribution of incane in the sending countries gave no 
conclusive results as to whether it leads to more or less 
~ ui table distri bu ti on. 
Migration also affects distribution of income through 
various channels. First, there is the effect of higher wages 
and income abroad on remittances and the ability to support and 
raise the standard of living of the dependents of migrants in 
the sending countries. Secondly, migration affects the wage 
structure in the sending countries. Wages in certain sectors and 
in certain occupations increase greatly in comparison to others. 
Inflationary pressures also lead to redistribution of incane in 
favour of the non-fixed income groups. Remittances may al so 
affect the distribution of ownership of assets. Migrants, 
especially in high income groups, use an important part of their 
incanes to acquire new assets They are encouraged to do so 
through facilitations and tax exemptions. 
While all such factors indicate that migration has caused 
unproportional changes in the income of different social groups 
and strata within the countries of origin, there is no proof as 
to whether this has led to a more or less equitable income 
distri bu ti on. 
While it is generally accepted that remittances have 
increased .the money incane of sane of the lower incane groups, 
it is doubtful whether it has really succeeded in eradicating 
poverty. Inflationary pressures through the seventies and 
deterioration of services, especially goverrment services, 
eroded the effect of incane increases. 
While transfer by higher income groups may increase their 
share of ownership through new investment, remittances by lower 
income groups are usually used to support their families, 
satisfy their demand for basic goods and meet part of the newly 
created demand for durables. The degree of variance of the new 
incane generated abroad, thus, also affects the general degree 
of variance of future income patterns in the country of origin. 
An important aspect that should be taken into consideration, 
however, is that migration has led to the expansion of the 
strata of small owners and 'own-account' operators in the 
countries of origin. 
91 
Abdallah - Migration, State Economic Control and Financial Options 
IMPACT ON STATE ECONOMIC CONTROLS 
While it is naor commonly recognised that large-scale migration 
of Arab workers to the Arab oil exporting countries in the Gulf 
and North Africa has both negative and positive effects, it is 
still argued whether the costs of migration exceed the benefits 
or vice versa. Whatever may be the case, it is an accepted fact 
that the tide of migration has be cane too strong for anyone to 
prevent or control it fran the source. Besides, labour sending 
countries have becane too dependent on incane generated abroad 
and remittances transferred by their workers to take aey 
measures that may reduce it. The na1 prevailing consumption 
patterns with high import content can hardly be changed in case 
of a reduction of incane inflow. The expected results, if this 
were to occur, would be deeper balance of payment deficits and 
1 ow er rate of growth of GDP. 
This dependency on migration, together with the stiffer and 
stiffer canpeti tion that Arab workers now meet in, the Arab 
labour importing countries fran other expatriates, especially 
from the south and south-east Asia, lead to urwillingness of 
policymakers to take any steps that might harm the goose that 
provides them with gal den eggs. 
Interviews with a number of policy makers and top officials 
in the labour sending countries show refusal to take any steps 
to control the 
flow of workers. ~st of the officials of the sending countries 
consider it urMise to negotiate on behalf of their fellaor 
migrant workers to guarantee better working conditions to ask 
for non-discriminatory trea t.ment or to protect their legal 
rights, etc. • • The idea of demanding compensation for losses 
caused by shortages of skilled manpower or for investment in 
education and training is not accepted. Policymakers are also 
very reluctant to accept suggestions that migrant workers should 
be compelled in any way to contribute to the financing of their 
country budget or to face the burden of a negative balance of 
payments. Taxation of migrant income is always refused as 
apalicy options. It is also considered unpractical to require 
migrants to transfer a certain minimum percentage of their 
incane through official banking channels. 
Transfers of remittances are considered too sensitive for 
any measure of control. The only sensible policy option under 
such conditions is to provide more and more incentives as well 
as guarantees against possible adverse action by their own 
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goverrments. Only economic levers can motivate workers-beyond 
the central of their goverrment-to send back a larger part of 
their inccme generated abroad (World Bank Mission 1 977). 
Even in the context of a tightly central.led system, some 
allowances and exemptions have to be provided to the owners of 
income generated abroad. As far back as 1968, Egypt which had a 
complete goverrment monopoly of imports, adopted what was called 
own-exchange imports. Through that system, private importers 
were permitted to import certain specific items if they needed 
no allocation frcm the foreign exchange budget. The goods which 
were thus imported were mainly raw materials, capital and 
intermediate goods needed especially by the ::mall commodity 
producers. Funds needed to finance this trade were for the most 
part purchased frcm migrant workers at a higher rate than the 
official exchange rate. After 1970, Syria, also provided a 
number of outlets to the private sector to import goods financed 
from foreign exchange holdings abroad, or through arrangements 
with migrant Syrian workers abroad. Non-residents were 
authorised to open foreign exchange accounts in Syria and to 
transfer funds without clearance frcm the exchange office. 
Within the context of the overall state control system of 
foreign trade, a system of extraordinary permits allowed the 
private sectors to import raw materials, intermediate goods and 
even some consumer goods on a restricted list. These measures 
increased the share of private sector imports from 29 per cent 
in 197 1 t.o about 40 per cent in 1976 (World Bank Mission 1977). 
Even PDYR which is still follow:ing a socialist road of 
development and is closely allied to the Soviet Union, 
introduced sane measures to encourage its migrant citizens in 
the Arab c.ountries to transfer part of their income either in 
monetary form or in needed goods to their heme country. 
Fran 1973 award, during the same period of large-scale 
migration of workers, a transformation of economic systems took 
place in a number of Arab countries. Certain countries that used 
to adopt a more or less centrally planned and controlled system 
during the sixties and or the early seventies, went through a 
process of liberalisation. 
Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Algeria, Sudan, Libya and PDRY, all 
depended on the public sector as the loccmotive of develoµnent 
during the sixties and or the early seventies. Internal 
resources were mobilised and brought under control of the 
central goverrment which became responsible for allocation of 
resources and the use of funds and the implementation of the 
social and economic develoµnent pl ans. 
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t-bst of these countries depended on administrative control 
devices to run the economy and ensure fulfillment of plans. Such 
controls were widespread in cases where resources are scarce 
compared with the goals sought. Policymakers and planners were, 
in such cases, compelled to adopt more and more administrative 
control devices to achieve some kind of equilibirum that could 
not be attained via market mechanisms except at a very high 
price of social injustice and deterioration of the standard of 
living of the masses. 
In most cases, investment, were centrally directed and 
controlled. Foreign, as well as local ca pi ta! was blockedd from 
investment in certain sectors or areas. Some kind of import 
controls, including of state or public sector monopoly of all 
imports, or importation of certain goods, and/or import permits 
were widely used. Foreign exchange was allocated by the central 
banks or other goverment organs according to priori ties set the 
central development plans. Movement of workers to other 
countries needed special permission and exit visas. 
The second half of the seventies was an era of 
liberalisation and releasing of certain control devices in a 
number of Arab countries. While in most countries it meant an 
easing of controls, the liberalisation process went as far as 
transforming the whole system in the case of Egypt and Sudan. 
While availability of Arab investible funds and the need to 
encourage the transfer of remittances are among the factors that 
led to a certain degree of liberalisation, other economic and 
political reasons could not be excluded, especially in the case 
of transformation of the system. 
{ a ) The case of Egypt 
Considering the case of Egypt, we can observe that attempts 
to liberalise the economy started during Nasser's rule. The 
Egyptian economy faced certain difficulties after the 
mid-sixties. Pressures on the economy were caused by the war in 
Yemen which started in September 1963, in which Egyptian armies 
became involved. Besides rigidities of the system, the absence 
of both positive and negative incentives led to inefficiency. 
The rate of gr ow th started to decline fr cm the year 1 96 4/ 6 5. The 
war with Israel, the military defeat and the protracted battles 
that Egypt had to bear thereafter made it very difficult to cope 
with economic problems. Average annual rate of grOHth declined 
to 3.5 per cent during the period 1964/65 - 1971/73, while 
population gr OH th reached 2 .5 per cent. As early as 1967 /68 
attempts were made from, inside the system to introduce a mmber 
of changes that would open the economy to some kind of 
94 
Abdallah - Migration, State Economic Control and Financial Options 
cooperation with Western countries and to motivate foreign 
capita! to invest in Egypt. It was also suggested to free the 
public sector from administrative controls and to depend more on 
the profit motive in directing economic activities. Such 
suggestions were made by the planning and policy committee of 
the council of ministers, which was then under the chairmanship 
of the Vice-president Zakaria Mohie el-Din, but were refused by 
Nasser. 
Soon after his death, however, the first attempts were made 
to encourage the inflow of foreign and Arab capita!. Law No. 65 
of 1971 was issued for that purpose. But it was only after the 
1973 war and the increase of oil prices that the infitah or 
"open door" policy was proclaimed as the official policy of the 
country. The October paper of 1974 declared that such a policy 
was necessary to benefit from Western technology and Arab funds. 
The public sector was then still considered as 
the leading sector in the Egyptian economy. Foreign ca pi ta! was 
to be called in to finance proje.cts approved and included in the 
economic development plan to help accelerate their 
implementation. Pressures by foreign and Arab capita!, together 
with local capitalists, soon washed awey all constraints and 
restrictions. Many restrictions that were imposed during 
Nasser's era were officially described as obstacles that 
deprived Egypt fran the benefit of advanced Western technology 
and available Arab funds. 
Law No. 43 of 1974 was issued permitting foreign investments 
in all sectors of the economy and granting guarantees and 
privileges to foreign and Arab capita!. The law was subsequently 
changed to accommodate the observations and ccmplaints of 
would-be ,investors. All privileges that were granted to foreign 
capital were soon extended to local capitalists also. To attact 
foreign capita! and encourage local private entrepreneurs, a 
large amount of legislation was issued during the 1974-77 perid 
and thereafter to ease restrictions and integrate the economy 
more and more in the international market. 
Goverrment policies towards control of foreign exchange 
importation of goods and emigration of workers changed entirely 
after the proclamation of the infitah policy. More and more 
administrative controls were substituted with incentives and 
guarantees. 
( b) The case of Sudan 
Changes in the economic system of Sudan took place after and 
as a result of the attempt to overthrow Numeiry in 1971. 'Ihe 
support of the communist Party of Sudan to the unsuccessful coup 
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led the president to make a canplete change of' f'ace and 
policies. He allied himself' with the Western countries and the 
conservative Arab regimes. This was accompanied by more 
dependence on the private sector and especially on foreign and 
Arab assistance and investment. As in the case of' Egypt, this 
necessitated . discarding maey of' the administrative control 
devices then in use and introducing a set of' incentives and 
guarantees to investors, whether local or foreign. 
Such a major change in econanic policies is the function of' 
a number of' economic, social and political factors. Sane are 
objective constraints while others are subjective, mainly 
related to the nature and preference of the ruling classes or 
elite. Mass migration of' workers to the oil countries due to 
income dif'f'erential is an objective phenomenon that can hardly 
be controlled by either administrative or economic means. Incane 
generated abroad is very sensitive to changes in the economic 
climate. It can hardly be controlled by national goverrments of' 
the sending countries, and cannot be mobilised by any 
administrative devices. At the same time, the flow of' incane to 
the countries makes it less necessary to use administrative 
devices. While emigration may thus encourage li beralisa ti on of 
the econanic system, a major change in the system is related 
mainly to the nature of' the ruling elite and its political and 
idealogical orientation. 
EFFECT OF MASS MIGRATION ON PUBLIC FINANCE 
The ef'f'ects of' mass migration on pub! ic finance of' the Arab 
labour exporting countries is very hard to trace. 'Ihe exodus of' 
workers and the resultant large inflow of' funds f'ran remittances 
i nf'l uenced the structure of' the economies of' the sending states 
as well as the relative importance of' their various financial 
resources. While -sane of' the most important direct ef'f'ects of' 
migration were mentioned in the first part of' this paper, these 
are only the apparently known results. 
Some of' the mu! tiplier and accelerating ef'f'ects of' inflows 
are very dif'f'icul t to ascertain. This is especially so because 
of' the lack of' accurate data and because phenomena like 
migration and large remittances constitute a break in the systan 
rather than a continua ti on of' it. Furthermore, the reactions 
of' the various Arab countries to the large increase of' 
remittances dif'f'ered be cause of' the dif'f'erences in the nature of' 
the prevailing economic systems, the structure of' the economies 
and the level of' develollllent. MJreover, certain variations were 
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also caused by the choice and adoption of different financial 
policies. Such choices are hard to relate directly or at least 
solely to the increase of migration and remittances. 
As mentioned earlier, migration and large increases in 
remittances resulted in a certain activisa ti on of the economies 
of the labour exporting countries. Especially, they led to an 
accel e1"a ti on of dependence on imported goods and very high 
increase of importation. They also contributed to the 
revi talisa ti on of the trade, finance, and construction sectors. 
They caused high inflationary pressures because of both the 
increase of costs and higher danand. These factors influenced 
both the revenues of the state budgets and their expenditures. 
Dcmestic revenues kept increasing mainly because of the rise 
of custom duties and the rise of business profit taxes. In 
Jordan, for example, total dcmestic revenues reached 28 per cent 
of GDP in 1979 compared to 22 per cent in 1972. On the average, 
12 per cent of dcmestic revenues came from incc:me and business 
taxes and 46 per cent fran custom duties (World Bank 1978, 
1980). In the YAR, which only established a modern tax system 
between 1967 and 1972, gover!1llent revenues showed a dramatic 
increase in the seventies. Tax revenues which were equivalent 
to 4 per cent of GDP in 1970/71 increased to 15 per cent by 
1979/80, with an average growth rate of 45 per cent per annum. 
Import duties constituted the single most important source of 
revenues ·in YAR. In 1979/80, they accounted for 60 per cent of 
total budget revenues. During the seventies, their share never 
fell below 50 per cent and they even exceeded 70 per cent in 
1976/77, which reflected dependence on imports as the main 
supply for goods of all kinds (World l3ank 1982). 
In Egypt, which has a more complex and developed tax system, 
revenues from total taxes kept up with the increase of GDP. 
Total taxes to GDP varied between 20 per cent and 24 per cent 
during the period 1976 to 1981/82. Tax revenues constituted 
about 90 per cent of total governnent revenues during the 
period. The two most important revenue sources were the 
business profit tax and custom duties. Business profit tax 
revenue increased by about 37 per cent annually during the 
period. Its share in total tax revenue rose frc:m about 
one-fifth to one-third during the period. This was mainly due 
to profits frcm oil and the Suez Canal. Excluding profits fran 
both resources, share of business tax revenues varied from about 
one-eighth to about one-sixth, with an increasing overall 
tendency. On the other hand, custc:m duties which constituted 
about 40 per cent in 1976 came down to about one- third of total 
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tax revenues by the beginning of the eighties. However, the 
ratio of revenues fran custom duties to GDP remained around 8 
per cent during most of the years as nominal revenues from 
duties increased by about 22 per cent per anm.m (World Bank 
1983, Ahmed 1984). 
Despite the naninal rise in revenues and of the ratio of 
total tax revenues to GDP, current and capital expenditures 
showed a high rate of increase that led, in most cases, to 
higher budget deficit. While most of the increase in public 
expenditures could be traced to inflationary pressures, whether 
danestic or imported, it was al so caused by the ambitious 
capita! investment programs of the gover?lllents. 
In Jordan, for example, the annual rate of growth of total 
gover?lllent expenditures reached 25 per cent during theperiod 
1972-75 and about 25.9 per cent during the period 1975/79. This 
was due to a current expenditures increase of 21 .3 per cent and 
22.7 per cent in the two periods and a capital expenditures 
increase of 32.9 and 27 .1, respectively. Current and capita! 
expenditures thus reached extremely high levels. 'Ihey increased 
fran 36 per cent and 18.1 per cent of GDP in 1973 to.47.1 per 
cent and 29 .1 per cent of the GDP by the end of the seventies. 
The very high level of current expenditures is due to the high 
level of military expenditures (about 17 per cent of GDP since 
1975) and of expenditure on the civil services. Even though the 
relative importance of the civil service in current expenditures 
decreased after 1975, its rate of growth was around 18 per cent 
annually. One of the reasons for the high rate of growth was 
the need to incrase wages in order to retain valuable personnel 
in the civil service. Nominal wages and salaries were increased 
at a rate close to the cost of living index till. 1978. A 20 per 
cent salary increase was also granted in 1979. Gover?lllent 
transfers also increased because of constmption subsidies and 
interest on public debt. Subsidies reached about 5 .1 per cent 
of GDP by the end of the seventies and the beginning of the 
eighties. Defence expenditures in Jordan have been and are 
covered by foreign assistance both frcm foreign and Arab 
countries. If both foreign assistance and defence expenses were 
excluded fran the budget, the budget would show a snall surplus 
during the seventies. This s:nall surplus turned into deficit by 
the end of the seventies due to a substantial increase in 
subsidies and interest on debt. When capital expenditures are 
added, the budget showed an overall deficit during all the 
years. 
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In YAR, budgetary expenditures increased at an average 
annual rate of around 35 per cent between 1970/71 and 1979/80. 
This was less than the rate of increase of revenues for the same 
period which reached almost 45 per cent. HCMever, within this 
period, there were two sharply constrasting phases. In the 
mid-seventies, the very rapid grCMth of imports financed by 
expatriate remittances increased revenues much more rapidly than 
expenditures. Between 1974/75 and 1976/78 revenues increased by 
nearly 85 per cent canpared with an increase of expenditures of 
under 50 per cent. During the period the overall deficit 
declined from 6 per cent of GDP to 2 per cent. A different 
pattern has developed since 1977-79 as the gr CM th rate of 
revenues declined to less that 17 per cent while at the same 
time expenditures increased by over 40 per cent annually. As a 
result overall deficit was more that 15 per cent of GDP by the 
end of the seventies. 
One of the main reasons for the increase of current 
expenditures was the rise of wages and salaries which accounts 
for about two-thirds of current expenditures. General 
adjustment of goverrment pay scales had to be made to meet the 
effects of inflation and wage increases in neighbouring 
countries. In 1977, salaries became twice their 1971 level. 
Another increase of about more than 40 per cent took place in 
1979. 
In Egypt, total expenditure as a percent of GDP has 
increased from 55 per cent in 1976 to 60 per cent in 1982/83, as 
compared with an increase in total revenue frcm 34 per cent to 
39 per cent of GDP in the same period. Deficit thus remained 
around 20 per cent with a wide fluctuation frcm a low of 17 per 
cent in 1977 to a high of 27 per cent in 1979. 
The high increase of budget expenditures is related to 
dcmestic inflationary pressures caused by the large deficit, as 
well as by the increase of public debt and the burden of serving 
debts. 'lhe deficit itself is susceptible to the influences of 
exogenous factors on both revenue and expenditures. The 
exogenous infiuences on the revenue side are transmitted through 
the dependence on the petroleum and Suez Canal revenues. The 
ratio of these revenues to the total reached about 35 per cent 
in 1980/ 81 but fell to less that 27 per cent in 1981 /82 and less 
that 25 per cent in 1982/83. 'lhe decline was due to lower oil 
prices and oil trade. The main exogenous influence on 
expenditure is the magnitude of consumer subsidies which mainly 
depends on international food prices. 
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Deterioration of terms of trade causes a reduction in 
goverment receipts, raising the budget deficit. As most of the 
deficit is financed through danestic sources, especially bank 
financing, it leads to an increasing rate of inflation which 
then feeds back into higher budget expenditures and deficit in 
the next stages. An increase of food prices in the 
international market has the same effect as lower revenues from 
oil or the Suez canal. 
Exemptions fran various taxes and duties are most widely 
used to attract migrants to bring their remittances back and 
invest them at hane. This becomes more and more important the 
larger the trade deficit of the country and the larger the role 
played by migrants' remittances as a source of funding of the 
balance of payment. Tax exemptions, however, can hardly stop 
there. As more incentives are offered to migrants, other 
investors and social groups usualy press for similar treatment. 
While most of the labour exporting countries complain of large 
budget deficits, they allow such wide exemption from taxes that 
their benefit is doubtful at best. 
Incentives via tax exemptions are more widely used· in cases 
where the market exchange rate of the local currency differs 
greatly fran the official exchange rate. 
Egypt widely uses tax exemptions to attract migrants to 
transfer their savings back bane. Incentives are provided in 
various forms. 
First, under law No 43/1974, amended in 1977, private 
foreign investments from all taxes for a period of 5 years from 
the first fiscal year fol.lowing commencement of production. The 
period could be extended to eight years. Exemptions are for ten 
years and can be extended up to fifteen years if investment 
takes place in the new urban areas. The 1 <J77 amendment provided 
Egyptian investors with a m.mber of advantages offered to Arab 
and foreign investors. One of the objectives of the 1977 
amendment was to attract Egyptian savings abroad. For this 
purpose, Egyptians were provided with advantages and exemptions 
that were included in six acts of the law. Tax exemptions 
covered industrial and commercial profits, incane on bonds, and 
total personal income. 
Revenues fran deposits in foreign currencies in Egyptian 
banks have long been exempted from taxes. However Law No 
11/ 1983 concerning migration and the protection of interests of 
Egyptians working abroad extended such exemption to all deposits 
in aey of the banks operating in Egypt by migrant Egyptians and 
Egyptian working abroad. Moreover, ca pi ta! shares by aey 
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migrant or Egyptian working abroad in project opera ting in Egypt 
are offered the most advantageous treatment of either foreign or 
local capital operating in the same field. 
As mentioned earlier, tax exemption for the benefit of 
foreign or Arab investors or for migrant Egyptians could not but 
be extended to all other Egyptian investors. The new joint 
stock company act provided Egyptian investors all the 
exemptions. benefits and guarantees included in law 43/ 197 4. Tax 
exemptions also cover: 
- interest income frcm bonds issued by joint stock companies 
and offered for public subscriptions; 
- interest on bonds issued by pub! ic sector banks as well as 
interest on bonds issued by banks in which public sector 
capital accounts for more than 5 per cent if the bond are 
issued with the aim of financing projects within Egypt. 
- profits resulting frcm revaluation of assets when these 
assets are used for participation in joint stock companies; 
real estate transactions if used for joint stock 
companies. 
As mentioned earlier in this paper, Arab workers in the Gulf 
and North African oil producing countries a re not subject to 
aey taxes frcm either the host countries or the country of 
origin. Taxation of such inccme by the countries of origin is 
ref'used by the decisionmakers. as it mey ef'fect negatively the 
inflow of remittances. While the migrants benefit fr an all 
goverrment servies when they go back to their countries, they do 
not contribute to the financing of these services. While they 
are working abroad their income frcm investments in their 
countryof origin is often exempted from taxes. Less fortunate 
citizens w9rking in the local market are left to bear the whale 
burden. 
Besides the uneven distribution of the tax burden due to 
such wide exemptions, their cost and benefit are not studied or 
known. However, as they become more and more widespread, they 
beccme harder to eliminate. We have only to take notice of the 
very strong reaction against aey attempts to change the now 
prevailing rules of the game. Attempts by the minister of 
economy in Egypt to organise the import market and to bring the 
black market in foreign currencies under control in January 1985 
were cruelly rebuffed. A campaign was launched against him, 
supported by actions fran those in control of the markets 
causing deep crisis and a state of stagnation, finally bringing 
the minister to his knees. 
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'lbese few remarks concerning effects of migration on public 
finance, do not thoroughly cover the topic which needs a more 
in-depth treat.ment as well as wider coverage. 'Ihey may, 
haiever, be useful to bring to our attention the dilemma nai 
faced by the Arab labour exporting countries. 'Ihese countries 
are nai faced by a decline or 1 °'er gr GT th rate of inf!°' of oil 
revenues fran abroad. Such a decline or lower rate of graith 
will influence internal economic activities and lead to the 
stagnation of budget revenues Expenditures haiever, are hard to 
cut down. Better mobilisation of resources through efficient 
and more equitable tax systems is raising and is expected to 
raise strong opposition fran very powerful and widely spread 
private interest groups. 
FOOTNOTES 
1. The author interviSNed a number of officials in Egypt, 
Sudan, Jordan and Yemen Arab Republic in preparation of his and 
Abdel Fadil' s book on the Movement of Arab Workers, Problems, 
Effects and Policies. 
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Chapter 4 
STATE EXPENDITURE IN THE MAGHREB (TUNISIA, ALGERIA, HJROCCO) 
Khaled el-Ma.noubi 
If it is true that state expenditure reflects the nature of the 
state itself, an examination of its spending will prc:mote a more 
precise understanding of the nature of the state. 
In this chapter we shall employ the concept of the 
1 sub-rentier state', which we al ready introduced in previous 
writings (Ma.noubi 1985). 
The reader will note as well that the concepts used and 
conclusions reached in this study benefit from certain 
commonalities that are evident through a cross-.sectional 
analysis of the three Ma.ghrebi states. 
As for the exact definition of state expenditure, in the 
case of both dependent societies in general and sub-rentier 
states in particular, state expenditure should be taken to 
include the whole of the public sector subjected to the 
authority or control of the state. By limiting oneself solely to 
central goverrment expenditure stricto-sensu, it is impossible 
on the one hand to account for the total reach of state 
intervention and moreover, to grasp the underlying logic of 
spending itself. In the hope of understanding this logic, we 
shall first attempt to highlight common characteristics of the 
three states which will provide a means of establishing both 
spatial (by using a few brief international comparisons) and 
temporal (providing a perception of underlying historical 
conditions of the societies being studied) analytical 
viewpoints. We will also employ the concept of the sub-rentier 
state as a means of examining the bureaucratic phenomenon on a 
practical and theoretical level in these societies. 
The second part shall be devoted to describing, first, the 
principles governing public expenditure for the purpose of 
capital accumulation, and second, the legitimation of the nature 
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It is important to stipulate at the outset that this nature 
clearly manifests itself in all three Maghreb states, despite 
the differences that distinguish them. Although these 
differences seem to be diminishing, the case of Al~ria stands 
out. There on the morrow of its independence, official sources 
spoke of pursuing a 'retreat frcm the frontiers of capital ism' 
and of the construction of a self-centered economy. 
PUBLIC EXPENDITURE, SPECIFIC FEATURES OF THE STATE AND 
BURE.AIJCRACY 
The present tendency of capital ism is characterised by a 
strenghtening of the state's role in coordination with capital 
markets, aiming at a growing socialisation of the production 
means, accompanied notably by a continued growth of the portion 
of social surplus managed by the state. Hence, total public 
expenditure as a percentage of gross dcmestic product (GDP) in 
1fJ72 ranged between 12.1 per cent and 31 .8 per cent in the 
largest industrialised capitalist countries (Japan: 12.1 per 
cent; Italy: 22.1 per cent; United Kingdom: 31.8 per cent) and 
in the smaller European capitalist countries, it reached 21.8 
per cent, 33 per cent and 34.4 for Austria, Dermark and Ireland 
respectively. Moreover with the deepening structural crisis of 
capitalism, the beginning of the present decade saw this share 
increase by at least two points in all the countries cited 
above. For the larger countries, total public expenditure as a 
percentage of GDP gre,, in 1980 to 14 per cent in Japan, 38.6 per 
cent in the United Kingdom and for the second group of countries 
to 24 .2 per cent in Austria and 53 .9 per cent in Ireland. In 
real terms, the share of the social surplus going into public 
expenditure is higher than the preceding percentages would seem 
to indicate because virtually all public expenditure is derived 
frcm the social surplus which itself is inferior in size to GDP 
as measured by the national accounts. As such, the percentages 
of public expenditure cited above must be raised by nearly 10 
percentage points on average to be brought in line with the 
social surplus, and hence may be estimated to oscillate within a 
range of 20 to 60 per cent. 
Independent capitalist countries such as the Maghreb states 
which are the subject of our study, public expenditure as a 
percentage of GDP is not inferior to that of the capitalist 
countries, approximately 25 per cent for the three states at the 
beginning of the 1970s and rising cautiously afterwards at equal 
rates within all three states. At the beginning of the 1980s, 
public expenditure as a percentage of GDP came close to 50 per 
cent in Algeria, 40 per cent in Tunisia and 40 per cent in 
Morocco. 
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Table 4 .2: Public Expenditure as a Percentage of Gross Dcmestic 
Product (GDP) 




Algeria 28.2 30.9 25.8 49 .1 38.0 45.9 49.5 2180 
Tunisia 23 .1 25.6 26.5 35.2 41.6 40.6 40.6 1392 
Morocco 26 .o 19 .o 20.0 36 • 1 36.4 38.8 28.2 807 
Source: League of Arab States, Rapport Economigue Arabe Unifil 
1984; IMF, International Financial Statistics, annuals 
In addition to the q uanti tive aspects already mentioned, it 
should also be noted that the portion of local (re~ional) social 
surplus spent by the state in the l>tighreb grCMs in direct 
relation to average income - the size of which is determined 
principally by the importance of sources of rent (in fact it is 
rather a subrent, as we shall see) accruing for the most part 
directly to the state which is left in turn to redistribute 
them. 
Even more significant, qualitatively speaking, is the 
allocation of public expenditure. Whereas in non-dependent 
capitalist countries, large and small, the major portion of 
public spending is destined for consumption, in the l>tighrebi 
states the share of consumption only exceptionally exceeds 50 
per cent and hovers almost invariably belCM this percentage. 
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Table 4.3: Public Consumption as a Percentage of Public 
Expenditure. 
1980 1980 1977 1980 
Canada 88.3 UK 56.6 Algeria 41.7 43.4 
USA 78.2 Italy 47.5 Tunisia 48.6 45.6 
France 71 .2 Austria 75.4 Morocco 51.5 58.2 
Japan ( 1979) 70.0 Dermark 66.5 
Australia 60 .1 Ireland 57 .1 
Source : IMF, Interna. tional Financial Sta tis tics 
In other words, more than half of public expenditure is for 
investment. 
State intervention in gross fixed capital formation is a 
fundamental priority of public policy. 'lhe share of the budget 
allocated to investment over the total gross fixed capital 
form.a tion demonstrates this, reaching in 1982 43 .5 per cent in 
Tunisia, 59.2 per cent in Algeria and 79.6 per cent in Morocco. 
In fact, state intervention in capital formation is not 
limited to public funds spent directly by the state, as the 
state totally (in most cases) or partially controls the 
investments of public or semi-public enterprises. In effect, 
this type of investment can take legal forms which differ from 
those of the central public administration. If we add capital 
formation by the public sector to that by the goverrment, the 
total reaches particularly high levels: more than 96 per cent in 
Algeria in 1980 according to Ma.hnoud Ourabah ( 1982) ( 1), 70 per 
cent in Morocco and nearly 60 per cent in Tunisia. The 
equivalent figure for the centre of capitalism, the United 
States, is a mere 14.1 per cent of total fixed capital formation 
(in 1980). Thus it is clear from a methodoligical point of view 
that spending on the part of public enterprises must be included 
in the analysis of public expenditure. 
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In the discussion of public enterprises however, analysis 
must be limited to the investment aspect. This is inevitable, 
given investment's important role in capital formation and 
because information sources are limited. Many of the sources are 
contradictory or non-comparable when it canes to data. 
Thus, while expenditure of the central goverrment in the 
Maghrebi countries is in line with that of non-dependent 
capitalist countries, large or small, when consideration of 
public enterprises is added, state intervention in Maghreb is 
clearly more important as the state controls the largest part of 
the surplus which is devoted to capital accumulation (or its 
near entirety in Algeria) and thereby occupies a crucial 
qualitative role. In effect, the state is not only the locus of 
the polarisation of the social surplus and the centre of its 
appropriation, but is as well the principal source and prcmoter 
of investment. Consequently, in cases of dependent capital ism it 
is not possible to limit the state's role to the area of surplus 
circulation - despite the importance of this aspect but 
rather, it is necessary to acknowledge the close relationship 
between the state and its ral e, and both domestic and foreign 
production relations. 'Iherefore, and to account for this 
phenomenon, we have retained the definition of the state as 
1 sub-renti er'. 
The state (and with it the public sector) not only directly 
underwrites the major share of capital formation, but it also 
assures conditions allowing national private capital expansion 
and strengthening providing guidance and continual support. 
M.'.>reover, the survival of national capital would be threatened 
in a situation in which these conditions were to cease 
(Benachenh.ou 1980, 1984; Malki and Doumou 1984). One should note 
that public sector intervention in capital formation is not only 
a quantitatively dominant factor, but also plays a strategic 
role in determining its sectoral distribution and in 
guaranteeing capitalist profitability, which allows the private 
sector to capture a share of the social surplus. In this way, 
the private national sector emerges as an emanation of the state 
and the latter can only be conceived as a depository of global 
capital. 
If then the state appears to impose itself on local society 
in the three Maghrebi countries, this phencmenon is not 
determined by the socialisation of production, but is an 
expression of the submission to the logic accumulation of 
capital, firstly global and then national. 
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In other words, capital develoµnent on the global scale as 
well as production relations at the national 1 ev el are 
reproduced through the national state which, as a result, is 
necessarily sub-rentier. The develoµnent of local factions of 
the dominant class in particular, can only be sustained on the 
coattails of the state. 
In order to perform this role, the state creates a vast 
bureaucratic apparatus which can be seen as a connecting link 
between global capital and local society. Naturally public 
spending is considerably affected by the existence of a large 
bureaucracy in terms of both its total level and destinations. 
Even if bureaucracy does not in itself constitute a class, 
in the case of the sub-rentier state it cannot be disti.nguished, 
in theory and practice, from other fractions of the dominant 
capitalist class, despite the very real contradictions that mark 
theire relations. 'Ihe phenomenon of the sub-rentier state's 
domination genuinely expresses one essential consideration: the 
impossibility of the national capitalist class to assert itself 
in production relations without state mediation. In dominant 
capitalist societies, capital (as a form of relations of 
production), originates social classes (the constituents of 
these relations) and classes express the state (ca pi tali st). On 
the contrary, in the case of sub-rentier states, the following 
sequence holds: capital (as a form of relations of production on 
the global scale), originates the sub-rentier state in national 
society, and the state originates social classes. 
This leads to the conclusion that state resources (and those 
of society itself) consist entirely of sub-rent, that they are a 
rent seemingly of external origin or a portion of the social 
surplus which global capital consents to leave to local society, 
entrusting the direct or indirect management of it to the state 
in conformity with the needs of production relations which 
generate the sub-rent in the first place. The rent remains 
qualitatively worn out, because of the inability of local 
society to control its utilisation. There are two major uses for 
the sub-rent: 
in support of capital accumulation - taking the 1 ion's share 
of the social surplus which is returned to society in the 
form of sub-rent. 
in support of legitimation - receiving a necessarily limited 
share in most sub-rentier states. 
These two categories shall be analysed in two successive 
paragraphs of this chapter. But first we must clarify the effect 
of the bureaucratic phenomenon on public expenditure in 
sub-rentier states. 
110 
Manoubi - State Expenditure in the Maghreb 
Bureaucracy is the sum of two components: the state 
apparatus on the one hand and public sector on the other hand. 
The state spends an appreciable amount of the GDP on 
administrative services. Since the 1960s nearly 9-10 per cent in 
Algeria and 12-13 per cent in Tunisia has been spent for this 
purpose. In contrast, while Moroccan spending hovered around 11 
per cent till the beginning of the 1 970 s it has since increased 
considerably and seems well on the way to reaching 20 per cent. 
Table 4 .4: Administrative Services as a Percentage of GDP** at 
Constant Market Prices•. 
68 70 72 73 74 75 78 80 81 82 83 
Algeria 10.6 10.2 9.7 9.2 8.8 9.9 
Tunisia 13.7 12.4 11.2 12.2 12 .1 
Morocco 10.2 11. 8 15 17 .4 
c• > 'Ihe 1975 and 1978 figures for Morocco are calculated at current 
prices. 
( **) The year is indicated in brackets 
Source: Documents of the Ministry of Planning; 
Ligue Ara be, al-Tagrir al-Ig tisudi al Arabi al Mugad; 
CNRS, Annuaires de l' Afrig ue du Nord; 
IMF, International Financial Statistics. 
In this way, administration services alone absorb nearly 12 
per cent of GDP in all of the Maghreb states - nearly one sixth 
of the national social surplus - and nearly one fourth of total 
public expenditure. But in order to completely evaluate the cost 
of the bureacracy, one must consider the purchase of goods and 
services consumed in large part by the bureaucracy in order to 
enjoy a lifestyle which often involves a certain degree of 
waste. The cumulative share of these two categories constitutes 
then nearly one-third of total state expenditure. 
The importance of this portion of public expenditure is due 
to the growth in the purchase of goods and services (machines, 
cars, furniture, etc.) this has been particularly rapid in 
Algeria since the oil price hike (Nancy 1981) and in Tunisia it 
surpassed the growth of salaries and of the total of public 
expenditure in recent years. 
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Table 4 .5: Salaries and Acquisition of Goods and Services as a 
Share of Total Public Expenditure 
( 2) ( 3) ( 1) 
Expenditure 
for salaries 
Expenditure in Total ( 1+2) 
goods & serv. 
1980 1983 1980 1983 1980 
Tunisia 26 .2 28.3 6.7 6.4 32.9 
Algeria 23 .O 
Morocco 25 .1 
Source: CN RS, Annuaires de l' Af rig ue du Nord; 
Bank of Morocco, Annual reports; 




Table 4.6: Growth of Administrative Spending on Salaries and 
Goods and Services (per cent) (annual gra1th rates for Tunisia 
only) 
Morocco Tunisia 
1970-1980 1970-197 4 197 4-1977 
Salaries 47 .6 12 17 
Goods and serv. 34.4 11 21 
Accumulated 
salaries, goods 
and services 43.9 
Total state 
expenditure 32.7 
Source : CN RS, Annuai res de l ' Af rig ue du Nord ; 
Bank of Morocco, Annual reports; 
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In Morocco however, expenditure for salaries was the most 
dynamic component; but purchases of goods and services still 
grew faster than total expenditure. 
At the same time, one must not lose sight of the fact that 
expenditure for salaries is nearly four times larger than that 
of goods and services, and consequently cons ti tut es the 
fundamental source of the hyper trophic administrative costs. 
The swelling of salaries can be attributed to two principal 
factors: 
- The need to keep up the purchasing power of at least part of 
the civil service, including in particular, executives as well 
as the army, the police and the judiciary. 
- The need to meet the personnel requirements of the sub-rentier 
state, in order that it can play its role with respect to both 
capital accumulation and legitimation (however restrained), 
through the supply of free social services and the recruitment 
of personnel beyond its real needs. The latter practice is due 
to either apparent or latent - but in any case, chronic -
under-employment dictated by the law of absolute overpopulation 
characteristic of dependent capitalism (Manoubi 1984). 
Even if one does not take into account education and heal th 
personnel, Table 4.7 indicates that in the three states of the 
Maghreb, the share of public over total employment far surpasses 
the equivalent indicator for the industrialised capitalist 
states, these have an administrative work force equaling 2-3 per 
cent of total employment, while the Ma.ghreb has almost triple 
(or more). Al though sources fail to concur completely, the table 
reveals recurrent and pronounced disparities between the Ma.ghreb 
states. These seem correlated to the level of per capita inccme, 
which is, to say the amount of sub-rent available to each state, 
as Algeria has the highest percentage, followed by Tunisia and 
then Morocco. We do not wish to suggest however that the 
ordering be attributable solely and unconditionally to the 
volume of the sta te 1 s sub-rent. 
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Table 4.7: Public vs Total Employment. 
64 66 69 70 73 77 79 80 
Morocco 6.9 7.3 8.5 9.0 
Tunisia 6.6 9.9 11.7 12 .4 
Algeria 19.5 16. 9 16.7 
( 1) According to L. Hajane, this percentage was 9 per cent in 
197 1 , see Annuai re de l' Ar rig ue du Nord 1980, Editions du CN RS, 
Paris 1981, p. 226. 
(2) According to M. Bekka.li, this percentage was 12.8 per cent 
in 1 976, see preceding reference, p. 66. 
Source: For Morocco, Recensement g§n~ral de la Population et de 
l 1 Habitat 197?, Serie "S", Vol. II, 1973, Table III 5; Boutata, 
M. La Crise... L' Alternative, Edition Al Bayane, Casablanca, 
1978, p. 252; IBRD, Rapport 1978 sur le Ma.roe, 1980 quoted by 
Daouad, Z. 
"Emploi sans formation, formation sans emploi. Le cas du Maroc", 
in Annuaire de l 1 Mrigue du Nord 1980, p. 86; Afrique Industrie, 
242, 15 Nov. 1981, p. 85. 
For Algeria, Benauchenou, A. Planifica tion et d~veloppement en 
Ale;€lrie 1962-1 980, 1980, pp. 222 and 262. 
For Tunisia, Ministry of Planning, Plan guadriennal 1965-1968, 
Vol. 3, p. 24, Series statistiques retrospectives 1972-1981, 
Statistigues Sociales, Enguete 1979 sur les entreprises 
publiques. 
In effect, the demands of the states' sub-rentier 
responsibilities on the one hand, and on the other hand the 
events of history, as seen in the case of Algeria, go a long way 
in explaining this hierarchy. In addressing the Algerian case, 
one must take into account the emergence, somavhat unknown in 
the other two countries, of a large political and military 
bur eaucr acy pr ece ding i nde pe nde nee, and which the post-col oni al 
state was obliged to absorb entirely. 
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the Tunisian colonial One should here recall that 
administration and, to an even greater 
on Morocco had been conceived in such 
extent, the protectorate 
a manner as to limit the 
costs. Thus, in the aftermath of 
not exist an inordinately swollen 
occupier 1 s bureaucratic 
independence there did 
bureaucracy. 
However one should not fail to note the remarkable 
convergence of these percentages in all three countries. One 
notes in Morocco, for ins ta nee, a moderate yet cl ear 
acceleration in the growth of this rate which could well exceed 
the 10 per cent mark. In Tunisia a considerable but decelerating 
rate of growth approaching 13 per cent has emerged, while in 
Algeria, one sees a considerable decrease which however, has 
slowed down as it approached the level of 16 per cent. 
In summary, these figures seem to suggest that the different 
rates are m011ing towards a point of convergence sanewhere 
between 13-15 per cent of total employment (2). This rate could 
very well constitute a characteristic of the sub-rentier state 
in dependent capitalist societies in a phase in which it is 
unable to address the question of industrialisation but, at the 
same time, it is still capable of preserving its independent 
existence. 
But direct control. of the state is not limited to the 
administrative apparatus. It encompasses the whole of the public 
sector producing material products and paid services which 
alone represent between one-quarter (in Morocco) and two-thirds 
(in Algeria) of total value added in the country. The 
administration and public sector together employ between 
one-third and four-fifths of salary earners, between one-fifth 
and three-fifths of the total work force, and equal more than 
half Of the accumulated sum of wage payments. In Algeria this 
figure reaches 90 per cent. Comparing columns 3 and 5 of Table 
7 .8 indicates that the share of the public sector alone in the 
social surplus sl.igh tly but clearly surpasses the share of the 
administration and the pub! ic sector together in total 
employment. It seems therefore, it should be possible for the 
state to pay its personnel and those of the public sector more 
than the average for the total work force, owing simply to the 
global value added of the public sector and independently of 
taxation. Thus, it should be of little wonder that state and 
pub! ic sector wage earners enjoy an average revenue which is 
higher (of more than 100 per cent) than the average revenue of 
wage earners in the private sector, al though the latter are 
mostly productive. 
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Table 4.8: 'lhe Economic and Social Impact of 
Administration and the Public Sector (in percentages). 
Adm.in Adm.in. & Adm.in & Adm.in & 
wage public public public 
earners sector sector sector 
per per wage salaries 
total total earners per 
wage wage per total total 
earners earners employment salaries 
Morocco 1 8% ( +) 1/3 (++) 1/5 ( ++) (++) 1/2 
( 1971) 
Tunisia 1 9% 38% 24% 62% 
( 1977) ( 1977) ( 1977) ( 1977) 
Algeria 20% 80% 60% 90% ( ++) 
( 1976) ( 197 8) (1978) ( 197 8) 
+) L. Hajane sets this figure at 22 per cent. 
++) Estimated by the author. 
Governnent 
Part of Public 
sector (with out 
administration) 
in value added 
25% 





Source: For Tunisia: various documents of the Ministry of 
Planning, in particular, L1 Enguete sur les entreprises 
publigues, 1969-1979, 1980; for Algeria: A. Benachenhou, 
Planification et developpement en Al@rie, 1962-1980, 1980, M. 
Durabah, Les Transformations economiques de 1 1 Alg0rie 35; for 
~rocco: European Year Book. Annua.ires de l'Afrigue du Nord, H. 
el-Malki, "ca.pi tali sme d' Eta t, D~eloppa:nent de la bougeoisie et 
problematique de la transaction. Le case du Maroa", Revue 
Juridig ue, Poli tiq ue et Economiq ue du Maroa, No. 8, 1980, p. 
219. 
The share of value added generated by the public sector is 
however modest when compared to the role of the state in capital 
formation. The state accounts for the 1 arge st sh are of 
investment but receives only a smaller share of the social 
surplus. Thus it is clear that the state allocates some of its 
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resources fran taxation and investment incane to uses outside 
the public sphere. We already pointed at the beneficiaries: 
global capital first and national private capital second. To 
them we now turn. 
PUBLIC EXPENDITURE AS AN mRESSION OF THE SUB-RENTIER STATE 
Public Expenditure and Ca pi ta! Accumulation 
ca.pi tal formation constitutes the fundamental priority of state 
expenditure in the three Maghreb states. 
In Algeria, investment expenditure alone constitutes 
two-fifths of total state expenditure, and the total of capital 
formation, subsidies, loans and participations has represented 
nearly three-fifths of total expenditure in recent years. The 
equivalent figure for Tunisia is more than 55 per cent over the 
period 1980-1983. If the proportion of investment alone { 31 per 
cent) was inferior to that of salaries and current inputs (l.!6 
per cent) during the same period, the sum of investment, 
subsidies, loans and participation taken together, nearly 
totalled two-fifths (l!O per cent). 
In Morocco, one can attribute the relative weakness of 
investment expenditure to efforts made in previous years which 
engendered a significant debt, and a debt serviceng factor which 
reached 13 per cent of total state spending in the years 
1980-83. As such, the sum of expenditure for capital formation, 
subsidies, loans, participations and debt service amounted to 
more than half of total public expenditure. In Tunisia the same 
aggregate equals two-thirds of all of public spending with a 
growing .Part ( 14 per cent in 1983 against 8 per cent in 1977) 
reserved for debt service and reimbursement. The same applies to 
Algeria: in her case, the debt service burden has been 
multiplied by a factor of 5.25 between 1974 and 1978, and this 
portion has jumped from 13 .9 per cent of export revenue in 1974 
to 39 per cent in 1979. According to World Bank sources, the 
service of the foreign public or publicly guaranteed debt has 
sharply increased fran 0 .95 of GNP in 1970 to 9 .8 per cent in 
1982. 
As far as growth rates in various public spending areas are 
concerned, it is generally found that capital formation is the 
fastest growing item whenever resources are available. If the 
administration's participation in and encouragement of capital 
formation slackens, it is the public sector that compensates at 
least in part for the absence of resources, even at the cost of 
growing debt. 
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Under all circumstances, the share allocated to the economic 
services, that the state extends to capital, continues to grow, 
despite the growing burden of debt service or armaments 
procurement. 
The portion of state-funded economic services has in effect 
gone in Morocco from 25 .6 per cent in 1972, to 28 per cent in 
1981, and in Tunisia fran 23.3 per cent in 1972 to 34 per cent 
in 1981 (see Table 4 .9). 
Economic infrastructure represents one of the services which 
the state or the public sector frequently supplies for free or 
at least well below cost. This item, for example, absorbs nearly 
a tenth or more of state investment. Moreover, invest.ment 
expenditure per se cons ti tut es a huge occasion for prof its to 
the benefit of foreign and national capital. In effect, somewhat 
less than one-half of capital formation is canposed of studies 
and equipnent which are essentially imported. Building and 
public works constitute the remainder. Here again, foreign 
public works enterprises play an important role in the 
realisation of projects, and what is not done by them is done by 
national enterprises which draw substantial benefits fran their 
work. 
We must now show how public expenditure and public sector 
invest.ment benefit first of all global capital and national 
capital secondly. 
First, one should address the significant decrease of 
agriculture's share in total capital formation in the 1960s and 
70s, passing fran nearly one-fourth in the three countries to 
nearly one-seventh in Tunisia and Morocco and one-fifth in 
Algeria. These figures clearly illustrate the evolution of the 
role of Ma.ghrebi agriculture in the international division of 
labciur since the departure of the European colonialists. 
In effect, the colonial farmers exported dry agricultural 
products (cereals, olive oil and wine notably) whereas since 
that time agriculture seems devoted to 'developing industrial 
crops for export and transformation by local industry' ( 4). This 
requires the mobilisation of important hydraulic resources, 
which are very limited in Maghreb (5). 
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In this respect, M.Benhl al, commenting on a mRD Commission 
1964 study of the Moroccan economy, writes, 
Agricultural problems were the subject of the longest 
chapter. The report argues that agricultural reform is not 
necessary, but counsels rather a rapid and efficient 
increase in agricultural production and a concentration of 
public and private investment in agriculture, particularly 
in hydraulic infrastructure' ( Benhlal 1975). 
'!he role assigned to Morocco (as well as to Tunisia and even 
Algeria) can be formulated in three essential points: 
Integration into the new international agricultural 
division of labour. 
- develoIJDent geared to the interests of national capita!, 
i.e. large and medium-sized land a.rners and agricultural 
transformation industries, which can be either state or 
private-owned, national or foreign. 
- the opening of profitable markets to the benefits of large 
foreign capitalist enterprises, particularly those 
constructing large dams whose devel OIJDent has been under way 
since the 1940s based on plans drawn up by the colonial 
administration. 
One should point out that 100 percent of large water-works 
technology and know-how has been imported along with 50 percent 
of the necessary raw materials, whereas the smaller water-works 
projects such as surface wells, which are superior to larger 
projects in terms of employment generation, intensification of 
cropping ·and soil protection depends on imports for no more than 
one-quarter of the required technologies and materials (Elamami 
1980). The three countries have increasingly allocated 
agricultural investment funds for irrigation and large 
water-works projects. The share of heavy hydraulics is 
constantly increasing and has reached nearly two-fifths of 
capita! fonnation in agriculture in Morocco and Tunisia, and 
one-quarter in Algeria. 
Agricultural subsidies in large part tend to go to owners of 
large and medium-sized farms. In an i~uiry conducted in the 
Gharb, it was learned that small farms of less than 10 hectares 
(not including cooperatives and breeders) received virtually no 
state subsidies, whereas large farms (more than 50 hectares) 
took in 42 .2 percent of subsidies for farm materials; 85 .5 
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percent of subsidies for fertilizers; 28.7 percent directed at 
selective seeding; and finally 40 .4 percent of subsidies 
available for animal production (Li~ration 20-27 Nov. 1980: p. 
8). A World Bank study of the Doukkala project confirmed these 
results revealing that at the project's termination, 'the 
average subsidy received by farms ranged from 2554 DH for small 
farms of less than 2 hectares of land to 41,213 DH for those of 
over 20 hectares - that is 16 times more for the latter' 
(Li~ration, 20-27 Nov. 1980: p. 8). 
State and public sector expenditure for industry - in terms 
of subsidies as well as investments - equally serves the needs 
firstly of world capital and secondly of national capital. 
With respect to global ca pi ta!, the operations of the state 
and the public sector assune two distinct but not fundamentally 
different forms. In Tunisia as well as in Morocco, state and 
public sector investment is clearly integrated in the 
international division of labour: valorisa tion of raw materials 
(principally the processing of phosphates) for export - an 
extention of agro-mining activities which began during the first 
period of the international (and colonial) divison of labour. In 
Morocco, export industries have been taken over by the public 
sector whereas, in Tunisia, these export industries have been 
developed by private Tunisians or foreigners, producing, .as in 
Morocco, in the interests and to the ultimate benefit of no 
other than the mu! tinational companies. 
Algeria, by contrast, has apparently not predisposed 
industrial development to evident integration into the 
international division of labour and has even endeavoured, 
formally at least, to construct an integrated industrial system. 
In the be! ief that it has paid the price of this avowed 
objective, Algeria nevertheless has accepted significant 
dev ia ti ons of real isa ti on fran the planned goals. We have 
already mentioned the declining role of agriculture in ca pi ta! 
formation - a role that lies well below expectations which 
themselves are in decline ( 6). 
The share of investment dedicated to basic infrastructure is 
also modest as for social services. But it is the analysis of 
the sectorial composition of industrial investment that 
clarifies the subservience to world capita!, which ensures in 
this way its hydrocarbon supplies, imposes a high cost on 
'industrialisation' and causes a high propensity import in the 
existing industrial structure. 
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Hydrocarbons have, in effect, received nearly one-half of 
industrial capital formation instead of two-fifths, as 
anticipated in successive plans in the 1960s and 70s. Moreover, 
90 percent of investment in hydrocarbons was to be allocated for 
the 'financial functions' of the sector, to the detriment of the 
genuine 1 industrial function' (production of fertilisers, 
petrochemicals plastics). 
It is equally significant that the total return on 
invest.ment in the hydrocarbon sector only reached 4 .3 per cent 
in 1977 against 18.3 per cent for total investments.Therefore, 
invest.ment in this sector, serves merely to maintain existing 
production and export capacity. 
As for the rest of industrial investment, nearly one-tenth 
of the total goes to non durable consumer goods, and an 
equivalent share goees to equiJ;lllent goods, which are rightly 
considered to play a strategic role for capital accumulation. 
The local private sector on the one hand receives various 
incentives, exemptions and direct and indirect subsidies 
covering financing, realisation and start up of new production 
capacity. At the same ti.me, and more importantly, the private 
sector also benefits fran low priced inputs and services 
supplied fran the public sector. For example, one notes in this 
regard, that in Tunisia, for someone starting a business, it 
sufficed to put down only 3 per cent of the cost to realise a 
project up to a maximum amount of 30,000 dinars in 1974 and 
75, 000 in 1 977, thanks to multiform state support totally 
nine-tenths of the costs (Dimassi 1983). As an example of the 
low pricing of inputs let us recall that in Algeria, the SNS 
public company sells 30 per cent of its production to the 
private sector at prices lower than both local production costs 
and international prices. Similarly, a national construction 
material company sold 40 per cent of its production to the 
private sector (2.5 million tons per year) at a loss of 30 
dinars per ton produced or imported, generating an annual 
transfer of value to the private sector amounting to nearly 75 
million dinars (Benachenhou 1980: 109). Naturally, under such 
conditions, the state budget is pock-marked with costs arising 
fran ,public sector losses. 'Ihese costs reached 4 .2 per cent of 
the GDP in Tunisia in 1983, whereas treasury securities taken 
out in the name of invest.ment and invigoration of public 
enterprise reached an amount equal to GDP. 
Our discussion of the support offered to private capital 
could not be complete without mention of the subsidies to 
productive consumption, which are a form of direct assistance to 
capital, as well as subsidies for final consumption. The latter 
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constitute, above all, an indirect aid to the enterprises by 
holding back wage costs. This policy therefore reflects the 
logic of ca pi ta! accumulation in a situation of dependence, 
al though it also serves purposes of legitimation, which is 
discussed in the foll owing paragraph. 
These subsidies were instituted as short-term pol icy and 
ended up assuming a structural character to the point where they 
approach today 2 per cent of GDP, 5 per cent of state 
expenditure and 5-10 per cent of Gross Fixed Ca.pi ta! Fonua ti on. 
Such levels of had already been reached in Tunisia in 1974 while 
Morocco and Algeria passed them in 1980 and 1982, respectively. 
By 1984 Tunisia had attained rates of subsidisation twice as 
high as those registered ten years earlier. 
The Expenditure of the Sub-Rentier State: Fran Restrained 
Legitimation to Internal Repression and Border Conflicts 
Indebtedness in the Maghreb states - certainly not the same for 
each country - is clearly growing. The situation in Morocco has 
becane critical as debt reached nearly 61 per cent of GDP in 
1982. Yet the rate of public or publicly guaranteed debt 
servicento GDP in .Algeria was greater than the corresponding 
rate in Morocco (9.8 per cent against 9.4 per cent and 5.9 per 
cent in Tunisia) because of Algeria's higher rates of 
investment, which are twice those of ~rocco and 50 per cent 
greater than Tunisia's. 
One is not surprised then to see that the three states have 
reduced the share of expenditure devoted to social services to 
the work-force, and more generally to acquire legitimation. Thus, 
the share of social services in total investment in Algeria has 
dropped fran 18 per cent before 1974 to 14 per cent afterwards 
(according to Planning Ministry statistics). In Tunisia, the 
share of social services in total state spending has fallen fran 
47 per cent in 1972 to 37 per cent in 1981, while in Morocco, it 
has also fallen fran 32 per cent in 1972 to 25 per cent in 1981 
according to World Bank data. Measured against GDP, the growth 
of state spending in social services seems modest (around two 
percentage points) in Tunisia and in Morocco, compared to 
increases in economic services and defence spending, (both 
doubled during this particular period), and to the growth in 
demand for social service in connection with their expanding 
base. 
Yet this level of expenditure for legitimation does not 
assure social peace in the real sense of the term and has led to 
the growing tendency to resort to forms of internal repression. 
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Table 4.9: Evolution of Total State Expenditure and its 
Structure. 
Morocco 
197 2 1 981 
Total expenditure 
( S of GDP) 
Surplus/Deficit 












- teaching (19.2) 
- housing and welfare ( 8 .4) 
- heal th ( 4 • 8 ) 




























( 7. 7) 
21.1 
Source: World Bank, World Devel.oanent Report 1984 (in Arabic), 
pp. 306-7. 
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Table 4.10: State Expenditure Structure and Importance 
(percentage share over GDP) 
Morocco Tunisia 
1972 1981 1972 1981 
Economic Service 5.7 11.1 5.2 11.0 
Defence 2.8 6.4 1.1 2.7 
Social services 7.3 10.0 10.5 11.9 
Of which: 
- teaching (4.3) ( 6. 7) ( 6. 9) (5.0) 
- housing & welfare ( 1 • 9) (2. 2) ( 2. 0) ( 4. 4) 
- heal th ( 1.1 ) ( 1.2) ( 1. 7) ( 2 .5) 
Other expenditure 6.7 12.2 5.6 6.8 
Source: World Bank, World Develoanent Re12ort 1984' (in Arabic), 
pp. 306-7. 
However, the latter has proved insufficient to consolidate state 
authority, the state is forced to seek legitimation by leading 
the country into border conflicts with neighbouring countries. 
Border area conflicts among sub-rentier states have not been 
a rare occurrance in the Ma.ghreb in the post-colonial period. 
All five states of the Ma.ghreb, when viewed in terms of the 
bilateral relationships stipulated by their common borders, have 
experienced border conflicts, without mentioning clashes, with 
other neighbouring non-Ma.ghrebi states. 
Border area conflicts in a certain way represent the real.i ty 
of the sub-rentier state and are indeed organically bound to its 
very nature. 'llley require significant military resources which, 
al though providing some legitimation, are not sufficient to 
dispense of internal repression. Hence the swelling of the 
resources allocated to the police. How large exactly are these 
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resources?. It should be noted that important data on military 
and pol ice spending remain unavailable and are classified as 
military secrets. This expenditure is only partially accounted 
for in official statistics. Nevertheless, available information 
makes it possible to form a rather clear idea of the increasing 
ral. e of military spending. 
Similarly, the three states have taken 
increasing their acquisition of armaments since 
the 1970s for use in internal repression. 
particularly true for Tunisia. 
the cciur se of 
the beginning of 
This has been 
In only four years ( 197 2-76) the size of the Tunisian pol ice 
force doubled frcm the 1970 figure of one pal.ice agent for every 
700 inhabitants to one every 500 in 1976. This effort continued 
in the 1977-81 plan. 
In total, domestic and defence spending oscillates between 
one-third of state personnel expenditure (in Algeria) to 
two-fifths (in Morocco) (Bank of Morocco 1983). This figure grew 
more rapidly than those for teachers and heal th services 
personnel. 
As far as equiµnent spending is concerned, the share of 
military spending in this area has risen from a neglible amount 
in the early 1970s to 26 per cent of direct state investment in 
1982 (7). In Morocco, military equiµnent expenditure, which 
represented only 3 per cent of all' state investment during the 
period 1968-72 rose to 15 per cent between 1 973-77. 
The share of defence in total state expenditure has risen 
in Morocco (from 12.3 per cent in 1972 to 16.2 per cent in 1981) 
and even more so in Tunisia (fran 4.9 per cent in 1972 to 8.3 
per cent in 1981). Relative to GDP, the share of defence has 
similarly gram fran 2.8 per cent in 1972 to 6.4 per cent in 
1981 in Morocco and from 1 .1 per cent in 1972 to 2. 7 per cent in 
1981 in Tunisia. According to available information, it seems 
that Algeria, stands in an intermediary position vis-~-vis 
Tunisia and Morocco. 'Ille latter makes the greatest effort in 
relative terms, with defence allocations equalling 40 per cent 
of total state spending at the beginning of the 1980s (Bernard 
1 981) . 
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NOTES. 
1. In spite of the underestmation of the portion of private 
capital in Gross Fixed Capital Form.a ti on, it is very low in 
Algeria, though not negligible. In the three countries, the 
portions presented otherwise constitute a rel.a tively good 
approximation of reality. 
2. This corresponds closely to the share of administrative 
salaries in GDP that we have already deduced in comparing the 
three states. 
3. In Tunisia, for example, in terms of average salary; the 
average incane of a salaried worker in the public sector = 62/38 
= 1 .63. The average salary of the rest of the salaried class = 
38/62 = 612. The ratio of the former to the latter= 
1.63/0.612:266 or 166 per cent more. 
4. See, for example, the Moroccan Plan for 1968-72, Vol 1, p 
103. 
5. Irrigated land accounts for 11.1 per cent of workable 
agricultural land in Morocco, 4 .5 per cent in Algeria and 2 .9 
per cent in Tunisia. 
6. The portion of ca pi ta! formation tends to grCTrl and to be 
oriented tCTrlards dry crops in the three states, but their are 
maey doubts about this new pol icy. 
7. According to budget figures published by ~e Ministry of 
Planning. 
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Chapter 5 
GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE STRUCTURE AND IMPACT: THE CASES OF EGYPT, 
KUWAIT, SAUDI ARABIA AND JORDAN 
Mona El Baradei 
INTRODUCTION 
There is no doubt that the economic positions of the Arab 
countries are strikingly different because of oil revenues 
accruing to some of them and not to others. After 1973 this 
variance was greatly accentua. ted, and a sharp economic line 
divided the Arab world into two groups, the balance of payments 
surplus countries versus the balance of payments deficit 
countries (Mabro 1979: 23). 
At the same time, the increase in weal th and surplus funds 
in the rich oil states facilitated the creation of mechanisms of 
inter-country transfers through which the poor countries of the 
Arab world could secure for themselves sane of the returns of 
the oil weal th. These transfers affected to a great extent the 
public budget in the countries examined and created what was 
called the 'rentier mentality' (El-Beblawi 1982: 214). 
PUBLIC EXPENDI'IURE AT THE AGGREnATE LEVEL 
There is generalised evidence that over the post-war period 
there have been sharp upward movements in goverment expenditure 
relative to GNP. There has also been pressure on goverments to 
spend (Prest 1977: 14). '!he four Arab countries examined are no 
exception. In this case, besides the other reasons, which are 
common to most countries, one should mention the greater role of 
the public sector (Egypt) and the unprecedented increase in 
goverment revenues (Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, to a lesser 
extent, Jordan). 
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When examining the figures in Table 1, we find that Saudi 
Arabia has the highest annual growth rate of public expenditure 
as compared to the other three countries. With an average growth 
rate of 24.4 per cent per anm.111, it is followed by Egypt ( 15.5 
per cent) and then Kuwait and Jordan with a similar rate (14.9 
per cent). 
Fluctuations in the rate of growth of public expenditure are 
higher in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia than in Egypt. However, the 
four countries show a big surge in the growth of public 
expenditure in the period of the oil boom compared to the period 
prior to the oil boom, and a fall in this growth, even negative 
growth in the case of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait ( 1) af'ter this 
period. The figures below show the difference between annual 
growth rates of public expenditure in the different periods: 








1 982/ 3-1 985/ 6 
Kuwait 
1963/4-1 973 
1 97 4/ 5-1980/1 
1981 /2-1985/6 
Jordan 
1 96 4/ 5-1 97 3 
1974-1981 
1982-1 985 
% Rate of Growth 
6.9% 
31 • 1 % 
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( 1) years relate to fiscal years which normally do not correspond to solar years, in this 
case, only the second of the two years is indicated (i.e. 1963/64 = 1964) except for Egypt 
fran 1980 onwards and Jordan in 1964-65, for which only the first year is indicated (i.e. 
1980 = 1980/81); also, fiscal years are often based on Hijra calendar years, hence, 1972 
corresponds to 1391/2 H and so on. 
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Table 1 (cont.): Annual growth rates of public expenditure and GDP in Egypt, Kuwait, Saudi 
Arabia and Jordan 
Saudi Jordan 
Arabia 
Total Annual Annual Proportion Total Annual Annual Proportion 
Fiscal public growth growth of public public growth growth of public 
year expenditure rate % rate expenditure expendi- rate % rexpendi ture 
( 1) in of to GDP % ture of GDP to GDP % 
ML SR GDP% in ml JD 
1964 43 .6 29.3 
1965 46.9 7.5 12.5 27.9 
1966 38.6 -17.7 1.7 22.6 
1967 68 .1 76.4 -23.0 51.9 
1968 80 .5 18.2 18.9 51.5 
1969 88.4 9.8 17.4 48.2 
1970 6028 35.0 17 .4 
1971 6293 4.4 31.6 27.8 80.7 -8.7 -4.9 46.3 
1 972 8130 29.2 23.3 29.0 83 .1 2.9 6.7 44.6 
1973 10158 24.9 44.0 25.3 101 .4 22.0 11.2 48.9 
1974 18595 83 .1 146 .5 18.8 119.5 17. 8 5.3 54.7 
1975 35039 88.4 40.8 25.0 146 .6 22.6 13.2 59.2 
1 976 81784 133.4 17.7 50.0 204.8 39.6 26.2 56.6 
1977 106737 30.5 24.4 52.3 262.4 28.1 35.0 62.2 
1 978 137110 28.5 9.8 61 .2 337 .8 28.7 21.9 65.6 
1979 146255 6.7 10.6 59.0 361 .5 7.0 22.9 57 .1 
1980 185724 27 .o 55.0 48.5 515.6 42.6 19. 1 68.4 
1 981 230416 24.1 35.0 44.5 563 .1 9.2 30.0 57.4 
1982 283258 22.9 0.8 54.2 647 .1 14.9 20.7 54.7 
1983 244900 -13.5 n. a. n. a. 656 .2 1.4 13.5 48.8 
1984 223200 8.8 n. a. n. a. 717.6 9.3 10.7 48.2 
1985 212900 4.6 n. a. n. a. 770.2 7.3 
1986 200000 -6.0 n. a. n. a. 811 .2 5.3 
Average - 24.4 32. 9 40 .8 14.9 12.8 50.6 
* Budget 
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Sources: 
Epypt: for 1963/4-1973: Reafat Al Ma.hgoub, Al-Ma.leva al-Amma, 
Dar El. Nahda al-Arabiyya, 1973, p. 84 and CAPMAS, Statistical 
Yearbook, various issues; for 1974-1981/2 : World Bank, Arab 
Republic of Egypt, Current Economic Si tua ti on and GrCMth 
Prospects, World Bank Report No. 4498-EOT, Washington D. C., 5 
October, 1983, table (2-1) p. 124 and table (5-1) p. ·136; for 
1982/3: Closing Account Report presented to the People's 
Assembly; for 1983/4-1985/6: Public Budgets presented to the 
People's Assembly. 
Kuwait: for 1963/4-1968/9: Central Bank of Kuwait, Economic 
Report, various issues; for 1969/70-1978/9: Central Bank of 
Kuwait, The Kuwaiti Economy in Ten Years, Economic Report of the 
Period 1969-1979, pp. 45 and 51; for 1979/80-1982/3: Central 
Bank of Kuwait, Economic Report, 1983, p. 32; for 1984/5-1985/6: 
Middle Eastern Economic Digest, 26 April 1985, p. 21. 
Saudi Arabia: for 1969/70-1981/2: Ministry of Planning, Haguae 
wa Arguam, 1390-14-2 H., Tables, 1,2,5, 6; for 1982/3-1985/6: 
Middle Eastern Economic Survey (MEES), 25 March 1985, p. B1; for 
GDP fran International Mmetary Fund, International Financial 
Statistics, various issues. 
Jordan: for 1964/5-1983: Central Bank of Jordan, Yearly 
Statistical Series (1964-1983) Special Issue, Tables 36, 39 and 
45; for 1984 and 1985: MEED, 4 January 1985, p. 13. 
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Table 2: Canpo si ti on of public expenditure in Egypt, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and 
Jordan (%) 
Egypt Kuwait (9) s. Arabia Jordan 
Year Current Capital Current Capital Current Capital Current Capital 
( 1 ) exp en- expen- expen- expen- expen- expen- expen- expen-
di ture di ture di ture di ture di ture di tur~ di ture di ture 
( 2) ( 3) 
1964 62.0 38.0 
1965 62. 7 37.3 7 9 .o 21.0 
1966 71.3 28.7 76.2 23 .8 
1967 64.4 35.6 73.3 26.7 
1968 72.0 28.0 65.5 34.5 
1969 70. 7 29.3 71.0 29.0 
1970 68.6 31 .4 57 .8 42 .2 63.3 36 .1 73.8 26 .2 
1971 74.4 25.6 55.6 44.4 63.lJ 36.6 73.0 27.0 
1972 72.0 28.0 65.8 34.2 58.5 41 .5 73.0 27 .o 
1973 71.5 28.5 63.4 36.6 55.7 44.3 69 .o 31.0 
1974 75.0 25.0 50.8 49.2 45.5 54.5 65.0 35.0 
1975 76.0 24.0 37 .1 62 .9 43.4 56.6 70 .s 29.5 
1 976 80 .o 20.0 49.2 50 .8 47 .1 52.9 61.5 38.5 
1977 77 .o 23.0 49. 1 50.9 48.8 51.2 7 0.8 23.2 
1978 51 .6 48.4 38.8 61.2 51.4 48.6 57 .9 42 .1 
1979 56.0 44.0 45.3 54.7 55.9 44 .1 58.8 41.2 
1980 53 .o 47 .o 51.9 48 .1 51.8 48.2 62.3 37.7 
1981 57 .o 43.0 44.0 56.0 36.3 63.7 59.6 41.4 
1982 59.9 40 .1 46.2 53 .8 39.6 60.4 60.5 39.5 
1983 59.0 41.0 54.8 45.2 45.5 54.5 66.o 34.0 
1984 62.0 38.0 69.5 30.5 n.a n. a 62.5 37.5 
1985 61 .o 39.0 50.0 50.0 58.8 41.2 
60.0 40.0 
Average 63. 8 36.2 51.9 48 .1 50.0 49.6 66.7 33.3 
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Notes: 
( 1) years relate to fiscal years which normally do not 
correspond to solar years, in this case, only the second of the 
two years is indicated (i.e. 1963/64 = 1964) except for Egypt 
from 1980 onwards and Jordan in 1964-65, for which only the 
first year is indicated (i.e. 1980 = 1980/81); also, fiscal 
years are often based on Hijra calendar years, hence, 1 972 
corresponds to 1391/2 H and so on. 
Source: 
Egypt: for 1963/4-1973: Reafat Al Mahgoub, Al Maleya El 'Amma, 
Dar El Nahda Al-Arabiyya 1979, p. 86; for 1973-1977: Mahmoud 
Abdel Fadil and Reda El-Edel, Ma.bade al-Maleyya al-' Amma •.• 
(Principles of Public Finance with special reference to the 
Evolution of the Egyptian Fiscal System) Dar al-Nahda 
al-Arabiyya, Cairo, 1982 p. 189; for 1978-1982/3: Actual 
spending, in the 1982/3 Closing Account Report presented to the 
People's Assembly; for 1983/4-1985/6: Public Budget presented to 
the People' s Assembly. 
Kuwait for 197 3-1979: Central Bank 
Economy in Ten Years, Economic Report 
Table 11, p. 51; for 1979-1983/4: 
Economic Report, 1983, Table 6, p. 33. 
of Kuw ai t, The Kuwaiti 
for the period 1969-1979, 
Central Bank of Kuwait, 
Saudi Arabia: Ministry of Planning, Hagaek wa Arquam, Mongazat 
Khettat al Tanmeya (Facts and Figures, Achievements of 
Develoµnent Plans, 1390-1402 (Ministry of Planning, Al Riad, 
1403), Table 4, p. 72.; 1982/3-1984/5: EID, Quarterly Economic 
Review of Saudi Arabi a, Annual Supplement, 1 984, p. 20. 
Jordan for 1964/5-1983: Central Bank of Jordan, Yearly 
Statistical Series, ( 1964-1983), Special Issue, Table 39; for 
1 984, 1 985: MEED, 4 January 1 985, p. 13. 
( 2) Includes investment expenditure and ca pi ta! transfers 
( 3) Includes i nvest.ment expenditure, land acq uisi ti on and 
foreign expenditure 
(4) Kuwaiti budgets are a curious mixture of capital and current 
items. The FFG receives a minimum statutory subvention 
equivalent to 10% of the state's total revenues, while KFAED' s 
capita! is increased by a typical KD 30-50 mn per annum. Both 
these items technically represent investment of reserves, but 
the incane derived fran these reserves is excluded fran the 
goverment' s budget calculations. In effect, the FFU and KFAED 
expenditures represent no more than an accounting gesture, and 
are best described as an allocation fran investment income. 
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PUBLIC EXPENDI'IURES DISAGGREOATED 
It is impossible to have a common classification of expenditures 
for the four countries, because on the one hand, each one of 
them has items that do not correspond to other countries and on 
the other, there are items which gain great prominence in one 
country so that they require sepa.ra tely trea tament. 
Table 2 gives a broad canposition of public expenditure in 
Egypt, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Jordan. 
The two oil countries (Kuwait and Saudi Arabia) have about 
the same composition between current and capita! expenditures 
and so do the two 'semi-oil' countries (Egypt and Jordan). 
However, the four countries show an upward trend in capita! 
expenditures during the period of the oil boom (1974-1981/2) 
averaging 34.3 per cent in Egypt, 54 .8 per cent in Kuwait, 52 .1 
per cent in Saudi Arabia, and 37 .3 in Jordan, canpared to 31 .o 
per cent, 41.3 per cent, 39.6 per cent and 28.1 respectively in 
the period prior to 1974. 
Egypt 
The complexity of Egypt's budgetary accounting system makes it 
difficult to obtain a comprehensive overview of goverrment 
expenditure. 
Economic Classification of Expenditure A partial economic 
classification of expenditure is available only for current 
expenditure after 1979 (Table 3 below). It indicates that 
between 1973 and 1982/3 current expenditure has grown at a 
higher annual rate (43 .2 per cent) than investment expenditure 
(25 .2 per cent) with the consequence of the decline of 
investment expenditure as a proportion to total expenditure fran 
38.6 per cent in 1979 to 29.6 per cent in 1982/3. 
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Table 3: Egypt: Economic classification of current expenditure, 1979-1982/3 




Value j Value j Value j Value j 
t-' Current expenditure 4.044.0 61.4 6,080.4 61.8 7.872.7 65 .1 11,889.2 70.4 43.2 w 
14.8 °' Wages & salaries 993 .o 15.0 1 ,452 .6 1.947.5 16 .1 2,200.8 13.0 30.3 Defence 772.0 11.8 1 ,039.0 10.6 1,365.8 11.3 3 .329.6 19. 7 62. 7 
Danestic interest 208.0 3.2 340.3 3.4 360.7 3.0 890 .2 5.3 35.7 
Foreign interest 147. 7 2.3 116.8 1.2 147.0 1.2 
Other nonsubsidy 200.7 3.0 436.3 4.4 583 .6 4.8 1. 756 .2 10.4 106 .o 
Subsidies 1 ,352 .2 20.5 2.116.4 22.0 2,199.8 18.2 2 ,053 .6 12.2 14.9 
of which: G ASC ( 1 • 002. 1 ) ( 1) ( 15. 2) (1.703.0)(2)(17.3) (1,473.1)(1,2) (12.2) (1,336.5) (7.9) 10 .o 
Other (350.1) ( 5. 3) ( 463. 4) (4.7) (726.6)3 ( 6. 0) (717.1) ( 4. 3) 26 .9 
Public Authorities 
deficits 234.0 3.6 274.8 2.8 414. 7 3.5 127 .6 0.7 -18.4 
Other current 
transfers 4 136.0 2.0 254.2 2.6 853.6 7.0 1 ,521 .2 9.0 123 .6 
Investment exEendi ture 2 ,547 .O 38 .6 3,765.3 38.2 4,218.1 34.9 5,007.0 29.6 25.2 
Total expenditure 6 .591 .o 100 9.845.7 100 12 ,ago .8 100 16,896.2 100 36.8 
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NOTF.s 
1 • Exel udes fran current expenditure and subsidies in 1981 /2 LE 
122.3 million in subsidies incurred in 1979. An equal amount 
has been added to subsidies in 1979. 
2.Excludes fran current expenditure and subsidies in 1981/2 LE 
595 million which is equal to the debt incurred by GASC to 
finance losses on its operations in 1980/81. 'Ihe central 
govermient did not provide financing for these losses until 
January 19, 1982, when it issued a bond in the amount of LE 595 
million to the Central Bank and used the proceeds to repay the 
GASC1 s obligations to commercial banks. 'Ihe 1980/81 actuals 
have been adjusted to include this transaction as expenditure 
in that year. 
3 .LE 300 million in construction debt arrears incurred by the 
govermient since 1979, budgeted in 1981/82 but disbursed in 
1982/83, has been excluded fran current transfers in 1981/82. 
However, an equal upward adjustment has not been made to the 
earlier years since the allocation of the arrears to the date 
originally incurred is not possible. Since these were disbursed 
in 1982/83, they are regarded as payment of arrears in that 
year rather than an expenditure item. 
4. Includes mainly current transfers previously classified as 
'expenditure fr an treasury and investment funds'. 
Source: 1979-1 981 /2: IMF, Arab Republic of Egypt, Recent 
Economic Develoanent (IMF Document SM/83/ 116, June 7, 1983), p. 
97, appendix I, table 48. 
1982/83: Closing Account Report presented to the People's 
Assembly. 
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Interest payments experienced a high annual rate of growth 
(35.7%) reflecting the grCM'th in foreign and domestic debt and 
consequently debt service obligations. Egypt's foreign debt has 
increased considerably during the last f&1 years reaching a 
total of 30 .8 billion dollars in 1982/3 ( 130% of GDP) (World 
Bank 1983: 40-5). Domestic public debt has also increased 
sharply since 1979 reaching 240 .8 million Egyptian pounds ( 112 .8 
per cent% of GDP) (Ministry of Planning, various reports). 
Defense appropriations have grown at a vecy rapid rate (62.7 per 
cent annually) in comparison with subsidies which have only 
shown a moderate rate of growth (14.9 per cent). 
Defence Expenditure Fran the beginning of the fifties, 
military spending constituted a heavy burden on the Egyptian 
budget because of the par ti cipa ti on of Egypt in several wars 
since that date. Al though the information on military spending 
is secret, we still have sane indicators of the defense 
expenditures and their volume. 
Egypt has devoted an extremely large percentage of its 
national resources to defense as can be seen fran Table 4 below. 
Table 4 : Mil i tary expe ndi tur e and gr os s national product in 
Egypt (in billions of US dollars) 
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980/1 1981/2 1982/3 1983/4 1984/5 
1.Mil..EX 1.3 1.5 1.5 2.8 4.1 6.1 4.9 4.4 4.4 2.2 2.1 2.4 2.4 3.0 3.7 
2.GNP 6.7 7.1 7.6 8.9 9.5 11.7 12.9 13.3 n.a 16.2 n.a. n. a. 31 • 7 n. a. n. a. 
18.9 21.1 19.9 31.0 42.8 52.4 37 .o 32.8 n.a 13.1 9.5 8.6 7.5 n. a. n. a. 
Source: International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance, London, variou, 
issues 
Another estimation (US ACDA 1983, 35-8) of Egyptian defence 
expenditures amounts to 47 .2 per cent, 47 .5 per cent, 47 .7 per 
cent and 47.7 per cent of GDP in 1981/2, 1982/3, 1983/4 and 
1984/ 5 respectively. These are extraordinary levels of 
expenditures for any country. 
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'!he full extent of Egypt's military debt is not known. 
However it is significant and rising rapidly. Since 1979 total 
inflows of loans and grants from the USA have been more than $2 
billion. At least 75 per cent of this amount has been in the 
form of long-term loans at commercial US interest rates, 
currently averaging 12 per cent to 13 per cent. Egypt has also 
borrowed from several other countries. In addition, there is the 
overhead of unpaid military debt owed to the East Bloc countries 
which has not been serviced for several years. According to 
official statements this could be as much as $3 billion (World 
Bank 1983: 40). 
However, defence expenditure which is the largest economic 
drain on Egypt's national resources has not alWC3¥S been 
essential to internal security; rather it was 'the inescapable 
legacy of choices made decades earlier, of long - standing 
decisions and policies - both foreign and domestic - whose 
out canes had so structured the national condition as to leave 
little if any roan for substantial dowaiard alterations (Jabber 
1982: 419) 
There were several motives besides the wars behind this high 
level of defence spending in Egypt. Since 1952, Egypt knew only 
military leadership which continued to anchor its political base 
in the military institutions and it was to be expected that 
military st·rength was alWC3¥S a matter of high priority to it. 
Added to this was the desire to build up army morale after years 
of neglect on the part of the former colonial regime and the 
need to assure regime security in an unstable pali ti cal and 
economic environment (Jabber 1982: 422). 
Classification of Exoendi tures by Main Categories The 
coverage of the functional classification is seriously 
incomplete (al though recent budgetary reforms have somewhat 
simplified the picture). Another categorisation of public 
expenditure in Egypt (World Bank 1983: 44) is based on two main 
pillars: the importance of expenditure and its autonomy (where 
expenditure is called autonomous whenever the degree of 
discretionary decision is very snall). 
It includes: (a) current expenditures of the central, local 
and service agencies (which include wage and salary payments and 
purchases of other goods and services), (b) current deficit of 
the public economic authorities, (c) net capital transfers, the 
three constituting autonomous expenditure, (d) subsidies as a 
major budgetary expenditure since 1974) (e) investment 
expenditure. The contribution of each category to the overall 




<'.omposition and Structure of Puhll<· f<~xp~nditurP in Eg_ypt, lff/4-1~8~/5 (milJions of Egyptian Pounds) 
Value % Value % Value % Value % Value % Value % Value % ValuP % Value % Value % 
Central, local & 
ser·vjc:~B agenc:ies 949.0 4S.8 1352.0 44.8 \6"/0. () ')0.9 1701.0 40.8 2623.8 40.6 3686.3 4?.0 3900.5 38.0 5?3"/. 2 36.6 7945.8 47.0 1017. 5 51 .8 
current f•xpend i-
tu?~~ 
Puhl ic economic 
aulhoritiPs 3·1.0 l .8 39.0 I . '.i 42.0 1.3 '55.0 1. 3 58.0 0.9 60.0 0.7 67.3 0.6 96. l 0.7 1?7.6 0 .. , 264.4 1.2 
Current deficit. 
Subsidies 410.0 19.8 622.0 20.ti 4·34 .0 13.2 650.0 15.6 711.0 11.0 i229.9 14.0 1571.0 15.3 2909.2 20.3 2053.7 12.2 1996.l 10.1 
NPt <:apit.al 
80.0 
expPnd i t11rP (a I 
3.9 102.0 3.4 154.0 4.7 214.0 5.1 T16.4 12.0 1062.4 12.1 1054.3 38.0 1664.6 11.6 1756 .2 10.5 1811. 3 9.2 
Investment 
expenditure 59·1 .o 28.7 900.0 29.9 980.0 29.9 1549.0 37 .2 2282.3 35.5 2736.6 31.2 3691.8 15.9 4404. l 30.8 ')007 .2 29.6 5430.0 27.7 
Total p11bl ic 
2073.0 100 3280.0 100 4169.0 100 6451.5 JOO ff/"75.2 100 10284.9 100 14lll.2 100 16890.3 3010.0 100 l 00 19659.4 100 expenditure 
No tr (al Includes govPrnmt?nt debt inst.al lme11Ls ondrnn~st.ic and forPig11debt., nPt. capital tranrsfer to public 1-:c-011omic a11thorit.ies and publir sec-tor companies and 
misetdlaneous capil.al Pxpcud i t.ure by l.lu· g(1vt·n11111:11t. 
~= 19'/4-19'/"/: Ca]cu]atPd from World Ra11k, .Aral!_ !l_ep_u!>]l~-~!-_~f.YP~.1-~urre!_l_!:_!f~~!..1~~l~-~~_!,~1~ticn and Urcl/.dh !'1c~~1'(< 1.~:, W1 ir Id BBnk RPport Nu. 4498-~:c;T, "OC:tbber 5, 1983 
(Table '1.1, p. 135. 
19'18-l<JB?/1: Calculated from Uw 198:'/:l Closing Account Hepur·t, prPs<>ntrd Lo Uw l'Popl«"s l\ssPmhl.v (l\n1tah) 
* BudgP t, pret;en tP.ci to t-_he P<-'op l P. 's Assemh 1 .v 
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The main characteristics of public expenditure during the period 
f ran 1 97 4 to 1 982/ 3 are: 
1. 'Ihe large role of autonanous expenditure. 
2. The growing importance of subsidies as a major budgetary 
expenditure. 
3. The slowdown in the grCMth of investment expenditure. 
Between 1974 and 1980/1, autonanous expenditure declined 
relative to subsidy and investment expenditure due to very rapid 
growth rates in the two categories (22 .5 per cent for subsidies 
and 35.5 per cent for investments), following the favourable 
resource situation which emerged in Egypt during the 1974-1980/1 
period (Ahmed 1984: 44). · 
The increase in budgetary subsidies is a reflection of the 
goverrment' s pal.icy of protecting the living standards of the 
poorer sectors of" society, against grCMing concentration of 
incom,e and rapid inflation. The growth in investment 
expenditure, on the other hand, indicates both the attempt on 
the part of the government to ease up the existing 
infrastructure bottlenecks which had gained praainence with the 
surge in the level of economic activity in this period, and the 
attempt to reorganise the industrial base into a more modern and 
capita! intensive structure (Ahmed 1984) 
With the emergence of resource tightness since 1981/2, the 
relative importance of .autonomous expenditure has increased, 
follCMing rapid growth in its canponents due to high rates of 
inflation and the goverrment' s policy of absorbing a part of the 
impact of decline in resource availability by limiting growth in 
investment and subsidy expenditure. The 1982/3 -1985/b 
experience illustrates this quite dramatically. 'lhere is a big 
jump in the share of autonomous expenditure and significant 
decline in the shares of subsidy and investment expenditures. 
1. Autonomous Expenditure: The largest component of autonomous 
expenditure is current expenditure. The main reason for the 
rapid increase in current expenditure is increases in defense 
appropriations and in the wage bill. The grCMth in the wage bill 
has been due more to increase in the level of employment in 
goverrment services than to wage adjustments (Ahmed 1984) The 
large increase in goverrment employment reflects the pal.icy of 
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providing guaranteed employment to graduates. '!he employment 
guarantee for graduates was first introduced in 1964 to assure 
full employment and to be a redistributive tool. This policy has 
led to excess employment of educated employees. The goverment 
sector is thus characterised by considerable surpluses leading 
to work disincentive and this has contributed to the 
deterioration of work ethics (Hansen and Radwan 1982: 206-8). 
Since 1 '1'19 the expenditure on interest payments (domestic 
and foreign) has assumed significant proportions. '!he growing 
burden of the public debt since 1979 has also resulted in 
increased budgetary expenditure on amortising payments. 
The other component of ca pi ta! transfers expenditure is 
loans to public economic authorities and public sector canpanies 
to cover their ca pi ta! commitment deficits and al so their 
current deficits. 
2. Subsidies: Subsidies first entered as a budgetary item in 
1950 but it was not until 1'1'13 that they gained prcminence. 
Since then, subsidy expenditure has increased at a very rapid 
rate. It increased from 2.8 per cent of total current 
expenditure in 1969/70 to 24 .2 per cent in 1974 and reached 32 .3 
per cent in 1979, (Ministry of Planning 1981: 40-1) but declined 
to 20.5 per cent in 1982/3 and declined also from 19.7 per 
centof total public expenditure in 1974 to 12.2 per cent% in 
1982/3 ( 1982/3 Closing Account Report presented to the People's 
Assembly). The most important category of direct subsidy is food 
which alone accounts for about 70 per cent of total subsidy 
expenditure (World Bank 1983: 61). Other items include 
transport, agricultural input subsidies on fertiliser and 
pesticides, interest subsidy on agricultural and housing 
credits, consumer subsidies on textiles, kerosene, bottled gas, 
newspapers and various types of industrialised goods produced by 
nationalised industries. '!he growth in budgetary expenditure on 
food subsidies are due to increases in the variety and volume of 
subsidised goods, as well as to increases in the gap between 
procurement and sales prices (World Bank 1983: 61). 
Budgetary subsidies reflect only explicit subsidy 
expenditure incurred by the goverment. Even such subsidies are 
underestimated because all imported subsidised goods are 
chanelled through the General Authority for Supply Commodities 
(GASC) and are evaluated at the Central Bank exchange rate. 
Apart frcm direct food subsidies, the goverment has 
attempted to improve the in cane distri bu ti on through two other 
channels. These are: (a) expenditure on health and education and 
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(b) subsidies through price controls on transport and on 
industrial goods, an interest subsidies for housing finance and 
a guaranteed employment programme for graduates. 
While it is true that food subsidies have a favourable 
effect, on incane distribution, they also have negative effects 
especially on the allocation of resources, by providing erroneos 
signals. 
But in spite of all the negative effects of the subsidy 
system and of the price control system on efficiency and 
resource allocation, the regime has chosen to keep it, after the 
food riots of 1'!77 that took place in most Egyptian cities, 
which were to a large extent dominated by the urban proletariat 
(Ayubi 1982: 419). 
3. Investment expenditures: Between 1'!74 and 1982/3 naninal 
investment expenditure grew at an annual average rate of 3 5.5 
percent. '!he growth in investment expenditure was quite uneven. 
In 1977 the share of public investment expenditure reached 37 .2 
percent of total expenditure. Since 1979 the share of investment 
expenditure has been declining. This decline is partly due to 
the goverrment policy of reducing investment expenditure in 
response to resource tightness in the economy and partly due to 
physical absorptive capacity constraints. These physical 
constraints are inadequate availability of overhead, such as 
transport, construction materials and skilled workers as well as 
institutional bottlenecks (World Bank 1983). However, it remains 
that public investments expenditures are the main element 
affecting growth and resource allocation in the economy (despite 
what is often argued about the low level. s of efficiency of these 
investments and the large discrepancies for almost all sectors 
between financial and economic profitability) (World Bank, 1982) 
for they account for about 70 percent of total investment in the 
economy (World Bank 1983: p. ii) (and they accounted for 90 
percent of total investment in the period fran 1971 to 1976) 
(Zaki 1 9 81 : 11) • 
The government of Egypt has formulated a five-year 
devel.oµnent plan for the period from 1982/3 to 1986/7. The need 
for structural change is explicitly stated in the pl an. The plan 
identifies several constraints which need to be overcane, the 
first one is the structure of output which is biased towards 
non-commodity production. Despite an increase in the share of 
investments in the commodity sectors of about 17 .8 per cent in 
1981/2 which increased the share of commodity sectors to 44.1 
percent compared to 42.6 percent in 1981/2, 55.9 percent of this 
expenditure went to the services sector with the consequence 
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that the share of commodity sectors is still about 44.1 percent 
of total investment expenditure compared to 48.1 percent in 
1980/1 and 48 percent in 1979 (1982/3 Closing Account Report). 
However, in the conditions of tight budgetary resources 
aggravated by the decline in exogenous resoures fran the 
beginning of 1981/2 and economic distortions mainly due to 
political constraints, public investment expenditures, despites 
their capita! importance in the case of Egypt, are not expected 
to fully achieve their effects on resource allocation and 
developnent. 
Further, the high rate of growth of pub! ic expenditure with 
insufficient revenues has caused a grCMing public deficit. 'lhe 
most important feature underlying the financing of pub! ic 
deficit is the increasing role of bank financing, which 
increased frcm 34.5 per cent in 1976 to 47 per cent in 1981/2 of 
total deficit financing (World Bank 1983: 46) but declined to 23 
per cent in 1982/ 3 ( 1982/ 3 Closing Account Report). Increasing 
reliance on bank financing has caused an expansion in the supply 
of money in the economy - the average proportion of deficit bank 
financing to the supply of money during the period from 1974 to 
1979 was 29 per cent (Zaki 1981: 122) - a rate faster than the 
rate of expansion of the danand for money. 'lhe imbalance has 
generated significant inflationary pressure in the economy 
causing problems for resource allocation as well as inccme 
distribution (Abdel Fadil 1982: 68). 
Kuwait 
The discussion of expenditure composition of the Kuwaiti 
goverrment may be carried out at two levels: current versus 
development expenditures, and sectoral distribution of 
developnent expenditures. 'lhe former serves as an indication of 
the developnent orientation of goverrment finance, while the 
latter may point out the develoIJ!lent pal.icy of the goverrment ( 
El.-Mallakh and Atta 1981: 42). 
Current exoendi tures Two expenditure categories have been 
experiencing fluctuations: land purchases and foreign transfers. 
'lhe program of land acquisition has been criticised for being an 
indiscriminate and inequitable way of distributing revenues and 
for failing to i rwigora te the economy, because the private 
sector has invested a large amounts of the funds received abroad 
(Khouja and Sadler 1979: 34) Sane have the feeling that the 
program weakened entrepreneurial ability because of grCMing 
dependence on the goverrment as a source of in cane (Ibrahim, 
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Shibata and Ma.bro 1978: 1) 'lhe second major item is foreign aid, 
which fran the domestic point of vie1 constitutes a drain on 
developnent resources. However, Kuwait's awareness of its 
vulnerability as a mineral rich but militarily weak state was 
evident from the early beginnings of its emergence as an 
independent state in 1961 when foreign aid became a political 
necessity ( El-Mallakh and Atta 1981: 17 4). 
The political objective in ·Kuwait's aid is, however not the 
only one. It has been indicated that there is a mix of 
political, sociological and historical motives (Khouja and 
Sadler 1979: 210). Al.so, with virtually no other natural 
resources aside from oil and gas, Kuwait is very constrained in 
its developnent potential, so it is in Kuwait's interest that 
the Arab world develop as a whole (El-Mallakh and Atta 1981: 
176). 
Wages and salaries were the most important item of current 
expenditure in almost every year from 1976177 to 1982/3. This is 
due to Kuwait's employment policy which aims, on the one hand, 
at securing employment for all Kuwaiti citizens and on the other 
hand, at raising wages and salaries to attract foreign skilled 
labour (Sayigh 1982, 167). Kuwaitis represent around 54 per cent 
of total goverment civil servants; around 25 per cent of the 
total Kuwaiti labour force is in goverment employment (Central 
Bank of Kuwait, 1980: 59). Employment thus provides serves as an 
allocational and redistributional device (El-sheikh 1972 63) and 
also encourages pressure fran the population for ever 
expenditures on subsidies and social services. 
alternative use of funds is investment abroad or 
foreign aid, it is often difficult to resist such 




The consumers in Kuwait has long enjoyed many goverrment 
subsidies irrespective of their incane. 'lhese subsidies cover 
such basic services as water, electricity and gasoline. Due to 
inflation, the subsidy system has been extended in recent years 
to cover many of the essential food products (rice, sugar, milk, 
meat, vegetable oil, etc.). '!he cost of the food subsidy 
programme has varied but it is estimated to be in the order of 
KD 20 million per year (Khouja and Sadler 1979: 34) 
Defence expenditure. Defence and security expenditures 
ranked first on the bill of public expenditure in the seventies 
with their outlays totalling KD 1595 million or 17 .4 percent of 
the total public expenditure. About 82 percent of the outlays 
related to this sector were incurred in the second half of the 
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Tab]cc 6: Composition of Public Exp<mditure inKuwait (KD millions) 
Domestic expenditure 
( a+b+c +d+e) 
a) Domestic current 
expenditure 




b) Land Purchases 
c) Development Epend. 
d) Local loans 
e) Participations 
- share of local 
companies 
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seventies for the construction of military bases, armaments and 
the institution of compulsory military service (Central Bank of 
Kuwait 1980: 58) 
Defence expenditures accounted for about 5 .4 per cent (on 
average) of GNP in the seventies, as shown by Table 7 below. 
Table 7: Military expenditures and GNP in Kuwait, 1971-1980 
(billions of US dollars) 
1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 
1.MILEX 0.185 0.210 0.234 0.568 0.731 1.086 1.043 1.076 1.181 1.315 
2.GNP 3.882 3.778 4.032 11.481 13.348 15.509 16.562 17.856 26.663 30.969 
% 4.8 5.6 5.8 5.0 5.4 1.0 6.3 6.0 4.4 4.2 
Source: USA Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), World Military 
Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1971-1980, ACDA Publications, Washington 
D. C., 1983, Table I, p. 44. 
Total goverrment expenditure in Kuwait is an injection of 
liquidity into the economy and it has been proved that a close 
relationship exists between the domestic balance, liquidity 
expansion and inflation in oil-rich countries (Morgan 1979). 
Govermient domestic expenditure has been rising at a rapid rate 
in Kuwait which has consequently led to a high rate of inflation 
(0.6 per cent in the period fran 1960 to 1970 and 35.6 per cent 
in the period from 1970 to 1976) (Ma.bro 1979: 21). 'lhe 
cost-of-living index rose fran 100 in 1972 to 175 in 1979 
(Central Bank of Kuwait 1979: 70) and from a base of 100 in 1978 
to 138.7 in 1983 (Central Bank of Kuwait 1983: 95). The policies 
that Kuwait adopted to alleviate inflation (through subsidies, 
welfare services, elimination of taxes ••• ) did not help much, 
because as experience demonstrated, 'attacking the symptoms of 
inflation by means that exacerbated the causes was likely to 
yield, at best, only temporary results' (Morgan 1979: 76). 
Hence, price stability has not been achieved. 
In recent years Kuwaiti budget forecasts have shown 
increasing expected deficits. However, the deficit is more 
apparent than real and in fact, the figures conceal heal thy 
surpluess. The following factors account for the discrepancy. 
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First, about half the deficit is represented by transfers to the 
Future Generations Fund and KFAED, which are not expenditures in 
the real sense. Second, the deficit is usually reduced by the 
'scissors effect' of actual expenditures falling below budget, 
while revenues are higher than planned. The third factor is 
investment income, which is treated as an off-budget item. 
Develor;:ment expenditures. In the period fran 1976/7 to 1982/3, 
develoµnent expenditures decreased as a proportion of total 
expenditures. Until recently, Kuwait has had no formal 
develoµnent plan al though economic guide! ines were set for 
1967/8-1971/2 and 1975/6-1980/1 and for specific economic 
sectors such as electricity and water, housing, oil and gas, and 
public health. Instead Kuwait has tended to rely mainly on 
annual programmes with only vaguely de sari bed 1 ong-term 
objectives. The increasing canplexi ty of the economy, however, 
together, with the shockwaves induced by the collapse of the 
unofficial stock market in 1982, prcmpted the goverrment to 
elaborate a more comprehensive strategy to be incorporated in a 
five-year plan covering 1985/6 to 1989/90 (Economist 
In tell ige nee Unit 1984: 7) • 
Actual spending has always been less than appropriations, 
but not much less, (Sayigh 1982: 168). 
Table 8 shows a sectoral distribution of public 
expenditures. The data reflects the infrastructural bias in 
ca pi ta! expenditures. 
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Table 8: Kuwait, Government dev elo pme nt expenditures 
1978/9-1982/3 (in millions of Kuwait dinars) 
Actuals 
Fiscal years 1 978/9 1979/80 1980/1 1981/2 1982/3 
General public 21 17 28 31 33 
service 
Education 1 8 15 1 8 11 18 
Health 21 11 9 9 28 
Social affairs 8 6 7 16 10 
Housing 
Facilities 1 41 134 108 126 157 
Economic 
services 191 234 316 464 458 
El.ectri city, 
etc. ( 117) ( 141 ) ( 197) ( 31 9) ( 343) 
Roads ( 51) ( 68) ( 80) ( 97) ( 84) 
Other ( 23) ( 25) ( 39) ( 48) ( 31 ) 
Other 2 6 3 6 4 
Total 408 423 489 663 708 
Source: IMF, Kuwait, Recent Economic Develoi:ments, (IMF Document 
SM/85/2, Washington D. c., 1985) Table 16, p. 37. 
Saudi Arabia 
The Saudi Ministry of Planning gives a composition of public 
expenditure which is limited only to wages and salaries, 
transfers and subsidies (current expenditure) and projects 
expenditure (Ibrahim 1982:54). Another classification of 
goverrment expenditure in Saudi Arabia may give a better picture 
(Table 9). 
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Table 9: goverrment expenditure estimates in Saudi Arabia 
- Human resource 
dev el opn ent, 
- Transport and 
comm uni cations 
- Economic resource 
dev el opn ent 






- Defence and 
security 
- Public admini-
stration and other 
gov er rm ent spending 
- Goverrment lending 
institution 
















!Us mn % JU s mn % 
8.9 31.864 10.1 27.791 10.7 
11 .9 32.533 10 .3 24.950 9.6 
7,7 22,045 7.0 13.209 5.0 
4.5 17.010 5.4 13.591 5.2 
4. 7 11 • 07 5 3 • 5 9. 5 83 3 . 7 
8.8 26,225 8.4 19.070 7,3 
















Source: The Economic Intelligence Unit, Quarterly Econanic Review 
of Saudi Arabi a, Annual Supplement, London, 1 984, p. 20. 
The pattern of public expenditure in Saudi Arabia displays 
clearly the nature of the dilemma which Saudi Arabia faces: 
gr<:Mth versus security. 
The vast financial resources have pl aced obligations on the 
Saudi government to modernise the country, create new 
institutions, build an elaborate infrastructure, raise the 
standard of living and diversify the economy. At the same time, 
these vast financial resources thrust the kingdom into a sudden 
position of importance and vulnerability (Ibrahim 1982: 55). Th.e 
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concern is with both external (geographical proximity to 
disputed territories) and internal security (justified in view 
of repeated attempts at coups d'etat). 
Thus the goal of rapid socio-econanic develoµnent works in 
sane ways at cross-purposes with the goal of internal security 
and the political stability of the regime (Ibrahim 1982). 
Table 10: Military expenditure and gross na. tional product in 












































Source: International Institute for Strategic Studies, The 
Military Balance, London, annual. 
Defense Expenditure The breakdown of Saudi goverrment 
expenditures in more recent years confirms that defense 
expenditure ranks first in goverrment spending and by far 
exceeds all other items. In the three years, 1981/2 to 1983/4, 
it avrage 28.2 percent of public expenditure. In the 1984/85 
budget, defence and Security continues to be the major item 
(30. 7 per cent of total projected expenditure) (MEES 9 April 
1984' p. A2) • 
Estimates indicate that military spending in Saudi Arabia 
absorbed 14.16 percent of GNP during the period from 1970 to 
1 97 9 (Table 10 above) • 
Public administration and other goverrment spending This ranks 
second in public expenditure. Together with municipal services 
itey constitutes an average Of 23.7 percent of total expenditure 
in the period from 1981/2 to 1983/4 (EIU1984: 9). 
Develoµnental expenditures Transport and communications with a 
priority over all other develoµnent expenditure, averaged 10 .6 
percent of total expenditure in the 1981 to 1984 period (EIU 
1984). Economic develoµ:nent policy in Saudi Arabia was 
articulated into five-year plans, the third and most 
comprehensive Of which started in 1980. 
In the first and second plan, both spending and performance 
targets tended not to be fulfilled as the kingdom's planners 
overestimated the absorptive capacity of the economy. During the 
second plan, spending raced ahead as the economy over-heated and 
inflation took off, but this did not affect the pace of 
implementation of infrastructural projects 
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many of which have been carried over incanplete into the third 
plan, which already seems likely, for this reason, to have more 
of an infrastructural and less of a productive bias than 
originally planned (EIU 1984) Table 11 shows the apparent shift 
in developnent emphasis between the second and third plans. 
Table 11: Goverment expenditure on developnent in Saudi Arabia 
2nd plan 3rd plan 
( 1975-1 980) 
% Rls bn 
( 1 980-1 985) 
% 
Economic resource developnent 
Human resource developnent 
Social developnent 
Physical infrastructure 
Total developnent expenditure 
Administration 












701 • 7 
31.4 
49.6 
Source: The Economist Intelligence Unit, 
Reviav of Saudi Arabia, Annual Supplement, 









London, 1 984, p. 9 
The table clearly indicates the high priority of physical 
infrastructure in developnent planning. Economic resource 
developnent gained importance in the third plan, as did human 
resource developnent. The Saudis have usually maintained that 
they prefer not to duplicate the Kuwaiti experience with its 
emphasis on a substantial welfare programme. Yet, when the total 
of social programmes, including subsidisation of food staples is 
added up, it is difficult to differentiate between the system 
which seems to be emerging in Saudi Arabia and that which exists 
in Kuwait. 
With education and heal th care provided by the goverrment at 
no charge, with housing, transportation, electric! ty and food 
subsidised, and with extensive social security programmes to be 
effected, the Saudi Arabian goverment is evidently assuming a 
major role in the economic life of its citizens (Wells 1976: 63) 
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'!here is one major omission frcm the data on expenditure in 
Saudi Arabia namely, foreign assistance to other countries. For 
example, Saudi Arabian commitments of bilateral aid were 
estimated to be over $2 billion. Aid has been extended to a wide 
range of developing countries. In addition to bilateral aid, 
Saudi Arabia also pledged funds to the oil facility of the IMF 
( El-Beblawi 1982: 200) 
It was estimated that Saudi Arabia's foreign aid 
dispersements eualled $2 .4 billion in 1977 and $1 .s billion in 
1978, or 4.3 percent and 2.3 percent of GNP respectively 
( El-Beblawi 1982: 200). 
Fran the via1 point of assessing develoµnent strategy, it is 
important to understand the limits of the planning exercise. 'At 
one extreme the plan could be the primary determinant for budget 
decisions; at the other, it might be an ineffectual statement of 
intentions, ignored in the budget decision-making process' 
(Wells 1976: 50), for each ministry draws up its own set of 
objectives, programs, and projects. Each individual ministry has 
its own political base and not all ministries are equal. Tribal 
and family loyal ties abound throughout the goverrment and power 
and influence are closely tied to such relationships. 'Ihese 
considerations help to explain why two important sectors 
(defence and oil) are not integral parts of the plan (Wells 
1976: 51-2). 
Jordan 
The striking feature of the Jordanian budget is the great 
dependence on foreign aid, al though military aid does not appear 
in the budget. In spite of this underestimation, it appears that 
more than 50 per cent of public expenditures are financed 
through different forms of foreign aid: budget support, economic 
and technical assistance and foreign borrowing (Rivi er 1980: 
62). The Jordanian budget is divided into two autonomous parts: 
1. 'Ihe first part is financed through internal revenues (taxes, 
profits ••• ) and untied foreign aid (budget support, untied 
loans). 'Ihese revenues finance the central goverrment' s current 
expenditures (wages and salaries, subsidies, defence and 
security) and capital expenditures (foreign debt, develoIJilent). 
Since internal revenue is always insufficient to cover 
goverrment expenditure, foreign aid is essential for financing 
both capital and current expenditure (Rivier 1980: 24). 
2. The second part of the budget is exclusively financed through 
tied aid (econanic and technical assistance or tied loans for 
specific projects). 
Table 12 gives a composition of public expenditure in Jordan 
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Table 12: Composition of public expenditure in Jordan 1973-1983 (%) 
Year General Defence Internal Inter- Finance Economic Social Culture COOIJlluni ca- Total 
admini- order national admini- develop- services & infor- tion & 
stration & security affairs strati on ment mation inform a-
services services ti on 
services 
1973 0.9 35.9 5.4 1.0 20 .9 23 .4 9 .1 2.0 2.2 100 
1974 0.7 30.4 5.6 1.1 24.1 21.5 12 .6 1.8 2.2 100 
1975 0.6 23.6 5.0 1.1 28 .1 24.1 11.6 2.0 3.9 100 
1976 0.5 35.6 4.4 1.1 22.0 16.8 12.0 1.7 5.9 100 
1977 0.4 24.5 4.3 0.9 23 .4 28.9 10 .6 1.9 4.8 100 
1978 0.7 24.7 4.7 0.9 20.6 29.6 11.4 2. 1 5.3 100 
1979 0.6 22.3 4.8 0.8 30.4 22.6 10 .9 1. 7 5.9 100 
1980 0.5 21.0 4.4 0.8 29.5 25.3 11.5 1.3 5.7 100 
1981 0.5 21.3 4.6 0.8 30.6 23 .4 12.3 1.7 4.8 100 
1982 0.6 23.9 5.3 0.8 27.5 21.0 12.8 1.9 6.2 100 
1983 0.6 23 .4 5.0 0.8 30.5 21.5 12.3 1.4 4.5 100 
Aver 
age 0.6 26 .o 4.8 0.9 26.2 23.5 11.5 1.8 4.7 100 
Source: Calculated from Central Bank of Jordan, Yearly Sta tis ti cal Series ( 1964-1 983), Special Issues, 
Table 39. 
Baradei - Goverrment Expenditure in Egypt, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Jordan 
'lhe first major item in the budget (as for the other three 
countries examined) is defence expenditure wnich accounts 
(together with internal order and security expenditure) for an 
average of 30 .4 per cent throughout the period. 
Administration ranks second on the budget with an average of 
26 .8 per cent (for both general and finance administration). The 
third item in the budget is economic devel.olJllent expenditure 
with an average of 23 .5 per cent, followed by social services 
with an average of 11 .5 per cent. It must be noted that economic 
devel.opnent expenditure showed an upward trend, especially in 
the years 1 978 and 1 979, then started to decline. 
Defence expenditure has also declined fran 35.1 per cent in 
1979 to 23.4 per cent in 1983, although those figures do not 
include military expenditure which constitutes a heavy burden on 
the national budget as can be seen from Table 13. 
Table 13: Jordan, Military expenditures and gross national product 








1972 1973 1974 1975 
0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 
0.7 0.9 1.0 1.3 














0 .4 n. a. 
2. 7 n. a. 
14.2 n.a. 
1 981 1 982 
0.4 0.4 
n. a. n. a. 
24.6 24.8 
Source: International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military 
Balance, London, annual. 
These military expenditures are not only justified on the 
basis of the fact that Jordan is a 'front line state' but also 
on the basis of political stability endangered by repeated 
attempts at 'coups d'etat'. It is evident that the result of 
these heavy military expenditure, together with defence and 
security expenditure is a continuing drain on Jordan's tight 
econanic resources. 
As is the case with Egypt, the growing public deficit in 
Jordan and the increasing role of bank financing has caused an 
expansion in the supply of money in the econany. The public 
deficit accounted for about 25 per cent of the supply of money 
in 1977 and 1978 (Abdel Fadil 1982: 73) which led to 
inflationary pressures (the cost-of-living index in Jordan rose 
fran 126.4 in 1972, to 396 in 1983) (Central Bank of Jordan 
1972-1983). 
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CONCLUSION 
The structure of public expenditure in Egypt, Kuwait, Saudi 
Arabia and Jordan in the last decade demonstrates clearly that 
in spite of maey differences between these countries in income 
and revenues there is hanogenei ty in the pattern of public 
expenditure. Defence expenditure is the major item in the budget 
of each of the four countries in spite of the fact that the two 
oil countries are not 'confrontation' countries. Al though there 
is no explicit conflict in these two latter countries, there is 
a grav-ing sense of basic strategic insecurity among them. Wages, 
salaries and subsidies constitute major items in the budget of 
both the oil and the semi-oil countries. The latter two items 
showed an upward trend in the period of the oil boom, which was 
due, to a great extent, to the rentier mentality which prevailed 
in this period and to the choice of political stability. 
Develoµnent expenditures, which always rank second to the items 
cited above, had an infrastructural bias in the four countries. 
In most cases, the interrelationships between budgetary and 
planning policies have not been clearly recognised. Further, the 
high grav-th rates of public expenditures caused inflationary 
pressures (increased in the two semi-oil countries by bank 
financing of the budget deficit) involving disruptions and 
social tensions which in turn hindered develoµnent expenditure 
fran fully achieving its effect on resource allocation and 
growth. 
In spite of large resources devoted to subsidies price 
stability has not been achieved, because of the high rate of 
inflation. Subsidies, in turn had other disincentive effects 
which hampered efficient economic develoµnent. Furthermore, 
inflation pressures affected both income distribution and 
develoµnent efforts. 
Thus, the experience of public expenditure in Egypt, Kuwait, 
Saudi Arabia and Jordan proves that having or not having the 
money needed for develoµnent is not what matters most. 'It is 
the utilisation of money more than the acq uisi ti on of money 
which determines the develoµnental path of aey society• (Ayubi 
1982: 359). 'Ihe utilisation of money in the four Arab countries 
examined indicates that there have been maey abuses which 
hampered economic develoµnent. In maey cases, the main reason 
for these abuses was that the goverrment had to choose between 
efficiency and security. 'Ihe goal of rapid socio-economic 
develoµnent worked, in most cases, at cross-purposes with the 
goal of internal security and the political stability of the 
regime. 
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NOTE 
1. The expenditures are autonomous in the sense that the 
degree of discretionary influence is very snall. 
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Chapter 6 
THE STATE, SOCIAL CLASSES AND AGRICIJLTURAL POLICIES IN THE ARAB 
WORLD 
Hamid Ai t Amara 
For a grcrwing number of Arab countries, it is no longer a 
question of which part of the agricultural surplus should be 
appropriated by the state, but rather that of a correct 
evaluation of national resources to be devoted to the rapid 
developnent of agricultural production, in order to make up for 
past negligence and to re-establsh essential economic and social 
equilibria. While the 1960s were marked by a relatively high 
rate of investment and productivity grcrwth, the 1970s saw a 
considerable decrease of the relative role of agriculture in the 
economy and the beginning of a process of marginalisation and 
restructuration of the countryside. The Arab countries have 
becane extremely dependent upon foreign supplies to meet their 
food consumption, and devote a grcrwing share of their currency 
reserves to cover imports, and of their budgets to support the 
price levels of primary food items. 
At the beginning of the 1980 s, a majority of Arab countries 
initiated policies in favour of agricultural developnent. Public 
authorities very substantially raised financial contributions to 
the agricultural sector, aid to the modernisation of farms, and 
agricultural prices, in order to stimulate production and 
improve producers' incomes. 
In certain cases the new ori enta ti ons have brought about a 
significant change in the nature of relations between the state, 
various peasant groups and the urban working classes. The rise 
in the price of agricultural products reduces the purchasing 
power of fixed income earners, and in order to achieve the 
objectives that were set for the grcrwth of production, the state 
would like to rely more on market oriented farmers, and reduce 
the role of the small peasants. Hence, the food crisis, which 
almost all the Arab countries must confront, threatens the 
system of class relationships built up during the 1960s and 70s. 
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THE RETREAT OF AG RI CUL '!URE 
Since the seventies, the economy of Arab countries has undergone 
extensive restructuration, marked by the retreat of agriculture 
to the benefit of other sectors, and other sources of. savings 
be came more important for dev elo µnent. 
The turning point was obviously the increase in oil 
production and prices which led to a substantial increase in 
hydrocarbons export revenue. 
This flow of new resources and revenue marginalised the 
relative importance of agricultural exports in foreign trade. In 
the sixties, agriculture accounted for 30 to 50 per cent of 
total exports (26 per cent for Algeria, 35 per cent for Tunisia, 
33 per cent for Syria, 50 per cent for Egypt). At the beginning 
of the eighties, it accounted on average for only 5 per cent of 
export revenue ( 1 per cent for Algeria, 7 per cent for Tunisia, 
4 to 5 per cent for Egypt). 
In Egypt, between 1974 and 1980 oil exports, tourism, 
revenue from the Suez canal and migrants' remittances totalled 
more than 90 per cent of current account revenue. Cotton had 
been the main agricultural export (at the beginning of the 
sixties generating 50 per cent of hard currency earnings): its 
exports dropped by almost 25 per cent. Other agricultural 
exports - citrus fruits, potatoes, onions, and rice - have 
likewise declined in val ume due to the growth in dc:mestic danand 
and to the poor progress in production. 
In Syria, cotton exports which fluctuated between 200 and 
250, 000 tons per year in 1967/73, fell to 155,000 tons in 
1976177 and 117,000 tons in 1980. 
Algeria practically stopped exporting its agricultural 
products in the middle of the seventies. In 1980/84 hydrocarbons 
made up 97 per cent of export revenues. In Tunisia oil products 
and derivatives hal. d first place - 880 million Tunisian dinars 
in 1983 then come textile products - 339 million - and 
agricultural exports total only 86 million. 
All traditional Arab exporters of agricultural products 
experienced the same marked decline of the role of agriculture 
in foreign trade, with the exception of Morocco, which is not an 
oil producing country (along with Lebanon and Jordan). In the 
case of M'.:>rocco there was a small decline in the share of 
agricultural over total exports because of an increase of 
manufactured exports. 
The restructuration of 
hydrocarbon sectors and, 
manufacturing and services, 
economic activity around the 
to a lesser extent, around 
has considerably weakened the 
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relative importance of agriculture in gross danestic product. 
In Egypt between 1975 and 1980 the share of agriculture in the 
GDP fell by 7 .5 per cent. It went from 30 per cent in 1960 to 16 
per cent in 1981. The same happened in Syria where agricultural 
GDP went from 30 per cent in 1963 to 18 per cent in 1981, in 
Jordan fran 9 per cent in 1979 to 7 .3 per cent in 1982, in 
Morocco from 29.2 per cent in 1970 to 18 per cent in 1982. In 
Tunisia fran 20 per cent in 1970 to 12.4 per cent in 1982. In 
Algeria, finally, from 10 .9 per cent in 1970 to 7 .3 per cent in 
1 983. 
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Except for the Yemen Arab Republic, the agricultural GDP is 
below 20 per cent everywhere, nearer to 15 per cent on average. 
In the seventies, the share of agriculture on total GDP declined 
because of a perceptible fall in the rate of growth of 
agricultural production. The latter was greater than 2 .5 per 
year in the sixties, but fell to 1 .5 on average in the period 
1970/ 80. 
Despite the large relative decline in agricultural value 
added, population active in agriculture maintains a preponderant 
position in the structure of employment: 41 per cent in Egypt 
with more than 4 million fell ahs, 30 per cent in Syria, 25 per 
cent in Jordan, 30 per cent in Tunisia, 24 per cent in Algeria, 
35 per cent in Morocco. True, this represents an important 
relative decline compared to the sixties, but it must be pointed 
out th a t i n abs ol u t e numb er s th e po p ul a ti on a ct iv e in 
agriculture has slightly increased in all countries. 
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However, the decrease in agricultural growth and the 
reduction of agriculture's role in the economy are apparently 
not in all cases due solely to the increase of oil revenue. In 
Morocco this trend principally reflects the crisis of the export 
oriented model of agricultural developnent. 
Countries which chose to maintain or deepen their 
participation to international trade in agricultural products 
must face particular problems. This is the case of Morocco and 
to a lesser extent of Egypt, Tunisia and Jordan, which decided 
to play the card of 'comparative advantage', and export high 
value added products while importing products with lower 
relative prices ( 1). 
With the progressive closure of their traditional markets 
abroad these countries today face a serious crisis in 
agricultural exports, affecting in particular Morocco and 
Tunisia, which have closer ties with the European Economic 
Community. The north shore of the Mediterranean has, over the 
last decade, be cane a surplus producer of many agricultural 
products and is heading towards self-sufficiency in those 
Mediterranean products that until now had been exported by the 
countries in the south shore. The entry into the EEC of Portugal 
and Spain, foll a.iing that of Greece, leads to the expectation 
that in the foreseeable future European markets will be closed 
not only for Morocco and Tunisia, but for Egypt as well. 
Morocco was estimated to have had losses in the region of 
126 million US dollars in 1980/81 because of the enlargement of 
the EEC; Tunisia lost some 100 million dollars. 
'lhe developnent of agricultural exports was accompanied by 
concentration of resources in the production for export, 
benefitting the irrigated lands and the large commercial farms 
(which in Morocco, for example, generate almost 80 per cent of 
agricultural exports), to the detriment of dry farming zones and 
peasant food producing farms. 
The state encouraged investment in irrigation and extended 
aid to farms in the regions that produce export crops. This 
policy has had important social effects, increasing income 
differentials between categories of farmers, hindering the 
expansion of a majority of the peasants. 
'lh e failure of this agricultural dev elo pne nt strategy poses 
further problems. At a time when sectors which for two decades 
have received the greatest part of state resources are not as 
profitable as they used to be, it is necessary today to further 
invest in order to correct economic and social unbalances in the 
rural world, and gear production to local demand (2). 
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The retreat of agriculture has paradoxically been 
accompanied by a perceptible improvement of the standard of 
living in the countryside. Peasants and farmers have, generally, 
benefitted on various grounds frcm the diffusion of the oil 
rent. For countries like Egypt, Jordan, Tunisia or the Yemen, 
diffusion of the oil rent occurred through migration to the oil 
producing, capital surplus countries (Saudi Arabia, the smaller 
Gulf states, Iraq and Libya). Migration greatly affected the 
countryside, and in the case of Egypt it was estimated that 
agriculture lost around 15 per cent of its adult work force, 
which is to say about 1 .5 million peasants between 1975 and 1978 
(Sainte Marie 1 984) • 
The flow of remittances to the country side has meant not 
only that the micro-farming concerns of a numerically important 
group of the peasants have been kept active, but also that 
household consumption has been improved in a substantial way. 
Nevertheless, part of the agricultural population moved to urban 
areas or to non-agricultural activities in rural areas; this was 
the case in Algeria, Syria, ~rocco and in Tunisia; in the 
latter double employment is n<:M found among the farmers. 
Changes of activity or residence predominantly involved 
agricultural wage labour, landless peasants or peasants with 
very little land. This caused a decline in the supply of wage 
labour, and an improvement in the rate of employment of the 
poorest social groups. Agricultural wages have risen 
appreciably: in the most favourable cases (Algeria) agricultural 
wages have caught up with industry, while in the least 
favourable case (Morocco) the gap rel.a tive to non-agricultural 
salaries has remained stable. 
Thus, in Algeria, the guaranteed minimum wage in agriculture 
was made equal to that of industry and services in 1980. It went 
frcm an index of 100 in 1970 to 437 in 1980, progressing much 
more rapidly than the average non-agricultural wage index. In 
Tunisia the minimum guaranteed wage more than doubled between 
1977 and 1983, but it still only represents 70 per cent of the 
guaranteed interprofessional wage. In Morocco, the substantial 
increase - 40 · per cent in May 1979, or 10.15 dirhams a day 
against the previous 7 .25 - failed to narr<:M the gap between 
agricultural and non-agricultural wages. 
The general evolution also entails a widespread process of 
proletarisation of the smaller peasantry, which in increasing 
numbers must find complementary sources of income outside 
agriculture. The extent of double employment in agricultural 
househal ds in Algeria, Tunisia, M::>rocco and Egypt manifests a 
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deep crisis in subsistence production, and hew difficult it is 
for small-scale farms to stay in business. Thus, an improvement 
in revenue is sought rather through an increase in the supply of 
1 abour on the employment market than through increased sales of 
farming products. 
Improving urban and rural incomes led to rapid grewth of 
demand for food. 'Ihe caloric intake, which was between 2, 000 and 
2,300 calories at the end of the 1960s, has gone up fran 2 ,500 
to 2, 900 calories in most of the Arab countries. Availability of 
food has increased by 15 to 20 per cent on a per ca pi ta basis, 
and in certain countries (Algeria, Tunisia) one can even see a 
big reduction in the food consumption gap between rural and 
urban communities. 
This favourable evolution basically relied on imports, 
leading to grewing dependence on foreign supplies to meet the 
demand for basic staples: cereals, dairy products and sugar. 
An analysis of the agricultural food situation over the 
period 1973/83 shews that for a majority of the countries in the 
Arab world food imports eJ:'f!!M rapidly while danestic production 
of basic items declined on a per capita basis. Yet, one can 
distinguish two e;:"Oups of countries: a first eJ:'OUp, comprising 
Saudi Arabia, Syria and Libya, in which production per capita 
has perceptibly increased; and a second in which it decreased by 
1 0 to 15 per cent on average. Thus, the per ca pi ta production 
index in Egypt went from 99.13 in 1974 (1974/77 = 100) to 90.6 
in 1984, in Iraq it went fran 92 to 76, in Algeria fran 93 to 
82.8, in Morocco from 106 to 87.8 and in Tunisia from 94 to 86.7 
(FAQ 1 985) • 
The food deficit for the Arab world more than doubled in 
this period, totalling sane 20 million tons of cereals, 2 
million tons of sugar, 3 00 to 3 50, 000 tons of meat, s1 igh tly 
more than 100,000 tons of butter and between 100 and 150, 000 
tons of powdered milk. 
Table 2: Cereal Imports of Selected Arab Countries in 1980 -
1 000 tons 
Jordan 451 M:>rocco 1 ,821 
Kuwait 535 Algeria 2,992 
Lebanon 678 Iraq 2,476 
Tunisia 776 Saudi Arabia 3,063 
Libya 816 Egypt 6,028 
Syria 997 
Source: Economie et geopolitique des echanges de cereales en 
MMi terranee, !AM, Montepellier, 1985 
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Since the beginning of the 1980s the cereal deficit has yet 
again increased for all Arab countries, except Saudi Arabia and 
Libya which have partially reduced their foreign deficits. 'Ihe 
Ma.ghreb countries and Egypt have the biggest deficits; Algeria 
and Egypt, in particular, import more than half of their total 
food requirements (3). 
Table 3: Food Self-sufficiency Rate - Wheat, 1977/81 
Egypt Morocco Tunisia Algeria 
1969 86 94 83 70 
1979 54 63 56 40 
1983 30 40 47 26 
Source: FAO, Production Yearbook 1984 
In Algeria, with the exception of the excellent harvest of 
1985, average cereal production (durum wheat, common wheat, 
barley) has been stagnating at 1.8 million tons for about fifty 
years and that of wheat at 1.3 million tons. Total wheat 
consumption is estimated at 4 .5 m. tons. Local production, 
therefore, covers only about a quarter of national requirements. 
Egypt assigns only one million feddan to wheat cultivation -
less than for cotton which is exported - and the harvest is 
lower than in 197 4-76 ( 1,960 million tons, as against 1 ,815 
million tons in 1984). 
Food imports take up a growing part of available currency 
and contribute to the growing foreign trade deficit (Morocco, 
Tunisia, Egypt). The cost of foodstuffs imports in 1983 was 3 
billion US dollars for Egypt, 2 billion for Algeria, 0.8 for 
Morocco and 0.4 for Tunisia. The retreat of agriculture, the 
increasing importance of the food deficit and the expected 
decline in oil production (Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt) have led to 
the adoption of new policies for agricultural growth. 
A NEW AGRICULTURAL POLICY 
The new policy is based on an option in favour of accumulation 
in agriculture and an increase in agricultural revenue, in 
opposition to strategies which prevailed in the past, and aimed 
at transfering the agricultural surplus to other sectors of the 
economy. This orientation is found in varying degrees in most 
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countries - Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia and Syria - with the 
exception of Egypt, which still appears to aim at a gra,.ring 
integration of its agricultural system into the international 
market. One should al so dis ti ngui sh the case of ca pi tal surplus 
countries like Saudi Arabia or Libya, which have canpleted 
massive irwestments in order to enlarge a limited agricultural 
sector. 
Investment in a~icul ture 
The new policy is characterised in the first place by an 
increase in public budget allocations in favour of agriculture. 
Apart fran Egypt, where agricultural public irwestment has 
dropped from 24. 7 per cent of the total in 1965 to 16 .6 in 1970 
and to 4 .2 per cent in 1980, most other countries have seen a 
sharp increase in agricultural irwestments. 
In M::>rocco the amount of irwestment in agriculture 
including irrigation and agricultural water management - which 
stood at 5,468 billion dirhams for the period 1973/77, increased 
to 19,635 billion for the period 1981/85. In the case of 
Tunisia, this amount went fran 197 million dinars in 1972/76 to 
1,360 million in 1982/86 and in Algeria from 2,683 billion 
Algerian dinars in 1970/73, to 5 ,850 billion in 1974/77, to 10 
billion in 1980/84 (4). 
While public irwestment in agriculture declined in the 
seventies as compared to the previous decade, we witness today a 
strong recovery of the share of irwestment going to agriculture. 
In Tunisia, this share stood at 20 per cent for the decade 
1961/70, fell to 13 per cent in 1971/ 80, then increased again to 
17 per cent for the period 1981/86. In Algeria, agricultural 
irwestments were below 8 per cent on average in 1970/79, but 
appropriations went up to 12 per cent in 1980/84 and to 14.4 per 
cent of total irwestment in 1985/ 86. A new situation, indeed, 
whereby the agricultural sector receives in most Arab countries 
a share of public finance which is larger than its contributions 
to the GDP. Privately funded irwestment remains small when 
compared to the publ c effort, reaching some 13 per cent in 
Morocco, sanewhat less in Tunisia, and 10 per cent in Algeria. 
One can, ha,.rever, generalise the question posed by 
Hachmi Alaya (1984) for Tunisia: 'whether the volume of 
irwestment allocated to the agricultural sector is not 
greater than its absorption capacity, especially with 
respect to that part which is financed by the banks. 
Necessary conditions in the organisation and 
technical training of the farmers, in the farming of 
state lands, in agricultural prices, in the supply of 
165 
Ait .Amara - State, Social Classes and Agricultural Policies 
production inputs to the farmers, in the marketing of 
agricultural products - do not seem to be as yet all 
met to the extent that would warrant the planned growth 
of the sector 1 • 
This is especially true in Algeria where, despite a clear 
improvement, the rates of realisation in comparison to 
appropriations were only 65 per cent in 1970/73 and 68 per cent 
in 197 4/77. 
The structure of irwestment shows a concentration on 
irrigation, which receives more than one-third of all funds 
going to the agricultural sector. In Morocco, where the spread 
of irrigation is a characteristic feature of agricultural. 
policy, land irrigated by the larger dams has risen to 540, 000 
ha. Public entities irwested the equivalent of 9,500 million DH 
in the hydre>-agricul tural sector between 196 8 and 1980, which is 
to say, a yearly average of 792 million DH, with the aim of 
reaching 1,000, 000 ha irrigated by large and medium-sized water 
projects. 
Table 4: Share of Hydraulic Investment over Total Agricultural 
Irwestment 
Morocco Tunisia Algeria 
Period % Period % Period % 
73/77 33.3 72/76 39 70/73 31.3 
78/80 71.1 77/81 43 .6 74/77 29.9 
81/85 39.9 82/86 78.2 79/82 40 
In Libya, irrigated land has risen to 80 ,ooo ha, and a 
project being carried out by a South Korean company should, with 
al.most 4,000 kilaneters of canalisations, drain the water tables 
of the southern desert and bring the water to the lands of the 
north, increasing the irrigated area by 180,000 ha (at a total 
cost of 10 billion dollars) (Burgat 1985). Saudi Arabia has 
likEliise undertaken vast hydraulic irwestments to tap the 
shallower water tables; this allowed her over the last years to 
turn her wheat deficit into a surplus ( 5). 
Syria will double its irrigated surfaces, which are already 
quite vast (650,000 ha), following the canpletion of the 
Euphrates dam, thus bringing the total irrigated land to some 
1,200,000 ha. Finally, Iraq has hydraulic i nf'rastructure 
covering some 1,200,000 ha which, though underutilised to an 
extreme, should allow for a significant growth in production. 
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Implementation, however, is uneven and varies depending on 
the country. Saudi Arabia, Libya, Iraq, Syria and Morocco have 
progressed at a rapid rate and have today sane impressive 
facilities, more superior to those of countries like Tunisia, 
Algeria, and Jordan, whose modest programs could not buy more. 
Egypt, however, has considerably slowed down on irrigation 
programs, which initially (in 1954) had been expected to cover 
2 .5 million feddans. Fran 1954 to 1984 only 912, 000 feddans were 
effected, of which 670 ,000 were brought into production, mostly 
before 1975. In the last 12 years, 70,000 feddans have been 
added to the cultivated land, while it is estimated that 25,000 
to 40, 000 feddans are lost each year to urban expansion. With 45 
million inhabitants and an annual demographic growth rate of 
2.5, Egypt experiences growing demographic pressure on its 
lands. 

































Hydraulic investment aims at removing natural constraints to 
production. 'Ihe Mediterranean climate along the thin littoral 
be! t progressively deteriorates into a semi-arid or arid climate 
over the much wider farmable land surfaces of the interior. 
Countries like Egypt, Libya and Saudi Arabia cannot cultivate 
without irrigation. But in all other regions, the annual 
rainfall is insufficient as well, and a large part of arable 
land does not receive enough water for crops (6). This is the 
case not only of Jordan, Syria and Iraq but, in the western 
Mediterranean as well, of Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco. 
Aridity and insufficient water supply characterise the 
climate, limiting production and yield. Because production is 
sensitive to rainfall conditions fran one year to the next, it 
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fluctuates. With irrigation one can hope for a sizeable increase 
in the volume of production and a better yearly control over 
yields. 

















The water mobilisation programmes are all the more important 
because Arab countries have only a snall potential for expanding 
cultivated land. Demographic graith dramatically limited the 
ratio of arable land to population and the outer boundaries of 
cultivable land have been reached everywhere. Irrigation, 
therefore, is an essential step to increase agricultural 
productivity and pass fran extensive to intensive agriculture. 
Mechanisation of agriculture 
The modernisation ~ agricultural cultivation methods and 
equiµnent is the second aspect of the new agricultural policy. 
The state wants to achieve graith in agricultural productivity 
by increasing mechanisation services, introducing fertilisers 
and other chemical products, and improving the livestock. To 
this end, tax reductions, credit and subsidies have been 
introduced. Thus, for example, large subsidies are granted to 
encourage fertilisers consumption, and aid is given for the use 
of other production factors; imports of agricultural material 
are exempted frcm customs duties and taxes; the purchase of 
tractors is subsidised, and the state offers free services in 
fertilisation, veterinary care, plants and seeds, mechanised 
work. Credi ts to farmers at improved rates are obtained more 
easily. In Tunisia for example (but the same could be said of 
Algeria, Morocco and Syria) the operation of the Fond special de 
d~vel oppement agri col e (FOSDA) went f ran 1 4, 000 mill ion in 1 97 4 
and 18,000 million in 1977, to 65,000 million in 1982. In 1981, 
the National Bank of Tunisia doubled the funds allocated to 
farming loans fran 20 million DT to 48 million Tunisian dinars. 
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Mechanisation is the most remarkable aspect of the 
agricultural investment policy. Improved agricultural wages and 
state support led to a widespread diffusion of mechanisation in 
all Arab countries often coupled with a trend to increased 
concentration of production. 
In Algeria, the number of tractors has more than doubled 
since the beginning of the seventies - from 26 ,ooo to 58, 000 
uni ts - with an acceleration of gr0r1th in the last five years. 
In Tunisia, only 18 per cent of fanners used mechanical traction 
in 1962, whereas in 1976 that percentage had increased to 55 per 
cent and in 1980 to 58 per cent ( Ramdhane 1983). '!he tractor 
pool went fran 20,000 units in1976 to 28,000 in 1983. The same 
holds true for Morocco, Egypt and Syria where there has been a 
quantitative and qua! ita tive increase in mechanical implements, 
concentrated for the most part in large and medium-sized farming 
concerns. Correspondingly, snall-scal e concerns have limited 
access to mechanisation and run up against gra.ring difficulties 
in cultivation because of the substantial drop in domestic 
livestock. 
In general, agricultural modernisation depends on a greater 
absorption of industrial inputs, which many countries must 
import, either totally or partially. Egypt and Algeria have 
created an industrial sector which is capable of partially 
satisfying agricultural needs, but Morocco, for example, has to 
spend more than 22 per cent of its total agricultural imports 
for the acquisition of material on foreign markets. In other 
words, in most cases the mechanisation of agriculture has sane 
drawbacks and contributes to the trade deficit. 
Agricultural prices 
But certainly the most innovative aspect of the new pol icy 
concerns agricultural prices. During the sixties and the first 
half of the seventies, prices were the basic instrument for 
mobilising the agricultural surplus. '!he state rigorously pegged 
the prices of the main basic products, agricultural raw 
materials (cotton) or foodstuffs (cereals), at a level that was 
lower than that of world markets. Agriculture thus contributed 
to the creation of employment in the urban sector by assuring a 
cheap supply of basic foods. 
The increase in the prices of agricultural products, which 
most Arab countries decreed since the beginning of the eighties, 
represents an important change of mind with respect to the 
utilisation of the agricultural surplus and, more generally, 
with respect to the redistribution of GDP (7). 
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Prices of products controlled by the state were increased -
cereals or cotton, milk, oil sugar; the prices of other products 
- meat, fruits and vegetables (Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt) - were 
liberalised. 
The Maghreb countries have thus experienced a substantial 
increase in the price of cereals (wheat). 
Table 7: Evolution of Cereal Prices -Durum and Common Wheat in 
National Currency, per 100 kg 
Durum Wheat 197 9 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 
Tunisia 7.6 8.6 9.6 11.0 14 14 15 
Morocco 70 125 140 140 140 140 150 
Algeria 125 140 140 140 160 200 
Common Wheat 
Tunisia 7.0 7.7 8.7 12.8 14 14 14 .5 
Morocco 70 125 140 140 140 140 150 
Algeria 110 130 130 130 150 190 
In Tunisia, cereal prices have seen an annual average 
increase of 14 per cent, those of milk of more than 22 per cent. 
Bovine meat prices were liberalised at the end of 1982 after a 
16 per cent annual increase, and mutton prices were liberalised 
at the end of 1 979; since then a veritable explosion has 
occurred. In Morocco, the increases have been somewhere in the 
region of 47 per cent for wheat, 17 .2 and 16 .9 for beets and 
sugar cane, 42 per cent for oil seeds, 34 per cent for milk. 
In Algeria, prices have risen more sharply, 60 per cent for 
durum wheat, 65 per cent for common wheat and dry vegetables, 
upward of 150 per cent for milk. In Syria, the goverrment 
increased the purchase price of cotton by 44 per cent in 1981/82 
and by 20 per cent in 1982/83 (World Bank 1983). Finally, in 
Egypt, the price increases which occurred in 1979/ 80 were more 
modest. Wheat prices gained 9 per cent, rice 15 .4 per cent, 
sugar 27 .6 per cent. The price payed for cotton has remained at 
a much lower level canpared to the world market (World Bank 
1 980) • 
Generally speaking, price increases for basic products -
cereals, dairy products, dried vegetables - have been very high 
in most of the countries in recent years. Domestic prices, with 
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the exception of Egypt, are well above import prices, sanething 
which clearly indicates a reversal of the tendency seen in 
previous decades. 
However, the gr CM th of public financial aid to agriculture 
is principally aimed at encouraging commercial farming, on which 
the state relies in order to achieve its objectives for 
agricultural growth. Mechanisation, consumption of intermediary 
inputs and credits are, for the most part, channelled to the 
larger market-oriented farms. At the same time, funds that used 
to accrue to the smaller and poorer peasantry through different 
state institutions or the cooperatives that were created in the 
1950s and 1960s, are reduced or al together cancelled. 
This consequence is implicit in the generalised trend 
towards 'state disengagement' vis-~vis the social categories 
that in the past benefitted fran agrarian refonn programs 
(Egypt, Algeria, Tunisia, Syria). Tunisia was first in 1971 in 
terminating her attempts at agrarian reorga.nisa tion based on 
cooperatives, and in starting a proces of liberalisation of the 
agricultural sector and priva tisa ti on of land tenure. Until the 
beginning of the 1980s, however, it maintained a rigorous system 
of control over prices, which limited the developnent of 
commercial farms and protected the competitive position of the 
small peasant fanners. 
Since 1982 (Law 82-67, 6 August 1982) the land belonging to 
the state (almost 400, 000 ha of good land) can be leased for an 
approved length of time, not to exceed thirty years, to Tunisian 
joint stock canpanies called 'canpanies for agricultural 
improvement and developnent', in which the state directly or 
indirectly CMns a share of the equity (art. 10); or to private 
individuals. Thus in 1982/83, some 15,000 ha were ceded to 
Tunisian-Kuwaiti or Tunisian-Saudi private organisations, as 
well as to Tunisian private entities. 
In Morocco, the large capitalist farms specialising in 
export crops have won the largest share of state investments and 
aid, and will continue to play a vital role in the new 
agri cul tural strategy ( 8) . 
But it is Egypt where the system supporting the snall 
peasant farmers since the sixties was most thoroughly disnantled 
by a series of measures implemented si nee 1975: when taken as a 
whole the latter deserve to be called an 'agrarian 
counter-reform', The new banking network, substituting for the 
service cooperatives, will henceforth cut farmers who do not 
have sufficient guarantees off fran loans for farming and 
equiµnent. Relations between landowners and tenants have been 
reviewed to the benefit of the former. Leases can be transformed 
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with the sole consent of the owner into sharecropping contracts 
with new conditions set by the owner; in certain cases the 
latter can even expel the tenant. Finally, taxable incane and 
the amount of the land rent were both increased (Dowidar 1984). 
Finally, in Algeria, public authorities have dissolved the 
cooperative structures established by the agrarian reform of 
1971. The land that had been worked collectively was 
redistributed to individual farmers, and the service 
cooperatives which provided the technical assistance and 
material to certain categories of producers stopped their 
activities in 1982/83. In particular, the disappearance of the 
cooperatives' branches handling mechanical implements has 
resulted in a substantial increase in the rental rate for 
machinery, affecting the small peasant farmers who can no longer 
afford the 0:l uiµnent. These measures manifest the state's 
determination to disengage itself fran a category of peasant 
farmers, because the assistance that it once gave to them, in 
the form of subsidies and various services has today become too 
costly. 
CLASS RELATIONS AND AGRICUL1URAL POLICY 
What will the real impact be of' the measures taken in favour of' 
agriculture? Are they an attempt at a redef ini ti on of its ral. e 
in the national economy and its integration in the international 
context? There is no doubt that up until 1 the oil era' 
agriculture was an essential sector in the economy, the source 
of a surplus and of hard currency, that were channelled to the 
benefit of' urban expansion. 
During the seventies, the state's links with agriculture 
weakened; imports from abroad to a large extent replaced 
domestic production, and the country side was integrated into the 
employment and consumer markets rather than into the products 
market. The financial crisis and the fall in outside revenues of 
the 1980s led to a reorientation of agricultural policies, which 
however, was not in all cases accompanied by a reversal of the 
past trend and of the direction of flows in favour of 
agriculture. 
Countries with large capita! surpluses which have made big 
transfers in favour of agriculture, so as to establish or 
enlarge their agricultural production structures (Saudi Arabia, 
Libya and Iraq) should be distinguished from countries with 
small or medium export revenues, whose agricultural sectors 
suf'fered a big retreat in the 1970s. In the case of the latter 
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(Algeria, Egypt, Tunisia, Syria, Morocco) it is a question of 
limiting the damage caused on their agriculture by the expansion 
of the oil economy. 
The first group of countries only had a 1 imi ted agricultural 
sector and for the most part, financed the develoµnent of its 
agricultural sector and the growth in producers' income by 
transforming a part of its oil revenues into productive 
agricultural capital. Libya has devoted large sums to land 
reclamation, settled peasants on farms of 5 to 25 hectares, 
depending on the project. The farmers receive houses given them 
by the state, gardens and orchards. At settlement they receive a 
monthly allCMance of 90 dinars and 1 oans of 5, 000 dinars 
repayable after 15 years, interest free. Technology of the most 
expensive kind has helped create areas of intensive farming in 
the middle of arid steppes, and to produce wheat, fodder, fruit, 
vegetables, milk and meat (9). 
Saudi Arabia has made similar huge investments to exploit 
shallow underground water sources and expand irriga. ted land 
surfaces. In this way it has been able to considerably reduce 
its cereal deficit. 
In the second group of countries, the new orientation in 
favour of agriculture does not always imply a radical revision 
of agriculture's relations with the rest of the economy. It is 
rather a tendency to adjust the role of agriculture to the new 
conditions prevailing in the economy, rather than a complete 
break with the traditional model, in which the main function of 
the agricultural sector was to mobilise a surplus for the 
benefit of the other sectors. HCMever, compared to the other 
countries in this group, Algeria offers an example of a 
situation that is much more favourable to agriculture. 
The increase in agricultural prices, even more so than 
direct measures of support to the factors of subsidies 
(production, credits, rebates, free loans, etc.), is a good 
indicator of the tendency tCMards a recovery in agricultural 
revenues. In fact, in most cases (Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, 
Syria) the agricultural price index has grown more rapidly than 
the general price index. 
In Tunisia, for example, the general consumer price index 
went from 100 (1977) to 168 (1983) while the index for 
agricultural foodstuffs for the same period went fran 1 00 to 
175 .9. The biggest advances were for fruits and vegetables 
(199.4) and meats (212.2). 
In Algeria, the difference is bigger. Against a general 
index of 306.8 in 1983 (1969 = 100), the foodstuffs index rose 
to 393 .2. As can be seen in the table bel CM, the gap is widening 
after 1980. 
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As in Tunisia, fruits, vegetables and meats recorded the 
largest price increases ( 10). The same observations can be made 
for the other countries where, in general, the inflation of 
agricultural product prices is greater than that of 
non-agricultural products. 
Moreover, when considering the evolution in the prices of 
the factors of production supplied to agriculture, be they 
produced locally or imported, we come to the cone! usion that an 
improvement in the terms of exchange for agriculture has 
occurred. »:>st countries subsidise the factors of production, in 
sane cases to the extent that they are sold at prices well below 
their cost. 
In Algeria, for example, the prices of the main factors of 
production were frozen from 1974 until 1982, and then only 
slight increases were introduced; as a consequence, prices are 
today still half the international ones. 
Improvement in the agricultural terms of exchange does not, 
in all cases, imply a reversal of financial flows to the benefit 
of agriculture. Egypt, as opposed to Algeria, is a case where 
the difference between danestic and international prices is 
still clearly against local agriculture, notably for basic 
produc.ts such as wheat or cotton, while the increase in the 
international prices of agricultural machinery is transferred to 
the farmers in full. 
The new policy in favour of agriculture, however, pursues 
objectives that are not easily reconciled. On the one hand, it 
has to bear in mind the need for safeguarding the urban 
purchasing power for food, an important factor for political and 
social stability, while on the other, it aims at increasing 
agricultural incane by raising agricultural prices. 
The control of prices during the 196 Os and the beginning of 
the 1970s was implemented in a way that damaged growth of 
agricultural in com es, but did not necessarily favour 
accumulation in industry, contrary to what has been often 
suggested. In the Arab countries industry only employs an 
average of 15 per cent of the active population: 17 per cent in 
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Algeria and Tunisia, 14 per cent in Morocco and Egypt. In the 
latter country, industrial activity has been on the decline 
since 1975; in 1961 it accounted for only 15 per cent of the GDP 
and 7 per cent of its production was exported as against 9 per 
cent in 1973. 
It is the services sector which dominates everywhere. It 
accounts for half of the employment on average, so much so that 
these should really be dubbed services economy, rather than 
industrial economies. 
Job creation in the services sector and especially in the 
administration has been everywhere more important than in 
industry: there is one job industry for every three in services. 
'!he freezing of agricultural product prices at a low level has 
consequently been an essential instrument for the financing of 
employment in the tertiary sector. 
The massive reliance on imports to satisfy a graJing 
danestic danand caused a relative drop in the prices of local 
agricultural products. 
In some countries (Egypt, Algeria, Tunisia) the state has 
set up a distribution system for basic products - cereals, 
vegetable oils, dairy products - which are imported and sold at 
subsidised prices. Thus a twcrtier market for agricultural food 
produce was created, one functioning under the control of the 
state and assuring the distribution of basic products at fixed 
and subsidised prices, the other, distributing local 
agricultural products at prices fixed by supply and demand. 
State expenditure for subsidies to prices reached massive 
proportions. In Algeria, it rose to sane 3 billion dinars, or 
6.5 per cent of household consumption. In Morocco, the state was 
able to give each household an average subsidy representing 
about 7.3 per cent of the food budget for 1974, 9.8 in 1975, 4.5 
in 1979, and 5 .6 in 1980. In Egypt subsidies for essential goods 
(flour, sugar, vegetable oils and other food products) totalled 
2 .04 billion Egyptian pounds for 1983. 
This pol icy aimed at maintaining the purchasing power of the 
urban middle and working classes and was made possible by 
decreasing reliance on domestic production to meet food demand. 
Since the eighties, however, there has been a rapid and 
substantial increase in the cost of food, following the rise in 
agricultural prices and the progressive reduction of goverrment 
subsidies for consumption. 
In Egypt, price subsidies fell by almost 300 million US 
dollars in 1984. In Algeria, two increases of 22 per cent each 
were introduced in 1985 for cereals, vegetable oils and other 
basic foodstuf'fs. Parallel increases took place in Morocco 
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Tunisia and Jordan. The li beralisa ti on of prices of local 
products, fruits, vegetables and meats, led to steep increases. 
The urban middle classes, the working classes, and the 
agricultural wage earners have been the main victims of the rise 
in the price of foodstuffs and have had to adjust to a sizeable 
reduction in their purchasing power. Hardest hit by inf la ti on 
are the petty civil servants, employees and workers, all 
especially vulne.rable to food price increases. 
The erosion of real wages has been particularly strong in 
Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco and Jordan; the first three among these 
countries experienced serious popular outbursts as a 
consequence. In other cases, greater outside resources were used 
to compensate the effects of the price increases on low incanes. 
This is the case of Algeria where the goverrment decoupled 
agricultural producer prices fran consumers prices, the former 
being increased while the latter are kept at a relatively low 
1 eve!. This is why in Algeria salary increases surpassed the 
increase in the prices of basic products but did not match the 
increase in those of fruits, vegetables and meats. Put in 
another way, the purchasing power of salaries has improved for 
cereals, vegetable oils, dairy products, dried vegetables and 
sugar but deteriorated for fruits, vegetables and meats. 
The rise in the cost of the food ration is a tendency which 
all countries have experienced.. It seriously strains the class 
relationship built up in the 60s and 70s which for the most part 
was based on an alliance between the lower middle class, the 
urban working classes and the peasantry. 
The financial crisis and the drop in exogenous revenues 
imply that the state cannot anymore rely on imports and 
subsidies as a means of controlling domestic prices. In this 
respect, increases in the administered prices of agricultural 
products only anticipate new market conditions. The evolution of 
supply and demand for agricultural foodstuffs demonstrates the 
new economic and social importance of the countryside, deriving 
from the worsening of the food crisis in certain countries 
(Algeria, Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco). 
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NOTES 
1. 1 Producing citrus fruits at great expense for export and 
importing cereals to cover basic needs is consistent with the 
requirements of the process of integration of the M::>roccan 
economy into the global market' .See el-Malki, H. ( 1983) Au de!~ 
des chiffres guel developpement? Ed. Maghrebines?'. 
2. This is a profound transformation of the agricultural 
strategy envisaged by the Morroccan Plan 1984/ 85. 'To reduce the 
negative effects of unfavourable international developnent, curb 
the food deficit, restrain the rural exodus, try for a new 
equilibrium at regional, inter-sectorial and· intra-sectorial 
1 evels: these are sane of the main ideas that arise from 
developnents which the last Five Year Plan 1981-85 has devoted 
to the agricultural sector' (Habib el-Malki 1983). 
3. Egypt receives almost 44 per cent of world 'food aid' 
supplied by the USA. Wheat in the form of donation has, however, 
been progressively replaced by credit sales with no special 
conditions (like the city credit corporation USDA). 
4. The second Five Year Plan 1985-89 allocates 30 billion DA 
just for agricultural investments to which are to be added 40 
billion in water investments. 
5 . In 1 985, Saudi Arabi a produced 1 • 7 mill ion tons of wheat 
for a consumption of about 1 million tons. 
6. In Jordan, barely 30 per cent of land receives more than 
350 mm of rain annually, and only 600,000 ha between 200 and 350 
mm, the rest being unfit for cultivation. In Syria, 65 per cent 
of the 18.5 ha used by agriculture receives less than 200 mm of 
rain anually. In Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco fran one-third to 
half of all arable land has less than 400 mm water annually. 
1. 'Today's prices and market policy seems to be inadequate, 
from the point of view of agriculture, which does not make up 
for ground lost, and fran that of the consumer, who pays a 
higher price. One might think that the support given to products 
should outweigh the support given farming with prices therefore 
playing a more determinant role' {Three Year Plan 1978-80). 
8. 'It is mercantile agriculture and, in particular 
capitalist agriculture which will have to not only continue 
specialising in export crops but develop food production more, 
too. It is, therefore, mercantile agriculture which will have to 
assure the food security of the country (Revue Marocaine de 
droi t et d' ~conomie du developpement, 1982). 
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9. At Oubari,- for example. 'each farm covers 10 ha. With the 
farm comes a herd of goats, a tractor, a harvester, an orchard 
with citrus fruits, figs. a lucerne plantation. a kitchen 
garden. The holdings are grouped in small autonomous townships 
each having an electric power station, a mosque. a school, 
administrative buildings, tarred roads streaking the fields'. 
(Rossi, 1 979). 
10. The average agricultural price index does. however, 
conceal Ver"f big distorsions in favour of producers of fruits, 
vegetables and meats, to the prejudice of producers of basic 
produce, cereals. vegetable oils and milk - products for the 
most part imported and whose prices are fixed by the state. 
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FOREIGN DEBT IN THE ARAB COUNTRIES 
Azz am Mahj ou b 
INTRODUCTION 
This chapter discusses the importance of foreign public debt and 
its different origins for the various Arab countries, leading at 
the beginning of the 80s to a crisis of variable intensity, 
depending on the country. 
Our starting hypothesis is that the debt crisis of the Arab 
countries is but one manifestation of continuing structural 
inbalances (measured in macro-economic terms by the gap between 
resources and utilisations) that became particularly apparent at 
the beginning of the 80s and has characterised the recent 
evolution of the economy. 'lhe crisis appears at the time when a 
peculiar international economic juncture exacerbates the 
distorsions at hand and accelerates processes under way. 
The presence of both common and differentiating factors 
makes it possible to elaborate a clear basic typology of Arab 
economies. This typology should enable us to establish at the 
same time certain common traits as well as singularities of the 
Arab states, and to understand the nature and degree of 
political and social readjustment processes are taking place, in 
which the state is the decisive actor. 
First, it is a fact that at the beginning of the 1980s all 
the Arab countries experienced a clear economic deterioration 
often directly accompained by explosive social and political 
instability. The bread riots in Morocco, Egypt, Tunisia and 
Sudan, renewed military tensions within the Arab region, and 
financial scandals were irrefutable signs of the exacerbation of 
a profound malaise. 'lhe 1980s marked a turning point in the 
contemporary economic history of the Arab world. 
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'!he social upheaval brought to the fore the fragility of 
existing political systems and, above all, the widening gaps 
left over by the economic growth of the 1970s. Feverish growth 
rates of the 1970s declined and external financial and 
commercial positions deteriorated during the 1980s. 
To varying degrees the Arab economies find themselves 
increasingly integrated into the international Debt Economy. 
Certainly, the Arab countries do not constitute the weakest link 
in the chain; no Arab country unilaterally declared a 
moratorium, but the Sudan, Morocco and Iraq were obliged to 
initiate negotiations for debt rescheduling. 'Ihe situation is 
rather precarious in Egypt, Tunisia, Syria and Jordan, as well. 
Current trends could lead to a catastrophe and the danger of a 
1 Latin-Americanisation' of the debt is imminent if the trend is 
not subtantially reversed. 
It is necessary to note at the outset that the external debt 
of the Arab countries has grc~m by more than 10 per cent in 1983 
only, to somewhere near 100 billion US dollars, constituting 
one-eighth of total Third World debt. Between 1974 and 1983, it 
multiplied twenty times. Clearly the situation is not as 
catastrophic as in South America, nevertheless all the Arab 
countries, whether large, medium, or small exporters of oil (or 
non-exporters, at that) are in one way or another and with 
varying degrees of intensity, experiencing serious 1 :i.q uidi ty 
problems. Austerity, often with explosive social consequences, 
is the order of the day. 
The problem of financial surpluses in the 1970s has turned 
into an external payments crisis in the 80s. It is only recently 
that the Arab, and more generally, Third World debt has become a 
source of concern for the leading centers of international 
finance. The fact that Algeria, Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Egypt 
appear on the list of the twenty most indebted countries of the 
Third World, and the requests for rescheduling made by Sudan, 
Iraq and Morocco has brought to light the fragility and extreme 
vulnerability of the external financial positions of the Arab 
countries and their involvement in the international debt 
crisis. Arab debt grew by 25 per cent fran 1982to1984, to the 
130 billion dollars estimated by financial observers in the mid 
80s. 
180 
Mahjoub - Foreign Debt in the Arab Countries 
A TYPOLOO Y OF THE ARAB ECONOMIES 
As already suggested the foreign payments crisis affects the 
Arab countries in different and unequal ways, and each country 
is involved in the Debt Economy to a different degree and in 
specific ways. 
The Arab world is a field of unequal economic forces 
organised as nation-states, integrated into the world economic 
system with varying degrees of dependence fran the international 
division of labour, and structured by an intraregional network 
of interdependence, centred directly or indirectly around the 
oil surpluses. 
The Arab economies as a whole are usually divided into four 
sub-groups. '!hough this typology is too simplistic it is 






Saudi a Arabia, Libya, United Arab Emirates, 
Kuwait, Qnan, Bahrain, Qatar 
Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, Jordan, Syria, 
Lebanon 
Sudan, Somalia, Mauritania, Yemen Arab Republic 
Yemen Democratic Republic, Djibouti 
The distribution of population and income clarify the main 
structural differences between these groups. 
Table 1 : Distribution of GDP and population and average per 
capital GDP for groups of Arab countries 
Group Gross Domestic Product Population Average 
per ca pi ta 
GDP (US$) 
1970 1980 1982 
G1 21.6 20.9 16.8 20% 1:$1000 
G2 25.5 55.2 56. 7 10% 1:$ 4000 
G3 43.2 20.2 23.5 51% 1:$ 400 
G4 9.7 3.6 2.9 19% 1 :$ 300 
Total 100 100 100 100 
Source Arab Monetary Fund, Arab Economic Report, 1982 (in 
Arabic). 
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'!bus in the early 80s the first group cCl!lprised one fifth of the 
population and one fifth of the GNP; the second group comprised 
only one tenth of the population for more than half of the GDP; 
the third group had half of the population, but less than a 
quarter of GDP; and the fourth had almost a fifth of the 
population and 3 per cent of GDP. 
'!he most significant changes that took place in the decade 
1970-80 were 
- '!be relative stability of G1 is stare of income (with a 
slight drop since 
1980) 
- While G2' s share of income doubled, G3' s was halved. 
- G4 1 s share of incCl!le decreased to a third. 
'!bus, the strong and growing polarisation between G2 and G3+G4. 
Table 2: Sectorial Distribution of GDP 
Group: All Arab G1 G2 G3 G4 
countries 
Year: 1970 80 70 80 70 80 70 80 70 80 
Sectors: 
Agriculture 17 7 15 8 3 1 22 15 42 37 
Mining 23 23 22 32 59 53 3 16 2 1 
Manufacturing 12 9 13 11 5 6 18 16 9 7 
Construction 6 10 7 11 6 12 5 6 5 7 
Electricity, 
gas, water 1 2 3 2 
Transport, 
tel ecom. 8 6 7 6 6 5 10 10 8 9 
Other services 33 28 34 31 19 23 40 36 31 38 
TOTAL 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: Arab Monetary Fund, Arab Economic Re12ort, 1982 (in 
Arabic) 
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From the point of view of the sectorial distribution of GDP 
(table 2) the following is evident: 
The importance acquired by the mining sector, 
fundamentally in energy. Its contribution has more than 
doubled, and accounts for two-fifths of GDP. 
The substantial progress recorded in infrastructures, 
notably in G1 and G2. Manufacturing industries hold their 
own at around 10 per cent. 
The service sector loses relative weight but remains 
important. 
Mines (thus hydrocarbons) and services account for 
two-thirds of GDP. As for agriculture, its importance has 
decreased sharply, pointing to a relative marginalisation. 
Agriculture received no more than 5 per cent of fixed i nvest.ment 
in 1970-80. In fact, the main share of fixed investment went to 
mining (33.5 per cent) and services (27.6 per cent). 
Manufacturing industries, construction and transport have egual 
shares (10 per cent each). 
Now, considering the sectorial distri bu ti on of GDP by groups 
of countries, structural differences between G1 and G2, the two 
groups of oil producing and exporting countries, become obvious. 
For G2 the mining sector accounts for more than 50 per cent of 
GDP, agriculture is almost non-existent, the manufacturing 
industries play a small role. For G1 the mining sector accounts 
for only two-thirds of GDP, manufacturing industries and 
agriculture (although in recession) account for one-quarter of 
the GDP. Though the productive non-mining sector is weak, it is 
nonetheless 3 times more important in G1 than in G2; however, 
the service sector is relatively more important in G1. 
For G3, which has the largest demographic share (50 per 
cent), it should be noted that at the end of the decade mining 
(oil+ phosphates), agriculture and manufacturing each generated 
about one-sixth of the GDP. Services play an important role, 36 
per cent. 
As for G4, agriculture and the services are predominant, 
generating two-thirds of the GDP: this is a manifestation of the 
relative weakness of productive structures in this group. 
MACRO-ECONOMIC DISEJlUil..IBRIA AND DIFFERENTIAL PROCESSES OF 
FOREIGN IN DEB TEDN ESS 
From the point of view of macro-economic equilibrium (Resources 
= GDP, utilisations = public and private consumption + gross 
fixed investment) it is necessary to underline important 
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differences between the 4 groups that explain the processes of 
indebtedness for G1, G3 and G4. Tables 3 and especially 4 are 
quite indicative. 
With the exception of G2 whose foreign trade balance still 
are in surplus despite sane deterioration at the beginning of 
the 80s, G2, G3, and G4, with different income utilisation 
structures, recorded cumulative deficits, requiring foreign 
funding and originating indebtedness. 
For the G1 countries, oil surpluses brought with them 
developnental (and military) ambitions: hence the very high 
level of capital accumulation. Over the years they saw a 
worsening in their trade balances and became dependent on 
external financial sources. 
G3 countries with fewer internal resources and a high 
consumption/GDP ratio (around 90 per cent) had to systematically 
turn to foreign financing to sustain fixed ca pi ta! accumulation 
(20 per cent of GDP). Here the deficit took on a durable 
structural form. 
G4 countries, with minimal resources and an internal 
consumption that systematically and sane times largely outstrips 
GDP, had a large structural deficit; indebtedness became a vital 
necessity to ensure economic survival. 
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Source: Arab Monetary Funds, National Accounts of Arab Countries 
1971-1982 
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Table 4: Resources/Utilisations 
In % G1 G2 G3 G4 
Consumption/GDP 213 Between 90% 100% 
40 and 60% 
Gross Very high and high and moderate moderate 
Fixed rapidly rapidly grOMth : 20% and v ari able 
Invest/GDP grc:wing grc:wing except except Jordan 








Surplus exists structural 




40 to 90% of 
GDP 
Years 










75 81 82 75 81 82 75 81 82 75 81 82 
X exports/ 
M imports 101 74 62 295 209 140 69 78 67 46 31 37 
In 1960-70 both G1 and G3 countries ran deficits and built 
up their debt in order to speed up gr OM th, albeit to differing 
degrees and at different times. They increasingly and 
systematically resorted to foreign capital. 
Foreign financing was an attractive proposition because of 
the public nature of 1 aid', whether bilateral or multilateral, 
the long-term repayment conditions and their low real interest 
rates. In 1970, the total debt of the Arab regions ran at about 
18.5 per cent of GDP; the ratio of debt service to exports was 
quite small: around 9 .4 per cent. However, fast gr CM th in the G1 
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countries (fuelled by hydrocarbon production) and medium gL"OWth 
levels in the G3 countries (based on mining - oil, phosphates -
and import substitution) failed to solve structural deficiencies 
and created greater dependence on imports for intermediate and 
final consumption, thus leading to graning debt. 
In the case of G4 countries, as we pointed out, there was no 
notable growth in the years 1 960-70 and foreign indebtedness was 
a condition of mere economic survival. 
ARAB FmANCIAL SURPLUSES, wom.D FmANCE AND 'mE WORSENING OF THE 
mDEB TEDN E'.SS 
Arab financial surpluses became a feature of world finance and 
contributed to the priva tisa ti on of the international financial 
and monetary systems, inaugurating the world debt econany. The 
origins of the Eurodollar market are in US fiscal and monetary 
policy, but this market offered particularly attractive 
conditions and absorbed Arab surpluses while financing Arab (as 
well as non-Arab) deficits. 
The starting point is, of course, oil income and the creation of 
Arab financial surpluses. 
Table 5: Current Account Sur pl uses of the OAPEC Countries 
(billions of dollars) 
1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 
39.4 22 .1 31.8 27 .1 13.2 59.4 
Source: A. Martens ( 1983) ' L'~conomie des Qaxs arabes, Economica 
A break-down of Arab credits shows that three-quarters were 
invested in developed countries, one fifth in the LDCs and 4 per 
cent in multilateral financial organisations (World Bank-IMF). 
Most of these financial surpluses were reinjected, usually in 
very liquid form, into the international financial system, 
supporting the Eurocredi t market and international private 
banks. The one fifth going to LCDs, mostly Arab, includes a 
large part (60-75 per cent) of bilateral or multilateral public 
develoJ;111ent aid. 
The considerable increase in oil revenue gL"eatly stimulated 
demand and especially imports. Sane countries ( G2) initiated, 
and other countries ( G1 and G3) pursued more intensely processes 
of deficit growth by opening up more and more to the world 
market. 
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For G3 countries such as Egypt, Tunisia and Morocco, 
processes of deficit growth based on indebtedness took place 
thanks to greater extroversion and the setting up of suitable 
institutional rules to attract foreign capital. For Algeria and 
Iraq military needs and industrial ambitions compelled them to 
heavily rely on imports. 
The other Arab exporting countries with weaker 
socio-demographic bases very rapidly enlarged their absorption 
capacity. An extraordinary increase in the demand for goods and 
services of all kinds (consumer, ~uiIJDent, services) partially 
took the place of external financial placements. These countries 
slowly found themselves consuming excessive quantities of 
imported goods and products. Their economic bases are 
disconnected and vulnerable, and they rely exclusively on oil as 
a resource of external finance. They, too, experienced deficit 
growth, albeit with latent and deferred indebtdness (4). 
As we have already seen, the characteristic common to all 
the un~ ual growth processes in G1, G2, and G3 countries is the 
marginalisation of agriculture and the emergence of an 
agricultural deficit ( 5) • 
For the period 1975-81 the growth rate for agricultural 
production was 2. 6 per cent with the corresponding demand 
growing at the rate of 5 per cent (the demographic growth rate 
is 3 per cent). Even if agricultural import quantities (6) 
decreased, their value at current prices has nevertheless 
increased tenfold ( 1. 7 billion US dollars - 16. 9 billion US 
dollars). The agricultural deficit moved fran less than ha! f a 
billion dollars to 16 .25 billion. 
More than three-quarters of imports are manufactured goods 
and the deficits in this sector have gone from 4.5 to 18.1 
billion US dollars. Studies show that, in fact, less than a 
fifth of total imports are ~uiIJDent. The Arab world imports 
almost 100 per cent of its equipment. In 1980 it was seen that 
less than one-fourth of imports pertained directly to productive 
consumption (raw materials and industrial ~uipment). It is 
important to note, also, that for the G2 and G1 countries the 
major part of infrastructure work is essentially imported 
(construction has doubled its share of the GDP). 
Finally arms expe ndi tur e has a strong impact on the 
degradation of external commercial and financial positions. 
Tables 6 and 7 show the arms expenditures for countries such as 
Kuwait (G2) and Sanalia (G4). 
188 
Mahjoub - Foreign Debt in the Arab Countries 
Table 6: Military Expenses in Percentage GDP 
1972 77 79 81 
Saudi Arabia 18.1 13.5 15 
Kuwait 2.7 3.4 
Egypt 19. 9 32.8 13. 1 
Morocco 2.8 5.8 6.4 
Syria 10.9 14.9 
Tunisia 1.1 1 .5 2.7 
Somalia 6.2 6.8 
Source: P. Jaber ( 1982) in Richard (ed.) Poor States in the 
Mi.ddle East, ADP, cairo; World Bank 
Table 7: Military Expenses as Percentage of Total Expenses 
Algeria 14.1 % (1981) 12.7 % (1982) 
Defence+ interior 
Saudi Arabia Average 29 % ( 1981/84) 
Kuwait, Oman Average 29 % ( 1969/79) 38 % ( 1983/84) 
Egypt 11 • 8 % ( 1 97 9 )· 19.7 % (82/83) 
Morocco 1 2. 3 % ( 1 97 2) 16.2 % (1981) 
Syria 37 • 2 % ( 1 97 2) 37 . 7 % ( 1 9 81) 
Tunisia 4.9 % ( 1972) 8.3 % (1981) 
Sanalia 23 • 3 % ( 1 97 2) 25 % (1981) 
Source: Jaber, P. ( 1982) in Richard Poor States in the Middle 
East, American University Press, cairo. 
It should be noted that throughout the 1970s, the total debt 
of the Arab countries increased tenfold and debt service 14 
times. According to the Arab Fund for Economic and Social 
DeveloJ;111ent the total debt rose to 69 .2 billion US dollars in 
1980. The debt/GDP ratio rose substantially fran 18.5 per cent 
to 29 .5 per cent with debt servicing rising from 9 .4 per cent to 
11 .9 per cent. 
In 1970, four countries accounted for three-quarters of the 
debt - Egypt, Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia. In 1980, Algeria, 
Egypt and Morocco constituted 70 per cent of the Arab debt; 
three countries have seen their si tua ti on deteriorate 
significantly: Sudan, Ma.uri tania and Jordan. Algeria and Egypt 
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are at the top of the indebtedness list: their debt/GDP ratio is 
over 50 per cent (54.6 per cent for the former and 51 .4 per cent 
for the latter). 
The debt service/export ratio is quite high at 27 .2 per cent 
and 21 .8 per cent. 
Furthermore, according to the statistics of the OECD, in 
1970 and in 1980, four Arab countries were among the 20 most 
indebted countries: Algeria (ranking 5th), Egypt (11th), Saudi 
Arabia (12th) and Iraq (14th), as shown in Table 8 below. 
Table 8: External Debt of Selected Countries (millions of US$) 
1979 1980 
5 - Algeria 17 17 .3 
11 - Egypt 12.2 13.8 
12 - Saudi Arabia 2.7 2.9 
14 - Iraq 2.3 2.5 
TOTAL ARAB COUNTRIES 34.2 36 .2 
TOTAL OF 20 MOST INDEBTED 
COUNTRIES 266.2 301 .2 
Source: OECD 
All indications point to a strong trend toward growing debt 
during the 1970s, the gal.den period for oil revenues and 
inf itah. 
Furthermore it is necessary to point out that the portion of 
private credit (extended fran the financial markets and private 
international banks) rose significantly fran 25 .8 per cent on 
average, during the years 1 970-71-72 to 41 .2 per cent on average 
in the years 78-79-80 which, of course, had an effect on debt 
service. 
The amount of interest on debt has increased twenty-five 
times, going from 119.8 million US dollars to 2874.6 
million.Finally, according to World Bank statistics, Arab debt 
(including funds not yet disbursed) represented in 1970 
one-tenth of total Third World debt. During the 70s this portion 
rose to one-sixth. Among the countries that experienced a 
deterioration in their si tua ti on, particular attention should be 
paid to Sudan. Its debt has gone up thirteen-fold and the 
debt/GNP ratio has risen fran 14.6 per cent to 44 .6 per cent. 
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'Ihe debt service/export ratio rose from 10 .1 per cent to 16 .8 
per cent. In November 1979 ·the Sudan agreed to a rescheduling 
of its debt by one-tenth or 475 million US dollars, over a 
period of 7 to 10 years. 
An analysis of external debt identifies two different situations 
and trends. 
On the one hand, there is the case of the G4 countries such 
as Sudan and Ma.uri tan:l.a (and more recently the two Yemens, 
Soma! ia and Djibouti), whose resource base is weak and who 
cannot finance their growth. 'Ibey are extremely dependent on 
external assistance and on returns frcm one or more primary 
products subject to the whims of the international markets. 'Ibey 
have turned to borrQoling to be able to import goods needed to 
meet the basic needs of their population. 'Ihe amount of their 
debt is a snall portion of total Arab debt and moreover they are 
strongly dependent on bilateral and multilateral aid and on 
export credits financed or guaranteed by the public sector. 
On the other hand, there is the case of countries in G1 
(Algeria and Iraq) and G3 (Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia), whose 
indebtedness is rooted in the strategy of deficit growth and 
who experienced some industrial develolJllent. 
Till the end of the 1970s, the screen of financial surpluses 
accumulated by the oil exporters hid frcm view the perverse 
effects of deficit growth and in any case deferred the crucial 
deadlines. 
At the turn of the decade the awaken:l.ng was painful. 
Numerous changes in ·the global situation particularly affected 
financial equilibria, leading to the crisis: 
- the fall in the price of oil 
the emergence of significant deficits in the oil-
exporting Arab countries resulting in reduced growth. 
the implementation of a deflationary monetary and financial 
policy 
in the USA, restricing and increasing interest rates. The 
resulting world deflation caused a contraction of 
international trade and a lowering of Third World exports 
coupled with a deterioration of the terms of trade. 
The shock of the 1980s had serious repercussions on the Arab 
economies, for which oil revenue is the structural backbone. To 
be sure, other Third World countries were harder hit and 
external payment difficulties became macroscopic; requests for 
rescheduling multiplied; the IMF imposed conditions that often 
lead to social chaos. What is more, private banks, which had up 
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till then played a major role in Third World debt, shyed away 
and credit became more difficult to obtain. Many countries found 
themselves incapable servicing their debt. 
Arab total foreign debt reached 100 billion dollars in 1983, 
an increase of 10% over the year, and 25% between 1982 and 1984. 
The case of Iraq stands out with respect to the substantial 
growth in the volume of debt. Because of the war effort (one 
billion dollars a month), the si tua ti on became particularly 
critical, requesting negotiations to reschedule the debt. 
Furthermore, Saudi Arabia and other oil exporters, which till 
then still enjoyed surpluses, started experiencing deficits and 
indebtedness; while of little importance, this new experience 
has nevertheless led to a freeze on numerous projects and to a 
squeeze of public spending, resulting in reptriation of 
immigrant workers. '!he fall in the price of oil has lowered the 
revenues of these countries by 50 per cent between 1981 and 
1983, and they have been forced to turn to the Eurodollar 
market. The latent and deferred character of indebtedness 
contributing to growth deficit has becane real and immediate. 
Countries like 1-t:>rocco and Sudan, and to a somewhat lesser 
extent Egypt and Tunisia, have experienced a marked 
deterioration. It is in these countries that social tensions 
caused by austerity are the most acute. While Morocco and Sudan 
have already negotiated a rescheduling of their debt, the 
situation remains precarious and tense in Tunisia and Egypt. 
Countries like Syria and Jordan have experienced the 
repercussions of the dwindling of financial surpluses. Auster! ty 
is the order of the day, but grants which they received fran 
Arab sources have somewhat reduced their financial 
vulnerability. Deprived countries like Somalia, Mauritania, the 
Yemens and Djibouti, have a large rate· of indebtedness, 
particularly when taking into consideration their lack of 
resources. The structure of their debt (public credits, more 
liberal conditions) is a partial defence against the possibility 
of a ca ta strophic involution. 
It is not being overly pessimistic to under! ine the 
precariousness and fragility of the prevailing Arab financial 
si tua ti on moving into the 1980s. The greater integration in the 
international economic system of the Arab countries brought 
their vulnerability. to the surface. To be sure, the Arab 
external payment crisis is not as severe as in sane Latin 
American countries, yet further complications could cause it to 
precipitate. 
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Tunisia 3 .1 
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Lebanon 0 .24 
Sanalia 0. 87 
Mauritania 0.82 
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In this chapter we attempted to analyse the different processes 
leading to gr<Ming external public debt (and eventually to a 
series of crises, differentiated and unequal in nature, and 
implying different modes of economic readjustment). While 
sticking to the typology that we proposed at the outset, we 
intend to briefly examine how the specific characteristics of 
each state and political regime have, to a certain extent, 
determined the course of the debt process, the crisis, and 
r eadj us tm ent po s si bil iti es. 
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For the purpose of simplification we have taken one or two 
countries per group. 
G1 - Algeria 
G2 - Saudi Arabia 
G3 - Egypt 
G4 - Sudan, Mauritania 
At the basis of the correlation between the nature of the 
state and the indebtment process is the acknowledgement that 
throughtout the Arab world, the state has acquired a central 
role and primary importance. 'Ihe state is the backbone of the 
organisation of society and the economy. The state dominates 
politics and subordinates economic goals to the predominant 
concern of enlarging and concentrating power. 
The state establishes and reproduces within itself a ruling 
class which directs the state apparatus and forges alliances 
with other dominant social forces at a local and international 
level. 
This centrality of the state has come to even greater 
prominence in these last decades as it enlarged its control of 
the econany and its reproduction. The substantial growth of oil 
surpluses has in effect given the state an even more decisive 
rol. e to pl ccy-. 
Because of its centrality, the state has been at the heart 
of the debt economy and its crisis, at the heart of perverse 
defici tary growth and indebtedness. 
For the G1 group, Algeria exemplifies a country endowed with 
a medium sized demographic base and relatively high energy 
surpluses, which experiences a bureacratic political regime 
stemming from military origins, a populst ideology, an 
industrial pol.icy which marginalises the peasantry and embraces 
the dominant model of technological consumerism. It is fran 
these factor that the debt process takes its structural form. 
The crisis of the 1980s arises frcm the failure of the eta tiste 
develoi:ment model. Economic and social readjustments (balancing 
the budget, import limitation, economic de central isa ti on, 
support of the private sector) are initiated and controlled by 
an omnipresent state where the army occupies a central position. 
In the G2 group, Saudi Arabia is the example of a country 
with a rather weak demographic base, a significant oil surplus 
and a political regime which can be described as oligarchic 
(with tribal and religious support). The ruling class has strong 
ties to the West, entertains hegemonic ambitions over the region 
(hence her military effort), and seeks to integrate in the 
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international division of labour by investing in huge export 
orientated industrial complexes in downstream petroleum. The 
neopa trimonialist character of the state stemming from the oil 
rent, has led to the adoption of an ostentatious and imitative 
consumption model, spread by means of rent distribution. 
Here the process of deficit gra1th and deferred indebtedness 
is fuelled by an active policy of military expenditure, 
investment in infrastructure and in export-oriented large-scale 
industrial develollllent, and by a perverse consumption model 
deriving fran the 'rentier' character of the economy. Debt is at 
present mostly short-term; the crisis postulates readjustments 
including redefinition of the model of distribution which is 
also the essential base of legi tima ti on. 
In the G3, group, Egypt is a country with a strong 
demographic base and modest rent revenue. 'lhe political regime 
is bureaucratic in nature with military origins. The ruling 
class is formed within the state civilion and military 
apparatus. An initial phase saw the emergence and develollllent of 
an €!tatist industrial project based on a populist ideology, 
which in practice did not alla1 for the participation of the 
popular classes. 'lhe pan-nationalist project conceived by 
Nasser, and its imp! ica tions in terms of military procurement, 
canbined with modernisation based on imitation of the dominant 
technologial consumption model, led to deficit gra1th and 
indebtedness. 
The second phase, infitah, characterised by the importance 
Of rent revenues, further contributed to the import-dependent 
nature of the economy. 'lhe pursuit of military spending, the 
need to heavily subsidise basic necessities, the upkeep of a 
plethoric bureaucracy all worked together to make borra1ing 
unavoidable. The crisis questions the ruling class itself, as it 
is caught between the requirements of the IMF and popular 
revolts. In this case, the margin for manower is very narrai 
and the outlook for readjustment uncertain. 
Finally, in the G4 group, Sudan and Mauritania, despite 
their different demographic make-up, both have the canmon 
characteristic of having only very small surpluses. In both 
cases, the state is characterised by instability (national 
fragmentation, subnational particularisms). The ruling classes, 
military-type bureaucracies basing their pa1er on a snall 
surplus which has till na1 not been channeled into develollllent. 
One must speak of proto-sta te with extremely limited legitimacy, 
where survival depends on external support. Vulnerability is 
great and readjustments cause social change. 
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Thus, taking into consideration the class nature . of the 
state, its ideology, its economic policy (or absence thereof), 
its integration into the international system, the nature and 
level of surplus on which it is based, we arrive at different 
conditions determining the process of indebt.ment and adj ust.ment. 
NOTF.S 
1. In 1970, three-quarters of Arab public debt involved one 
country of the G1 Group - Algeria; and 3 countries in G4-Egypt, 
Morocco, Tunisia which were the first countries to be affected 
by the process of deficit growth and indebtedness. 
2. Total Annual Public Debt in 
budget deficit billions of $US 
1973 14.9 468.4 
1974 6 .1 485 .2 
1975 57.2 544 .1 
1976 73.7 631 • 9 
1977 53.6 749 .1 
1978 59.2 780.4 
1979 40. 2 833 .8 
1980 73.8 914.3 
1 981 78.9 1 003 .9 
1982 127 .9 1147 
1983 224.8 1383 .8 
Source: Economic Re12ort of the President, Washington - 1 983 
3. It is interesting to note that the US annual budget 
deficit in 1983 was almost twice that of the total debt of all 
Arab countries and that the American public debt in 1983 was 1.6 
times that of the sum of Third World debt. 
4. '!hat is to say, not creating local productive capacities 
to offset demands sustained by consumption patterns and capital 
accumulation. 
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Chapter 8 
THE RENTIER STATE IN THE ARAB WORLD 
Hazem Beblawi 
IN TH ODO CT ION 
The concept of a rentier state has gained renewed interest with 
the advent of the oil era and the emergence of the new Arab oil 
producing states. 
In a celebrated passage, Adam Smith distinguished between 
rent and other sources of incane: wages and profit. 'Rent' says 
Smith, 1 enters into the composition of the price of commodities 
in a different way from wages and profit. High or low wages and 
profit are the causes of high or low price; high or low rent is 
the effect of it' (Smith 1960: 412). A rent, it is to be 
remembered, is not merely an income for landlords, but generally 
a reward for ownership of all natural resources. 'Mines, as well 
as land' affirms Ricardo, 1 generally pay rent to their owners 
and this rent, as well as the rent of the land, is the effect 
and never the cause of the high value of their produce' (Ricardo 
1962: 590). The same applies to all natural and differential 
endowments: location, climate, etc. In its general usage, the 
term 'rent' is reserved for 1 the incane derived fr an the gift of 
nature' (Marshall 1920). Rent in this broad sense exists in all 
economies, albeit in different degrees. 
It is not the purpose of this paper to discuss the economic 
concept of rent and its various forms: rent/quasi rent, 
scarcity/differential rent, etc. In modern economic analysis an 
efficient management of resources would call upon rent as much 
as on other factor prices. No value judgement is implied, rent 
is an economic price or factor incane like any other price. 
It remains true, however, that social scientists - including 
economists - suspect a difference between 'earned' incane and 
effortless 'accrued' rent. Religious ethics, and then the 
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ca pi tali st instinct for work salvation helped create a long 
tradition of hostility against non-earned income ( 1). This was 
reflected in a deep-rooted mistrust of the economic profession 
against rent and rentiers. Classical economists - Mal thus apart 
- and later Marx have few kind words to say about rent and 
rentiers. Rentiers as a social group were thus assaulted by both 
liberal and radical economists as unproductive, almost 
anti-social, sharing effortlessly in the produce without, so to 
speak, contributing to it. 
A rentier is thus more of a social function than an economic 
category, and is perceived as a member of a special group who, 
though he does not participate actively in the economic 
production, receives nevertheless a share in the produce and at 
times a handsome share. The distinguishing feature of the 
rentier thus resides in the lack or absence of a productive 
outlook in his social behaviour. 
It is important to emphasise here that it is the social 
function of the rentier rather than his legal status of private 
ownership, that is usually evoked with under tones of discontent. 
'lhe contrast between the rentier and Schumpeter' s entrepreneur 
is striking as well as instructive. Dynamic, innovative, 
risk-bearing, Schumpeter' s entrepreneur is the anti the sis of the 
rentier. 
Such stereotype rentier is, of course, a caricature. In 
fact, 'pure rent in the strict sense of the term is scarcely 
ever met with; nearly all income... contains more or less 
important elements, which are derived from effort invested 
1 (Marshall 1920: 350). 
The emergence of the new oil states in the 1970s and their 
promotion to the forefront of world trade and finance 
resuscitated the concept of rentier economies. A windfall weal th 
of unprecedented magnitude in such short time revived the idea 
of unearned income, hence the epithet of rentier economies. The 
impact of the oil phenomenon on the role of the state and on 
economic behaviour in general has been so profound in the Arab 
world during the seventies as to justify special treatment. 'lhe 
concept of a rentier state is chosen for lack of better concepts 
to identify the prominence of the oil economies on the Arab 
region. 
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A RENTIER STATE: ELEMENTS FOR DEFINITION 
The purpose of an attempt to define a rentier state is not to 
reach an abstract notion of such a state but to help elucidate 
the impact of recent economic developnents, in particular the 
oil phenanenon, onthe nature of the state in the Arab region. 
Few characteristics should be kept in mind for a definition 
of a rentier state in our context. 
First, there is no such thing as a pure rentier econany. 
Each and every economy has sane elements of rent. A rentier 
econany should be defined as one, where rent situations 
predominate. this, of course, is a matter for judgement. 
Second, and this is very important, a rentier economy is an 
economy which relies on substantial external rent (Mahdavy 197 O: 
428). The externali ty of the rent origin is crucial to the 
concept of a rentier economy. The existence of an internal rent, 
even substantial, is not sufficient to characterise a rentier 
economy , though it could indicate the existence of a strong 
rentier class or group. A pure internal rent cannot be sustained 
without the existence of a vigorous domestic productive sector. 
In such a case, a rentier class is only one face of the coin, 
the other face would be a productive class. Internal rent is no 
more than a situation of danestic payment transfer in a 
productive economy. An external rent, on the other hand, can, if 
substantial, sustain the economy without a strong productive 
domestic sector, hence the epithet of a rentier economy. 
Third, in a rentier state - as a special case of a rentier 
economy - only fSil are engaged in the genera ti on of this rent 
(weal th); the majority being only involved in the distribution 
or utilisation of it. The distinction between genera ting weal th 
and its utilisation is not always clear. It can, however, be 
accepted that the creation of weal th is the cause of all other 
activities and the utilisation is only the effect. It is true 
that interactions always exist between various activites, 
blurring the cause-effect rel.a ti on. In the case of the oil 
producing countries, the role of oil revenues is so 
overwhelmingly obvious that it can be approximated to be the 
cause of other activities. 
A rentier economy is thus an economy where the creation of 
weal th is centred around a ::mall fraction of the society, the 
rest of the society is only engaged in the distribution and 
utilisation of this weal th. The respective roles of the few and 
the maey can hardly be overstated for the concept of a rentier 
economy. Accordingly, an open economy with high foreign trade is 
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not a rentier state, simply because it relies on the outside 
world, even if it generates its income fran natural endowment 
(e.g. tourism) in as far as the majority of the society is 
engaged in the process of weal th generation. 
Fourth, a corollary of the role of the few, in a rentier 
state the gov errment is the principal recipient of the external 
rent in the economy. This is a fact of paramount importance, 
cutting across the whole of the social fabric of the economy 
affecting the role of the state in the society. The role of the 
governnent as the principal recipient of the external rent is 
closely related to the fact that only few control the external 
rent. In fact, the 'economic power' thus bestowed upon the few 
would allow them to seize 1 political power' as well, or else 
induce the political elite to take over the external rent from 
them without major political disruption. A predominantly rentier 
state will accordingly play a central role in distributing this 
weal th to the population. This brings us close to a distinction 
proposed by Giacomo Luciani, that is, between productive and 
allocative states. (7) 
Having characterised the main features of a rentier state, 
it is important to emphasise that the choice of such a concept 
is based on the assllDption that such an economy creates a 
specific mentality; a rentier mentality. The basic assllDption 
about the rentier mentality and which distinguishes it from 
conventional economic behaviour is that it embodies a break in 
the work - reward causation. Reward - in cane or weal th - is not 
related to work and risk bearing, rather to chance or situation. 
For a rentier, reward becomes a windfall gain, an isolated fact, 
situational or accidental as against the conventional outlook 
where reward is integrated in a process as the end result of a 
long, systematic, and organised production circuit. The 
contradiction between production and rentier ethics is, thus, 
glaring. 
It is also assumed that the pre-eminence of the oil 
countries has not only brought to the fore a contradiction 
between production and rentier ethics, but more seriously, has 
meant the prevalence of the rentier economy. A decade of the oil 
era shows that the whole of the Arab world, oil rich as well as 
oil poor, is becoming a sort of oil econoxey with various 
undertones of rentier mentalities. This develoµnent has affected 
the role of the state in the whole Arab world. 
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THE on.. STATES: MULTil.AYERS OF RENTIERS 
The Arab oil states represent, it has been said, the example~ 
excellence of rentier states. With oil exports' revenues, the 
Arab oil states depend on external rent. Oil revenues represent 
more than 90 per cent of budget revenues, 95 per cent or more of 
exports. Also, only a SDall fraction of the population is 
involved in the generation of oil revenues, the rest being 
engaged in the use of the oil weal th. No more than 2 to 3 per 
cent of the labour force is engaged in the production and 
distribution of the oil weal th, which add 60 to 80 per cent to 
the GDP, as conventionally measured. Nevertheless, this fact 
does not preclude genuine productive activities outside the oil 
sector. Finally, oil revenues {rent) accrue directly to the 
state or the goverment. The Arab oil states thus correspond to 
our definition of rentier states. The role and the nature of the 
state has been greatly affected by this fact. 
'lhe state or the goverment, being the principal rentier in 
the economy, plays the crucial ral e of the prime mover of the 
economic activity. Rent that is held in the hands of the 
goverment has to be redistributed among the population. Special 
social and economic interests are organised in such a manner as 
to capture a good slice of goverment rent. Citizenry becomes a 
source of economic benefit. Different layers of beneficiaries of 
goverment rent are thus created, giving rise, in their turn, to 
new layers of beneficiaries. 'lhe whole economy is arranged as a 
hierarchy of layers of rentiers with the state or the goverment 
at the top of the pyramid, acting as the ultimate support of all 
other rentiers in the economy. It is important to add here that 
the rentier nature of the new state is magnified by the tribal 
origins of these states. A long tribal tradition of buying 
l oy al ty and all egi a nee is nCM co nf inned by an ~tat pr av ide nee, 
distributing favours and benefits to its population. 
The conventional ral e of the state as pr av ider of public 
goods through coercion - mainly taxation - is nc:M blurred in the 
Arab oil states by its role as a provider of private favours 
through the ruler's benevolence. Public goods and private 
favours have thus gone together in defining the role of the 
state. 
With virtually no taxes, citizens are far less demanding in 
tenns of political participation. 'lhe history of democracy owes 
its beginnings, it is well known, to some fiscal associations 
{no taxation without representation). 'lhe goverment' s budget in 
the oil states remains a one-sided document, an expenditure 
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programme, a promise to spend money and distribute benefits to 
the population with virtually no levy on than in terms of taxes 
or similar impositions. 
Kuwait was probably the one to introduce into the Gulf area 
the concept of distributing part of the oil weal th to the 
population which eventually evolved into that of the welfare 
state. 'lhe shrewd Sheikh Abdullah al-Salim of Kuwait made the 
fundamental decision that he (the state) should share part of 
the oil rent with the population. 'lhe role of the goverrment was 
thus defined as being primarily a partial distributor of oil 
wealth among the population. In his quest to create vested 
interests among notable Kuwaiti families round the new states in 
the early 1950s, Sheikh Abdullah al-Salim introduced the systan 
of goverrment land purchase, at prices hardly related to market 
value. No more than a decade or two later, the same system was 
adopted by other Gulf states: Qatar and UAE. In Saudi Arabia, 
the practice of land gifts was already in force since the 1920s 
and 1930s. With the annexation of Hij az in the pre-oil era, the 
pilgrimage royal ties (another source of rent) gave Ibn Saud the 
means to distribute favours (land). The goverrment continued to 
grant land to relatives, ministers and anyone else it wished to 
favour. The recipients sometimes sold their land to private 
developers, but the biggest and most generous buyer was always 
the goverrment itself (Field 1984: 99). The early relationship 
between oil revenues and iand speculation - the proper danain 
for rent and rentier - can be seen here. Later devel opnents, as 
we shall see, made land as well as shares a prosperous source of 
rentier speculation. 
Of course, goverments in the oil states outgrew their role 
as distributors of favours and benefits and anbarked on the 
modern function of providing public goods and services to their 
population. Goverrments are providing their populations with a 
wide range of genuine public goods and services: defense, 
national security, education, heal th, social security, 
employment, an impressive network of infrastructure, etc. The 
level and quality of these public goods and services are usually 
adequate, sometimes excellent. They are also provided free or at 
very low cost to the beneficiary. However, the original sin 
remains, sometimes open but mostly latent, thus vitiating the 
provision of these public goods. It is reported that 'if a 
prince heads a ministry or some other goverrment department, it 
is accepted that he is entitled to draw on the budget of that 
department or take a share of its spending in major proj eats 
1 (Field 1984: 101-2). To a certain degree, all goverrment 
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contracts are seen as royal favours. 'Iheir origin as part of the 
ruler's benevolence does not fail, thus, to exhibit their 
peculiar! ties. 
The distinction between public service and private interest 
is very often blurred. There seems to be no clear conflict of 
interests between holding public office and running private 
business at the same ti.me, and it is not infrequent to use the 
one to foster the other. Sometimes high-ranking public officers 
(ministers) take the trouble to form their private businesses 
under the names of their sons, brothers or similar prete-noms. 
In fact, huge developnent projects, joint ventures, agents, 
tenders and awards of hundred millions - sometimes billions - of 
dollars contracts have provided opportunites for those in public 
office to use their positions for private gain (Beblawi 1982: 
216). The practice varies fr cm one oil state to another; it is 
most conspicuous in Saudi Arabia and least apparent in Kuwait. 
In Saudi Arabia, contracts are given as expression of royal 
gratitude. Contract brokers, commission fees for the ruling 
elite, lobbying the royal family, etc. are not unusual practices 
in the Gulf areas. Some names earned notorious reputations in 
this respect; Adnan Khashoggi, Mahdi Tajir, Princes Muhammad Bin 
Ab del-Aziz, Muhammad Fahd, Sul tan Bin Ab del-Aziz are only the 
most visible (Field 1984). 
The goverrment not only distributes benefi.ts and favours to 
its population, but it is also the major and ultimate employer 
in the economy. Every citizen - if not self-employed in business 
and/or not working for a private venture - has a legitimate 
aspiration to be a goverrment employee; in most cases this 
aspiration is fulfilled. Though utterly free enterprise 
oriented, the nunber of goverrment employees in the oil states 
is only matched by socialist oriented states. Civil servant 
productivity is, understandably, not very high and they usually 
see their principal duty as being available in their offices 
during working hours (Al Dawam). 
If goverrments are the principal rentiers in the Arab oil 
states, they are by no means the only ones. Trade and business 
professions in maey cases consist in no more than taking 
advantage of special situations entrusted to them by law or 
fact. Merchants are favoured by existing laws. It is the law in 
oil states that foreign companies may sell their products only 
through local agents. Most states insist that foreign companies 
should also take local merchant partners if they want to operate 
on their soil. In aey case, foreign companies find it difficult 
to deal with local bureaucracy without local partners or 
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sponsors (Field 1984). The big trading houses, the family 
conglomerates that are involved in all business matters owe 
their weal th, in one way or another, to sane rent situation. 
Being a sales agent is the classical road to business and hence 
to wealth. Big family names in the oil states are intimately 
related with one or more brand names; e.g. in the car 
distribution business we have Alghanim with GM in Kuwait; 
Juffali with Mercedes in the truck business in Saudi Arabia, and 
Bisher and Al-Kazmy with the same company in Kuwait; Futtaim 
with Toyota in Dubai and Al-Sayer with it in Kuwait; Galadari 
with Mazda in Dubai... 'Ihe list is long indeed (Arabian 
Trading, Financial Times, 23 January 1985). 
Not only should distribution agents be exclusively nationals 
but also the practice of most professions and trades be 
restricted to nationals. This legal restriction has been 
established to counter the well-known shortage of professional 
and skilled labour. The result is the appearance of a peculiar 
function, that of the sponsor, al-kafil. This is someone, a 
national of course, who offers his name to expatriates to 
exercise various trades and professions under his name, in 
return for a share of proceeds (rent). 'Ihe kafil mentality, 
where citizenship is becoming a sort of financial asset and 
hence a source of income, transcends na tional/expa tria te 
relations, to become, even among nationals, a normal feature of 
every day life. For example, in Kuwait, during the euphoria of 
the stock market, it was the habit of the goverrment to allocate 
a certain number of shares for each Kuwaiti citizen in new 
public shareholding companies. A very active trade in 
'citizenship' (ganaci) took place, where those not interested 
in buying their shares would sell their rights - as attested by 
the citizenship certiffcates - to others. Citizenship is not 
only an affective relation between man and his hcmeland, it is 
also, or primarily, a pecuniary relation. 
Oil rent thus gave rise, in turn, to a secondary wave of 
rent generations: second order rents. Two areas seem to 
distinguish themselves as rent centres: real estate and stock 
market speculation. 
Land, it was said, has played a major role in the process of 
trickling down oil money from gov er nme nt s to private 
individuals. The readiness of goverrments to purchase land at 
higher prices sustained ever-growing prices for real estate. A 
very profitable business was created round land speculation with 
sane very active brokers. Goverrment was always prepared to act 
as the ultimate buyer. 
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'!he ingenuity of sane land brokers soon introduced a very 
powerful instrument to keep real estate prices high even in face 
of credit &l ueezes, 1 :iq uidi ty shortages and/or goverrment' s 
manentary reluctance to inject money into land purchase. This 
was the so-called forward market or post-dated cheque system. 
Kuwaiti brokers masterminded these new techniques and extended 
them imaginatively - and dangerously - to stock market 
transactions. Growing prices for real estate and stocks cannot 
be sustained indefinitely unless they are matched by a growing 
injection of l:iq uidi ty to back up demand for these assets. 
Sooner or later there canes a time when 1 :iq uidi ty is not 
forthcoming and the market comes to a halt if not a collapse. 
This is where the role of the forward transaction which provides 
the market with a new instrument for credit creation at the 
disposal of the speculators, bypassing the banking system canes 
in. Each speculator becomes something of his own bank, capable 
of adding to liquidity by issuing his own IOUs which are more or 
less accepted in the market (real estate, stock market). In 
final analysis, liquidity is created through bank intermediation 
in the exchange of obligations. With forward transactions and 
the issuing of post-dated cheques, speculators assume the role 
of informal banks and pay for their deals by increasing their 
own liabilities. 
A forward deal is a spot deal with credit, where the buyer 
gets the cOJIDllodity (shares, land, etc.) at the time of the 
transaction and pays forward with a post-dated cheque with a 
premium (an interest rate or rather a usury rate) which can vary 
between 50-200 per cent per annum. At maturity, he can either 
roll over the cheque with another more attractive premium (an 
offer which the other party usually cannot refuse), or if his 
creditor refuses the offer, he can just borrow from the market 
by buying another commodity (shares) on a forward basis (another 
post-dated cheque to a third party) and selling it on the spot 
market to get the cash to pay his first creditor. The game can 
continue indefinitely in as far as dealers are prepared to 
accept each other's post-dated cheques. In fact, there was a 
general tacit agreement to continue the game, with everyone 
issuing and receiving post-dated cheques at the same time. 
Cheques were rolled over and every second nav cheques were added 
to the market thus giving the illusion of ever-growing fortunes. 
'Ihese were the rules of the mirage weal th creation or the big 
casino later known as Soukh el-Ma.nakh. A money machine - the 
dream of all speculators - was invented and nothing could stop 
the attractiveness of Soukh el-Ma.nakh. Young graduates left 
their jobs for the new gold mine, early retirements took place, 
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'area tive' canpanies invested heavily in the stock market, thus 
scoring huge profits and offsetting their losses in their normal 
lines of business. Even off-shore bankers and more sober 
institutions and professionals were tempted by the new 
phenanenon. New canpanies were created ever":{ day, giving rise to 
new share-offerings on the market and accordingly fresh 
opportunities for new weal th. Social life was al so transformed: 
politics was no more a subject for discussion, and even 
gossiping, a favourite passtime, was fading away. The new and 
almost only talk of the town was centred on share prices and the 
new shares coming onto the market. 
The end of this fancy world is well-known to all. The Soukh 
el-Ma.nakh dream turned into a nightmare. In July 1982 sane 
dealers, sensing the imminent difficulties of the market, began 
to cash their cheques ahead of time. A minor crisis was thus 
turned into a full-scale crash. The age-old adage that what goes 
up - artificially - must cane darn, was finally vindicated in 
Kuwait (Beblawi 1984: 173). 
The goverrment role in the developnent of this speculative 
activity can hardly be over-estimated. Not only did goverrments 
indirectly help speculations, but in maey instances were 
directly involved in supporting speculative markets. When the 
Kuwaiti stock market faced its first setback in 1976/77, the 
Kuwaiti goverrment was pranpted to bail it out: Even in 1982, 
when the Kuwaiti goverrment refused to repeat the role it played 
in 1976-77, it canpensates the so-called small investor -
defined as one aied no more than KD 2 million ($ 6. 75 million): 
a no small reward for speculators. In both cases, a number of 
key members of goverrment and par! iament were deeply involved in 
the stock speculations. 
The juxtaposition within Arab oil states of a rentier 
economy and a productive economy is paralleled by the 
coexistence of two social communities: nationals and 
expatriates. Expatriates are called upon to help fill the gap in 
available manpower in oil states. More often than not, these 
expatriates assume productive activities to satisfy the growing 
needs of the society. They earn their 1 iving by the work they 
do. The relationship work-reward is actually maintained in their 
case. Rent economy, on the other hand, is normally confined to 
nationals; the privileges it conveys hardly extend to 
expatriates. 
The contrast between the two communities is striking as well 
as revealing. Nationals live more in a rentier economy and 
associate to its financial manna all the political rights of 
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citizenship. On the other hand, although earning their living in 
a more productive manner, the impact of the rentier economy on 
expatriates is far fran negligible, giving rise to serious 
corruption of the productive system and work ethics. Even if 
they form the core of the productive manpower, expatriates 
nevertheless remain alien to the body politic. Though they serve 
the country, live - and also die - on its soil, they are not 
part of it. Expatriates are thus part of the labour force but 
not of the society. 'Ille material life of expatriates is usually 
comfortable and by no means comparable to the 1 iving conditions 
in their haneland. Their emotional life is, nonetheless, 
unstable, terribly wanting in security and lacking a sense of 
belonging. 
The political cleavage between the two communities widens, 
as the economic rent to citizens increases. Restrictions on 
expatriates' professional mobility as well as their political 
integration increses with the increase in the oil weal th. 'Ille 
contrast between the less abundant years of the 196 Os and the 
more afnuent 1970s is vecy significant. Regardless of vocal 
rhetoric of Arab nationalism, in the 1970s the political elite 
in the oil states, no matter whether right or left-wing, 
advocated a narrow local nationalism and restrictive benefits to 
expatriates. 
TIIE NON-On. STATES: SEMI-RENTIERS WITHOUT On. 
Tue Arab norroil states are by no means rentier states in the 
sense previously outlined. The predominance of the oil 
phenanenon on the whole region is, however, such that many 
non-oil Arab states are showing increasing signs not dissimilar 
to those witnessed in oil states. 
Let us first draw attention to the fact that because of oil 
weal th, the whole Arab area - oil rich as well as oil poor - has 
asstmed strategic value in the world chessboard. The area as a 
whole, particularly neighbouring countries, have gained location 
rent. 
Military and political aid to preserve and/or introduce 
super-powers' - as well as mini-powsers' - innuence in the 
area, is a major source of external rents to many states. 
Otherwise remote and poor states (e.g. Sanalia) would hardly 
receive alternately Russian and American aid. In the 1960s Egypt 
received the highest Soviet aid to a foreign country, to becane, 
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together with Israel, the highest ·American aid recipient in the 
1970s and 1980s. Syria, Jordan and South Yemen are other 
examples. 
Rhetoric aside, inter-Arab aid was related, to some extent, 
to its effect on the stability and tra~ uilli ty of oil rent in 
oil states. Very often Arab aid to fellow Arab states was used 
in much the same way as danestic redistribution of oil revenues: 
to buy allegiance or rather avoid trouble. Pan-Arabism and Arab 
money were, to a great extent, and in different hands, the stick 
and the carrot, used to bring about a very subtle equilibrium in 
sharing oil rent. By conferring and/or withholding 
super-legitimacy over individual states, the advocates of 
pan-Arabism used their political clout as a source of financial 
aid. By distributing and/or premising aid, the carrot in the 
hands of the oil states helped them buy peace and stability. 
Arab finance was thus more a counterpart than a complement to 
pan-Arabism. It is no wonder, then, that Arab financial now to 
Arab brothers coincided with the retreat of the pan-Arab system 
after the 1967 war, which 'marked the Waterloo of pan-Arabism' 
(Ajami 1978/79). In the wake of the October 1973 war, it was 
Sadat and Assad - 1 revisionists' or 'correctionists' of the 
pan-Arab doctrine - who obtained Arab finance. With the decline 
of Egypt's role in mobilising Arab public opinion, 
particularly after camp Dav id, the Baghdad Summit relieved the 
Arab oil states of their financial commitments to Egypt, 
shifting them to more assertive Iraq, Syria and the PLO. The 
subsequent Iraq-Iran war proved to be quite a drain on their 
treasury. The Baath party, which is in power in both Iraq and 
Syria, though two competing factions, is notorious for its 
unscrupulous and ruthless practices vis-a-vis its opponents. 
Sane oil states - Kuwait and UAE for example - had the privilege 
of actually experiencing firsthand such practices when a number 
of attacks and/or banbings took place on their territory. '!hey 
had, of course, the tact and discretion to turn a bl ind eye to 
these 'accidents'. But the message is clear. 
External location rent is al so evident in so-called transit 
countries (Mahdavy 1970). Suez Canal revenue, oil pipeline 
royal ties are major revenue sources to some countries, e.g. 
Egypt and Syria. 
Workers' remittances are becoming one of the major foreign 
exchange sources in sane non-oil states. Yemen is a well-knCMn 
example where remittances represent more than 85 per cent of 
GDP. Workers' remittances are becoming the biggest single source 
of foreign exchange in Egypt as well. In Syria, Lebanon, 
Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco, workers' remittances play a very 
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important role in their balance of payment adjustments. It is 
not easy to equate workers' remittances to external rent. Fran 
the worker's point of view, he is earning his inccme at the cost 
of effort and work. Fran the recipient country's point of view, 
remittances are, nevertheless, more akin to aid or non-requited 
money transfers. 
All tolled, various elements of external rent play an 
increasing role in non-oil Arab states. In Egypt, for example, 
it is estimated that about 45 per cent of its GDP is represented 
by exogenous - read rent - elements in the form of oil revenues, 
workers' remittances, foreign aid, Suez Canal revenue and 
tourist expenditure. It is also to be noticed that most of these 
revenues accrue directly to the state or the goverrment. The 
epithet of semi-rentier state is, thus, not far-fetched. 
The semi-rentier nature of non-oil states is not without its 
effects on the role of the state and on citizens' behaviour. 
Goverrment favours are now embodied in a welfare doctrine. 
Subsidies of all kinds pervert the economic system. A huge 
bureaucracy, sort of a new renti er cl ass, is get ting a 
substantial slice of the goverrment' s accrued rent. Though 
individually very low-paid, civil servants as a social group are 
a very expensive element in view of their contribution to the 
country's productivity (it is often thought that they contribute 
negatively to the growth of the economy). 
It is al so interesting to see how each source of external 
rent has bred its own chain of second order rentiers. In Egypt, 
for example, a prosperous trade has been developed around 
workers' movement to the Gulf. Also, money dealers have grown 
immensely to process workers' remittances. .American aid helped 
create a flourishing consultancy - legal, technical, economic, 
etc. - business to prepare proposals for aid consideration. A 
new social class: 1 awyers, consultants, financial analysts, 
lobbyists, brokers, etc. - is on the rise everywhere. 
Finally, when not direct recipient of the rent, the state, 
because of its external origin, quite often tactfully courts the 
rent earners. Suf'fice it to observe tax exemptions and other 
incentives given to workers remittances, foreign banks, tourism, 
etc. Goverrments do their utmost to sweeten their nonnal 
coercion practices. They are willing to appeal and not to 
impose. Economic liberal isa ti on, inf i tah or whatever, is 
everywhere. 
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CONCLUSION: AN OIL ARAB ECONOMY 
It seems fran the foregoing that the oil phenomenon has cut 
across the whole of the Arab world, oil rich and oil poor. Arab 
oil states have played have a major role in propagating a new 
pattern of behaviour, i.e. the rentier pattern. Oil as the 
primary source of rent in the Arab region has generated various 
secondary rent sources to other non-oil Arab states. To the 
first order rentier oil states, is, thus added a second order 
non-oil rentier strata. The impact of oil has been so 
pre-eminent that it is not unreal is tic to refer to the present 
era of Arab history as the oil era, where the oil disease has 
contaminated all of the Arab world. Be it oil revenue, or 
workers' remittance, or strategic location, or el-kafil, or 
Soukh el-Manakh, they are all consequences of the oil 
phenanenon, and have been accompanied by a serious blow to the 
ethics of work. Income is no longer a reward of serious and hard 
work, it is very often related to special circumstances, chance, 
location, etc. In a word, we are living in a rentier universe 
which has affected both the state and the citizen. 
NOTES 
1. 'The religious valuation of restless, continuous, 
systematic work in a worldly calling, as the highest means to 
asceticism, and at the same time, the surest and most evident 
proof of rebirth and genuine faith, must have been the most 
powerful conceivable level for the expansion of that attitude 
toward 1 ife which we have here called the spirit of 
capitalism'.' Weber, M. (1958) The Protestant Ethic and the 
Spirit of Capitalism, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, p. 127 
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Chapter 9 
'm:E MACRO BEHAVIOUR OF Oil.-RENTIER STATES IN 'm:E ARAB REOION 
Mahmoud Abdel-Fadil 
BASIC FEA'IURES CHARACTERISING 'm:E ECONOMIES OF Oil.-RENTIER 
STATES 
There exist a number of socio-economic features that 
characterise the economies and societies of oil rentier states 
(Mahdavy 1970: 428-67). The most important feature is that the 
vast oil revenues received by the goverrments of these countries 
have very little to do with the productive effort of the 
community as a whole. Oil export prices are, in fact, totally 
divorced from costs of local production, as 1 the input 
require:nents of the oil industry from the local economies - at 
least for the inputs that have an opportunity cost - are so 
insignificant that for all practical purposes one can consider 
oil revenues almost as a free gift of nature (Mahdavy 197 0: 
429). 
Thus oil revenues are primarily in the nature of external 
collective rent. External in the sense that oil revenues depend 
on a variety of international factors and the collective 
bargaining power of oil exporting countries and accrue 
theoretically to the whole community. 
In such oil-rentier economies, the state becomes the main 
intermediary between the oil sector and the rest of the economy. 
It receives revenues which are chanelled to the economy through 
public expenditure, and since public expenditure generally 
represents a large proportion of na. tional in cane, the allocation 
of these public funds among alternative uses has great 
significance for the future developnent pattern of the economy. 
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'!he 1 oil boom' of the 1970s generated a 1 spending boom' 
unparalleled in the history of the oil-rentier states in the 
Arab region. '!he newly acquired financial resources induced 
policymakers to revise upward their growth targets and to embark 
on massive public expenditure programmes. '!he drama tic growth of 
public employment and the expansion of the area of provision of 
public goods and services (i.e. education, heal th, housing, 
communal services, etc ••• ) in many oil-rentier states in the 
1970s, constituted an important instrument of redistribution of 
oil revenues among various groups of the community. In the 
meantime, the absolute level and the relative share of current 
public expenditure on 'national defence' and internal security 
reached new heights. 
Infrastructure projects tended to absorb the largest share 
of the total public expenditure in construction activities. '!he 
reason for this is that such infrastructure fulfils immediate 
needs related to consumption activities in the oil-rentier 
states. 
The crucial role played by construction activities within 
the public investment programmes in Arab oil-dependent sttes may 
be deduced fran the colossal sums of money allocated to than, 
especially for big infrastructural projects. 
In fact, all goverrments in oil-rentier states were tempted 
to spend a sizeable portion of their revenues on lavish highways 
or housing schemes rather than in enlarging the goods 
producing capacity of the country. According to sane observers, 
'there are a number of reasons for this: public works yield high 
immediate political results and the results are visible to all 
to see' (Seers 1979: 237). 
Nonetheless, the important point to be stressed here is 
that, because of the high import intensity of these construction 
activities, extensive goverrment expenditure programmes (both 
current and capital) in oil-rentier states tended to generate 
negligible inter-sectoral linkages within the domestic economy. 
As a result, the linkages between the oil sector and the 
rest of the econany are very limited in oil rentier states, as 
its contri bu ti on to economic activity has been mainly through 
the availability of financial resources and goverrment spending. 
'!he 'multi plier effects' of public spending open up immense 
profitable possibilities of investment in housing, real estate, 
trade and distribution (the main fields of private capital 
formation) (Seers 1974). 
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A consequence of the rentier state - according to Ruth 
First, is that: 
The usual developnent process is reversed. Instead of 
the progression from agriculture to industry to 
services, oil provokes the growth of only the third 
sector (services), directly in the shape of all the 
ancillary services that the oil companies need: 
accommodation, pipelines and storage tanks, supplies to 
the desert and provision for the army of workers 
(foreign and Libyan). The tertiary sector, always 
disproportionate in underdeveloped societies, thus 
grows to elephantine proportions (First 1980: 120). 
In the case of Libya, 'Agriculture which, before oil, had 
supported the greatest majority of the population, suf'fers a 
serious reverse. Labour rushes towards the urban service sector, 
agricultural production declines, and a new cycle canmences: the 
use of oil revenues to purchase food' (First 1980). 
As the oil boom in such societies has generally taken place 
against the background of long centuries of relative stagnation 
and poverty, so strong tendencies to maximise present 
consumption have emerged in all oil rentier societies. The 
experience of continuous and sanetimes dramatic increases in oil 
revenues over a small number of years reinforced tendencies in 
favour of present consumption (ECWA 1979: 9). Over the years, 
the lifestyles of consumers in the oil-rentier states have 
becane heavily geared to imports of goods which cannot be 
produced locally. 
Those vested with political power in the oil-rentier states 
tend to forget that oil revenue will inevitably decline in due 
course, and aim simply at achieving temporary prosperity (Seers 
1978). Here lies a crucial paradox that best characterises an 
oil-based rentier society: 'security over the medium term 
affords a period of grace during which the canplex tasks of 
economic developnent may be carried out with enhanced means. But 
this very security, which could enable a country to take the 
long view, influences the time preferences in favour of the 
present and tends to shorten the time horizon of the planners 
and policy makers' (ECWA 1974: 9). 
Given the limited size and the narrow skill structure of the 
labour force in these economies, the local supply of skilled 
labour tends to be very limited. Consequently, basic services 
and activities need to be manned by imported expatriate labour -
a tendency which gives rise to the earnings of 'quasi-rent' ( 1) 
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by the technical and professional groups of imported labour, for 
the relationship between productive effort and financial rEWard 
becanes weak in the case of oil-rentier states. 
On the other hand, the temptation is great for native 
goverrment employees to turn into a class of 'pure rentiers' by 
collecting a handsome rent on their citizenship titles. 
Such active rent-seeking behaviour by most individuals in 
rentier societies affects people's perception of the working of 
the economic system. As Ann Krueger rightly pointed out, 'If 
income distribution is via.red as the outcome of a lottery, where 
wealthy individuals are successful (or lucky) rent-seekers. 
whereas the poor are those precluded fran or unsuccessful in 
rent-seeking, the market mechanism is bound to be suspect' 
(Krueger 1974: 302). The ultimate outcome of this process is 
that the rent-seeking mentality be canes a self-perpetuating one, 
and a dominant feature of the economic activity of these 
societies. 
THE MODE OF INTERACTION BE'IWEEN 'mE EXTERNAL Oil.. RENT AND THE 
INTERNALLY-GENERATED TYPES OF RENT WITHIN 'ffiE DOMESTIC ECONOMY 
Since oil revenues constitute the· primary source of rent in an 
oil-rentier state, the mechanism of 'internal recycling' of the 
oil rent within the national economy through the state budget 
(i.e. programmes of public spending) gives rise to a variety of 
secondary types of rent. Governnent expenditures which give rise 
to these secondary types of rentier incane are: ( i) project 
expenditures such as construction; (ii) transfer or welfare 
payments such as the land purchase programme in Kuwait (see 
figure 1). 
On the other hand, the state recycles part of the oil rent 
externally, through overseas portfolio investment. The mechanisn 
of 'external recycling' of the oil rent reinforces the rentier 
character of the oil-rentier states, as overseas portfolio 
investment adds new types of rentier income (i.e. dividends and 
interest) to the national disposable incane. 
As a result, a new pattern of a tripartite alliance between 
the state, the new business ~lites (i.e. merchants. contractors 
and financiers), and circles of international financial capita! 
emerges. Figure 2 depicts the dialectical relationship between 
these three agents as well as the feedback effects underlying 
the modus operandi of oil-rentier states in the Arab region. 
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Figure 1: Flow of Economic Resources in a Rentier State 




























Source: The Dynamics of Petroleum Dependency: Growth in an Oil-Rentier State, p. 26 
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Nonetheless, the degree of dependence on various types of 
external rentier income: (i) oil rent; (ii) locational rents; 
(iii) other mineral rents; (iv) workers' remittances; ( v) 
portfolio income; is not usually confined to the recorded volume 
of various types of external rents and unrequited transfers. For 
it is well known that all types of external rents and unrequited 
transfers exercise multiplicative effects upon the recipient 
economy. 
Professor Thanas Stauffer suggested a new kind of mu! tip! ier 
called the 1 rentier-incane mu! tiplier1 to capture the full 
extent of dynamic dependence of rentier states on external rents 
and unrequited transfers. 'Ihe rentier mu! ti plier is similar to 
the familiar Keynesian mu! tip! ier in that it specifies ha.t an 
initial injection of external rents causes a larger increase in 
effective demand and thus leads to an increase in national 
disposable in cane greater than the initial injection. 
In the case of oil rent, all but a snall part of total oil 
revenues accrue to the goverr.ment. 'Ihe goverment normally saves 
a certain portion of these oil revenues (i.e. reserves for 
future generations) and spends directly on imports such as arms, 
high technology packages and consultancy services. For the 
remainder, the goverrment pays wages and salaries to its 
employees, spends money on purchases of goods and services 
'which add to incane, even if the goods are imported, because of 
the domestic component of the retail markets', and on project 
expenditures such as construction. 
The recipients of these funds civil servants, local 
merchants and contractors - spend part of this money on imports, 
which then leaks out of the national economy, but the rest of 
the money is respent at bane and a second-round effect is 
generated, and so on. 
This shows the asymmetrical effects of 
process, as these effects are more localised in 
(i.e. construction, trade and finance) and 
socio-economic groups. 
the mu! tip! ier 
certain sectors 
among certain 
In the case of 1 non-oil' semi-rentier states such as Egypt, 
the Arab Republic of Yemen and Jordan, workers' remittances -
the most potent form of rentier income - are usually subject to 
an important mu! ti plier process. 
If we assume that E(t) denotes consumer expenditure in 
period (t), which depends on workers' remittances in period 
<t-1), and the average propensity to consume out of remittances 
is c, then we may formulate the 'workers' remittances 
mu! tiplier' as follows (Abdel Fadil 1985): 
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Figure 2. The Dialectical Relationship betwe~n the State, New Business 
Elites and International Capital in an Oil-Rentier State 
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where m is the marginal propensity to consume imported goods and 
services. 
Another formulation of such a multiplier is given by 
Professor Brian Van Arkadie in the following form (Van Arkadie 
1977): 
- t 
- c + m 
where t is the proportion of emigrants' remittances which 
substitutes for dcmestic earnings. 
In general, we may note that the higher the propensity to 
save out of remittances and to import out of consumer spending -
financed by remittances - the lower would be the value of the 
multi plier within the dc:mestic economy (Abdel Fadil 1985). 
'IHE TABLEAU ECONOMIQUE FOR RENTIER STATES: THE CASE OF KUWAIT 
AND NORTH YEMEN 
The purpose of this section is to examine the role of the oil 
rent category as a specific historical form of economic 
surplus - in affecting the dynamic macro-behaviour of a whole 
class of rentier states. 
This would provide an analytical basis for a new typology of 
various oil-based societies, based on differentiated rules of 
appropriation, allocation and the recycling of oil rent within 
the society. 
An attempt will be made here to apply a modified version of 
the Tableau Economigue of F. Quesnay, to serve as a useful tool 
of static macro-economic analysis. In fact, the French school of 
the 'Economistes' or 'Peysiocrats' of the third quarter of the 
18th century, was the first to view the 'feudal mode of 
production' as the creation of a 'surplus', primarily 
consumption goods, available for unproductive use to support 
goverrment activities and the cultural life of feudal seigneurs. 
Quesnay's tableau ~conomique, first printed in 1758, 
represents an early pioneering step towards the two overlapping 
and related kinds of investigative work that maey economists now 
carry on and call 'national incc:me analysis' and 'mathematical 
economies'. In his Tableau, Quesnay analysed the circulation of 
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the celebrated produit net among the different classes of 
society, the search for which was the central point in 
Phy siocra tic analysis. 
The tableau €lconomique is a representation of Quesnay's 
analysis of a socio-economic process as a pattern of 
interrelated flows: labour, inputs and resources in economic 
production, output and sales of products, incanes and outlays 
necessary for the continuing operation of the national economy. 
The tableau displays three simple general truths of national 
income analysis. The first is that the economy or the economic 
universe is a system of interdependent variable quantities which 
are interrelated to the extent that when aey of them change, all 
are, in time, bound to change together in more or less 
determinate relationships. The second point is that there is 
always, throughout a social economy a circular now of wealth 
(income and expenditure), i.e. expenditures by producers on 
production becane the incanes of consumers which, when spent by 
them, buy the products and become the producers' revenues and 
the sources of their new expenditures on new production, etc ••• 
The third point is that, within an economy, a set of conditions 
of a general equilibrium of all the related variable quantities 
and forces exists, such that when all variables come into play, 
all economic activities will have then attained their relative 
optimal economic situations or positions. 
Description of the tableau 
The tableau depicts the economy as an ever gra.iing circuit on 
I 
the basis of Quesnay' s conception of circular n a.is. Quesnay 
divided the economy into three social classes. These are: 
a) The productive class with which production expenditure is 
associated. Productive expenditure is employed in the 
primary sector in order to perpetuate weal th in the form of 
food, drink and raw materials for manufactured goods. 
b) The sterile class, whose sterile expenditure is on 
manufactured commodities and foreign products. 
c) The proprietor class, to which accrues a revenue fran the 
productive class, in return for the rental services provided 
by that class. 
Unlike Quesnay' s agrarian economy, the Kuwaiti economy 
consists of more than three social classes. This is mainly 
because of the existence of a large non-Kuwaiti labour force. 
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Instead of a productive class, a pro pri et or class and a sterile 
class, we have in our tableau, two major subdivisions consisting 
of Kuwaitis and non-Kuwaitis. 
Non-Kuwaitis are by definition wage earners only, since rent 
and dividends do no accrue to them because of restrictions on 
ownership of property and company shares. Non-wage income is 
restricted mainly to Kuwaiti industrial capitalists, traders and 
landowners. Civil servants are divided between Kuwaiti and 
non-Kuwaiti classes at roughly 40 per cent and 60 per cent, 
respectively (1976 data). There is no Kuwaiti agricultural 
labour. 
A further fundamental difference, with respect to Quesnay' s 
tableau, is the existence of factors of production other than 
land, namely capital and labour. 
Revenues generated by the oil sector can be regarded. as the 
base of the tableau, being the main contributing sector to 
formation of GDP and to goverrment revenue. Other sectors are 
also included in the tableau in order to capture the main 
socio-economic features of the Kuwait society. Such a modified 
version of the ta bl ea u ~conomiq ue a ppr oa che s the modern 
construction of Social Accounting Matrices (SAMs) (Barna 1973). 
222 
Table 1: SAM 1979 for Kuwait 
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Ma.in features revealed by SAM 79 for Kuwait 
The Rest of the World Account 







with the goverrment getting the largest share followed by 
other private. 
2) Workers' remittances (in cash) represented as an expend! ture 
by labour as a factor of production to the rest of the 
world, are at 147 million K. D. This gives an average 
propensity to remit of 1. 3 per cent out of total non-Kuwaiti 
wage income ( 1976) which is extremely low by acy standard. 
3) Oil export revenue (94 per cent) of total exports accounts 
for the impressive figure for export proceeds compared to 
the total import bill. 
Kuwaiti Classes Account 
1) Non-wage income is concentrated in the hands of Kuwaiti 
industrial capitalists and traders, and not those of the 
landlords who have an extremely meagre share of total non-wage 
income. 
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Distribution of non-wage Kuwaiti income accruing to 
industrial capitalists and traders was reported to be as 
follows: 
Return on capita! 72.3 %* 
Investment incane fran abroad 1.3 
Interclass transfers in the form of rent 1.8 
Rent payments by Kuwaiti civil servants 1.1 
Rent payments by Kuwaiti industrial labour 0 .1 
Rent payments by non-Kuwaiti professionals 3.7 
Rent payments by non-Kuwaiti agricultural 
labour o.o 
Rent payments by non-Kuwaiti industrial 
labour 1.0 
Rent payments by non-Kuwaiti other labour 0.3 
Rent payments by non-Kuwaiti civil servants 18.2 
100. 0% 
• Total may not add up due to rounding. 
2) State Payments to civil servants are split at 51 and 49 per 
cent between Kuwaitis and non-Kuwaitis, respectively. 
The sectoral distribution of Kuwaiti administrative and 
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Non-Kuwaiti Classes Account 
Total non-Kuwaiti wage bill is distributed as follows: 











Incane accruing to administrative and technical staff is 














It is clear from the above that the total wage bill is 
definitely concentrated in the hands of non-Kuwaitis at 82.4 per 
cent. Furthermore, non-wage incane represents 91 .2 per cent of 
total Kuwaiti wage and non-wage income. 
The State Account 
Oil revenue 93.2% 
Investment incane 5.3 
Other 1.5 
100. 0% 
The oil revenue figure consists of oil exports plus 
royal ties fran oil companies, sales revenue and taxes. The wage 
bill represents 35 per cent of total expenditure by the state. 
The capital Account 
About 88 per cent of total gross fixed capital formation is 
accounted for by the oil sector in 1979. 
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The Tableau Economig ue for the Yemen Arab Republic, 1973 and 
1982 
The Yemen Arab Republic (YAR) constitutes a typical example of a 
semi-rentier state heavily dependent on workers' remittances and 
aid flows emanating fran neighbouring Arab oil-rich states. 
Table 2: SAM 1 972/73 (millions of YRs) 
Table 3: SAM 1981 for Yemen (millions of YRs) 
An attempt is made here to construct a Social Accounting 
Matrix (SAM) for North Yemen for two points in time: the 
financial year 1972/73 and the calendar year 1981, in order to 
capture the increasing rentier nature of the Yemeni society (see 
tables 2 and 3). 
All figures are in money terms, and goods and services are 
valued at current market prices. The unit of currency is the 
rial ( = 100 fils). The rCMs represent total deliveries to the 
activities of the economy or total production, while the columns 
represent total receipts fr cm the activities of the economy or 
total purchases. 
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Table 2: SAM 1972/73 (millions cf YRs) 
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The semi-rentier nature of the Yemeni econoi:ey becanes 
obvious by 1982, as recorded workers' remittances amounted to 
1906 million YRs as compared to 252 million YRS in 1972/73. 
The property and entrepreneurial income fran the rest of the 
world as well as other current transfers from the rest of the 
world (i.e. aid flows and grants), reached about 3 .5 billion YRs 
in 1981 as compared to 50 million YRs only in 1972/73. All in 
all, current rentier income accruing to the Yemeni economy 
amounted to around 5 billion YRs in 1981 (or about 40 per cent 
of the gross domestic income). 
The impact of the increasing role of the various types of 
rentier incane on the Yemeni econoi:ey can be easily gleaned from 
the dramatic change in items of gross domestic expenditure, as 
shown in the following table: 
Table 4: Pattern of Gross Domestic Expenditure in 1973 and 1982 
(at current prices) (millions of YRs) 
Goverrment final consumption expenditure 
Private final consumption expenditure 
Gross final ca pi ta! formation 
Increase in stocks 
Exports of goods and services 

















Total expend. on the gross domestic product 2847 14637 5.14 
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The increasing dependence on various types of rentier incane 
in the formation of national disposable income may be deduced 
fran the folladng table: 
Table 5: National Disposable Income (millions of YRs) 
1973 1982 Ratio 
( 1) ( 2) ( 2/ 1) 
Compensation of employees ( danestic) 600 4465 7.4 
Com pe nsa ti on of employees fran the rest of 
the world* 252 1609 6.3 
Operating surplus (domestic) 1973 7542 3.8 
Property and entrepreneurial incane 
fran the rest of the var! d*' 75 506 6.7 
Indirect taxes 208 2265 10.8 
Other current tranSfers frcm the rest of 
the world* 391 412.1 10.5 
National disposable incane 3499' 20508 5.8 
• Rentier and semi-rentier types of income 
The two matrices also reveal the declining importance of the 
agricultural sector in generating the domestic operating surplus 
(i.e. economic surplus) as it, in 1981, accounted only for 44 
per cent, while that of trade increased its share to 27 per 
cent. The manufacturing and construction sectors slightly 
increased their share in total operating surplus to account for 
5 .9 per cent each. A major developnent, which took place over 
the period 197 2-81, was the dramatic increase in the role of the 
fnancial sector. This sector's share in danestic opera ting 
surplus (before deducting banking charges), jumped fran 2 per 
cent in 197 2/73 to 20 per cent in 1981. 
Al though national savings increased fran YRs 383 million in 
1972173 to YHs 2300 million in 1981 (i.e. a sixfold increase), 
their capacity to finance investments have greatly declined, and 
paradoxically enough, dependence on foreign finance gre,, 
dramatically. While the deficit on the current account of the 
balance of payments in 1 972/73 amounted only to 20 million YHs, 
(i.e. 5 per cent of investment expenditure), in 1981 net 
borrowing covered 53 per cent of the funds required to finance 
228 
Abdel Fadil - The Macro Behaviour of Oil-Rentier States 
investment. 'Ihe growing investment/saving gap reflects the fact 
that most of the increase in income is being absorbed by 
consumption, which reduces the saving capacity of the economy. 
Moreover, an increasing proportion of aggregate spending 
leaked out in the form of increased demand for imports, as can 
be witnessed fran the drastic volume of imports reached in 1981. 
In sum, the structure of danestic production has shirted towards 
services' sectors such as trade and finance. In the meantime, 
agriculture has been neglected, and lost the praninence it used 
to enjoy. In the past, it was the major source of opera ting 
surplus within the Yemeni economy. 
THE Oil.-RENTIER STATES AND PROBLEMS OF INTERTEMPORAL 
DISTRIBUTION OF WELFARE AND WEAL TH 
It is important to recognise that whether we set the time 
horizon next year or next century is going to make a 
considerable difference to attitudes towards the direction of 
structural change in an oil-rentier economy. But there is very 
rarely unanimity on the location of the time horizon within a 
given community. Hence, we must demarcate the socio-economic 
group (or groups) in which power is vested. Once the pattern of 
time preference of this dominant group (or groups) is located, 
maximisation of the welfare of this group (or groups) over a 
given period of time implies the imposition, paternalistically, 
of a certain time horizon of social choices on all who do not 
happen to share the same location of the time horizon (Van de 
Graaff 1967: 93-6). 
In most oil-rentier states, there seems to be a wide 
acceptance of the simple value judgement that the preferences of 
our contemporaries are to be given great weight, and those of 
unborn generations to be given a negligible weight in the 
formation of people's attitudes towards inter temporal choices. 
'!he presence of a strong pure time preference among members of 
the powerful business community in oil-rentier states may be 
conceived of in the following words, put by Sir Roy Harrod: 
We may be dead at the future date and not rate the 
welfare of our heirs as highly as our own. The desire 
to use the money now is reinforced by animal appetite. 
Greed may be thought to be as appropriate a name for 
this attitude as time preference, though less 
dignified' (Harrod 1956: 37). 
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It is generally agreed that the rate of investment in any 
society determines - to a large extent - what may be called the 
intertemporal distribution of welfare. Its optimum rate depends 
on the extent to which society thinks it desirable to sacrifice 
present welfare for the benefit of the never-ending succession 
of future generations. But the important thing about the optimum 
(or target) rate of investment is the very close connection it 
bears to the political (or collective) decisions we make 
regarding the time horizon of intertemporal social choices, and 
the size of the terminal capital equiJ;111ent. In short, the 
optimum (or target) rate of investment is essentially a 
'political' matter (Lerner 1944: 262). 
Thus, if contemporaries in an oil-rentier economy are 
exhausting their oil resources at a very high rate without 
leaving enough reproducible resources for the future 
generations, planners and pol icy makers in these countries may 
wish to interfere to override individual time preferences and 
enforce extra conservation of oil resources. Hence, future 
generations will at least have more 'oil in the ground' even if 
they would have preferred reproducible resources. 
That is the reason why several writers on the theory of 
planning have taken as their starting point the Pigovian 
assertion that individual preferences ought not to count where 
decisions affecting the future are concerned, since individual 
men lack a 'telescopic faculty' and tend to underestimate future 
satisfactions (Pigou 1932: 25). 
On the other hand, the current policies of oil production 
and public expenditure in oil-rentier states raise a major 
question relating to the inter-generational equity aspect of the 
distribution of the benefits of oil weal th, given the different 
mechanisms by which vast amounts of oil revenues become 
concentrated in a faN hands ( 2). 
Under the socio-political conditions prevailing in these 
states, the out cane of the current pali cies of oil production 
and r ecy cling of oil revenues amount to a ~ facto 
de-na tionalisa ti on of the oil weal th stored in the ground, which 
is supposed to belong to all members of the community concerned. 
ALTERNATIVE DYNAMIC TRANSITIONAL PA'IHS OF OIL-RENTIER STATES 
In their study of the Kuwait economy, M. Khouj a and A. Sadler 
set up a simple analytical model designed to illuminate sane 
future transitional growth problems in oil-rentier economies 
(Khouja and Sadler 1979). The analysis is based on the 
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assumption that all goverrment and private sector holdings of 
foreign assets are entirely deployed for the purpose of 
genera ting new forms of rentier incane to replace depletable oil 
revenues. The problem the model addressed itself may be stated 
as determining the 1 eve! at which earnings of foreign exchange 
can be utilised while at the same time permitting an 
accumulation of foreign assets in the face of depleting oil 
resources so that the income flow fran foreign earnings can be 
maintained at a level consistent with the optimum growth 
condition (Khouja and Sadler 1979: 157-8). 
Figure 3 illustrates the dynamics of transition frc:m one 
type of rentier econany (dependent on external rent) to another 
type of rentier economy (dependent on external oil rent earned 
on financial assets held abroad). The diagram ( 3) illustrates 
the build-up of incane on foreign assets over time in the face 
of constant or falling foreign revenues fran oil and their 
relationship with levels of foreign exchange requirements. 
The net foreign exchange requirements are determined by the 
difference between the sum of imports for consumption and 
investment purposes together with remittances minus non-oil 
exports. In the diagram KK' represents falling annual oil 
revenues over time, while the line FF' represents the growing 
annual net foreign exchange requirements referred to earlier. 
The third curve PP denotes the real income generated fran the 
national financial assets held abroad at each point in time. But 
the falling oil revenues over time would result in a diminishing 
addition to foreign assets fr an oil source, thus causing a 
flattening of PP to PP'. 
231 









Abdel Fadil - The Macro Behaviour of Oil-Rentier States 
'Ihe different paths of transition may be mapped out as 
follows. As long as the rate of reduction in KK' is 1 ess than 
the rate of increase in PP', the level of GNP will go on 
increasing over time but at a diminishing rate. On the other 
hand, if KK' falls at a faster rate than the rate of increase in 
PP', the prospects for future GNP growth depends on whether the 
two curves will intersect above or below the FF' line. For, as 
long as the intersection point is above the FF' line, foreign 
exchange earnings are in a position to supplant oil revenues and 
at the same time to allow a net surplus to augment foreign 
assets. If the point of intersection is be! ow the FF' line, the 
level of GNP will not be sustained in the long run without 
structural alterations in the danestic econoiey" to reduce the 
level of FF' (Khouja and Sadler 1979: 159). 
If we assume a nattening of the curve PP corresponding to 
income fran foreign investment as in PP', all three curves as 
drawn now intersect at one point (Z). This would indicate that 
the rentier income fran foreign financial assets is just 
sufficient to supplant declining oil revenues. At this point 
there is no further accumulation of foreign assets, but the 
country's foreign exhange requirements would always be 
satisfied. The intersection of PP' at Z also indicates that 
foreign investments have already reached the level where they 
are generating sufficient rentier income to take over fran oil 
as the main foreign exchange earner and to provide funds which 
regenerate themselves (Khouja and Sadler 1979: 160). 
While very useful in giving valuable insights into sane of 
the basic problems which face oil-rentier economies the 
Khouja-Sadler analysis outlined in the preceding paragraphs, 
remains couch.ed in terms of comparative statics. In fact, maey 
dynamic aspects of the transitional problems, especially those 
relating to uncertainty over oil prices, world inflation rates, 
foreign exchange rates, are brushed aside. For it is well known 
that oil revenues and earnings on financial assets held abroad 
are subject to serious risks ari$l.ng frcm the high rates of 
world inflation and foreign exchange fluctuations caused by the 
instability of the key international currencies. Under these 
conditions, it is hard to accept the Khouja-Sadler assumption of 
positive real yield on foreign assets (i.e. the rate of return 
exceeds the rate of inflation) at every future point in time. 
Moreover, there are many other dynamic factors which need to 
be taken into account in order to assess the viability and 
feasibility of the assumed transitional path as depicted in 
figure 3. A scenario based on a few simplified assumptions was 
devised by Dr. Hazem el-Beblawi (1978: p. 19), to show that, 
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1 other things being equal 1 , the potential claims of oil-rentier 
countries on the exports of goods and services of the host 
industrialised countries (especially U. s. A.) will be 
unexpectedly high, when they start the annual servicing of 
financial assets accumulated by the oil-rentier states. 
We may thus contend that the transitional pa th fran one form 
of rentier economy to another, under the conditions of declining 
income fran oil, is highly unstable and is surrounded by maey 
uncertainties which may well reduce the welfare of future 
generations. And, in the absence of well-defined policies on the 
directions of hane irwestment and the diversification of the 
domestic economy (at the individual country the regional level), 
it is impossible to draw any safe conclusion about the 
capability of an oil-rentier economy to steer a transitional 
course to a self-sustained growth path. 
Ideally, the national interest would be best served if the 
oil resources were depleted at a time when the highest possible 
level of develoµnent and diversification of the domestic economy 
has been attained, a possibility which is highly unlikely under 
the prevailing set of policies in Arab oil-rentier states. 
NOTES 
The author wishes to thank Ms Mayar Farrag and Ms Rasha 
Abdel-Hakim, both research assistants at the American University 
in cairo, for their valuable he! p in compiling data and 
constructing Social Accounting Matrices for Kuwait and 
North-Yemen. 
1. Quasi-rent may be defined as the return to a seller of a 
good or service over and above its opportunity cost when the 
good is temporarily in fixed supply. The concept was applied by 
Alfred Marshall to the determination of the price of ca pi ta! in 
the short run when the supply of capita! is fixed. The owners of 
ca pi ta! receive a payment which differs fr an the opportunity 
cost of using that resource by the amount of quasi-rent. In the 
long run, when the factor can be augmented or depleted, the 
equilibrium price will reflect the cost of alternative uses. 
Quasi-rent exists because prices in the short run are not in 
equilibrium. Marshall used this concept as an element in his 
explanation of the rate of profit. 
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2. In the case of Kuwait, this was apparent in the 
goverrment' s land acquisition programme. Purchase of land by the 
goverrment was considered the simplest and quickest method of 
distribution of national oil wealth among the Kuwaiti 
population. Thus, a total of more than KD one billion 
(equivalent of US $3.4 billion) was disbursed through the land 
acquisition programme during the years 1952-1975. The 
goverrment, in fact, distributed by this means about one-quarter 
of its total oil revenues during the period from 1946 to 1 971. 
The funds allocated to this programme in these years exceeded 
the country's investments in foreign assets and were almost 
equivalent to all goverrment develoµnent expend! ture during the 
same period. The goverrment was paying for the purchased land 
s1.m1s of money far in excess of what it was worth. 
The programme implemented in the sixties has been sharply 
criticised for being an indiscriminate and inequitable way of 
distributing oil revenues and for failing effectively to 
invigorate the Kuwait economy because the private sector 
invested abroad a large part of' the funds received under the 
programme. The programme has, however, been revived since 197 4 
on a seemingly more rational and systematic basis with 
allocation representing about 10 per cent of total goverm.ent 
expend! ture. ·See. Khouja and Sadler, ( 1979) The Economy of 
Kuwait, Macmillan, London, 1979, pp. 44-5. 
3. The figure is a slightly modified version of the diagram 
which appears in Khouja and Sadler' s bok on page 158. 
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